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Introduction 
 
Introducing vision, perception and action 
The present thesis is about vision, action and perception. Because even a 
superficial look at the literature indicates that there are numerous definitions of 
these concepts, I start with explicating what exactly is meant by vision, action 
and perception when referred to in the present thesis. I use the term perception 
in a restricted sense: perception is the detection of information in order to gather 
knowledge of the environment. Perception subserves the recognition and 
identification of persons, objects, events and places, including their spatial and 
temporal relations. In contrast, action refers to the use of information for the 
online control of goal-directed movements, where most actions consist of a 
complex set of movements (e.g., walking, prehension). The thesis’ treatment of 
perception and action is confined to vision. Hence, the nature of the information 
that is exploited for perception and action is visual. 
 
In humans’ everyday life, vision is constantly used to interact with the 
environment. Clearly, we use vision for different types of interaction with our 
environment such as perception and action. For example, imagine you are in a 
shabby sushi restaurant where the food moves on a conveyor belt. You can pick 
whatever sushi you desire. But first you need to make up your mind about the 
sushi you want, a choice which is not only a matter of taste, but also depends on 
factors like whether or not it stayed on the conveyor belt too long, its price tag, 
etc. After you have decided what sushi to take, you choose (probably without 
being aware of doing so) an effective and appropriate way of grasping the sushi 
(e.g., you can use either one or both hands) and you need to actually produce 
the grasping movement, during which you have to adjust movement speed, 
hand aperture and hand orientation to the properties of the food you are picking 
up. Unmistakingly, both making up your mind about the sushi you are going to 
eat and picking it up from the conveyer belt are highly dependent on the use of 
visual information. Vision thus is crucial to perception and action, but how 
perception and action relate is less clear and has been matter of debate for many 
centuries. 
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The view, which can be traced back to Descartes (1662, Rossetti, 1998), that 
visual perception enslaves action has dominated this debate. It is nicely 
illustrated by a drawing in Descartes’ ‘The Description of the Human Body’ 
(1662) (La description du corps humain); light from the environment enters the 
brain through the eyes, where after some kind of inferential process it is 
transformed into an internal representation of the environment (i.e., perception). 
It is this internal representation that forms the basis of conscious experience of 
the environment. The internal representation then serves as the foundation for 
the control of actions such as grasping, catching, walking and so on. According 
to this view action is enslaved by perception.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Serial view of perception and action. A) drawing from Descartes’ book 
‘The Description of the Human Body’ (1662) (La description du corps humain), 
illustrating the serial Cartesian view of how the light comes into the muscles. B) 
Schematic representation of the serial view. 
Information Action Perception 
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This serial view of the relation between action and perception has often been 
criticized (e.g., Gibson, 1979). Goodale and Milner formulated one of the more 
recent influential criticisms (1992, Milner & Goodale, 1995; see also 
Bridgeman, 1991; Jeannerod & Rossetti, 1993; Jeannerod, 1994). They argued 
that two separate neuroanatomically and functionally different visual systems 
exist for action and perception: the ‘vision for action’ system mediates the 
visual guidance of movement, whereas the ‘vision for perception’ system serves 
to obtain knowledge about persons, objects, events and places. Goodale and 
Milner contend that the two separate (but interacting) visual systems for action 
and perception work in parallel rather than serial. Contrary to the serial view, 
action is not necessarily preceded by perception. 
 
The main purpose of the present thesis is to further scrutinize the relationship 
between vision, action and perception. The starting point of this endeavor is 
Goodale and Milner’s parallel view of action and perception. This Introduction 
will first discuss the serial and parallel views of action and perception in more 
detail. The brief review identifies some important yet unresolved issues, 
particularly with regard to the parallel view. The Introduction then concludes 
with an overview of the experimental chapters reported in the present thesis. 
 
 
The serial view: Perception enslaves action 
The traditional notion is that visual perception provides a unified perception of 
the environment, which is full of persons, objects, events and places that are 
imbued with meaning and significance. Even when humans or objects move 
from one place to the other, causing the retinal image to be in a constant flux, 
the visual system provides a stable perception of the environment. For example, 
objects do not appear to change shape and size when they approach or recede. 
Apparently, the visual system compensates for motion; humans perceive 
themselves and objects in a stable environment. These observations have led 
scientists to assume that there exists an internal representation that codes the 
environment and the objects therein (Cuijpers, 2000). The serial view of 
perception and action holds that action is based upon and controlled by this 
perceptually based internal representation of the environment; action is 
therefore considered to be entirely determined or enslaved by perception. 
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Yet, an abundance of research on human perception suggests that the Euclidean 
geometric properties of the physical world such as distance, location, size, shape 
and orientation are distorted in the perceived world; they are not veridically 
represented (Blumenfeld, 1913; Foley, 1980, 1991; Gilinsky, 1951; Helmholtz, 
1962; Hillebrand, 1902; Indow, 1991; Koenderink & van Doorn, 2000; Tittle, 
Todd, Perotti, & Norman, 1995; Wagner, 1985). For example, it has long been 
known that participants show systematic perceptual deviations when asked to 
judge the halfway point between themselves and a point straight in front of them 
(Foley, 1967, 1972; Gilinsky, 1951). Helmholtz (1866 [1962]) demonstrated that 
participants fail to arrange lines in a physically frontoparallel plane, although 
they report that they perceive the lines to lie in a frontoparallel plane, and 
Blumenfeld (1913) found that perceptually parallel alleys and equidistant alleys 
are indeed not physically parallel and equidistant. More recently, it has been 
reported that systematic deviations occur when participants reproduce the 
orientation of reference lines in the frontoparallel plane; deviations are larger for 
oblique orientations than for cardinal orientations and they increase with 
increments in the lateral distance of the reference lines (Cuijpers, Kappers, & 
Koenderink, 2000a, 2001; Hermens & Gielen, 2003b; Soechting & Flanders, 
1993). 
 
The veridical perception of orientation, distance and size is indispensable for 
adaptive actions like grasping or catching objects or walking through a cluttered 
environment. The reported perceptual distortions therefore present a problem for 
the production of adaptive actions. That is, if the conjecture that action is 
enslaved by perception is correct, then inaccuracies related to the perceptual 
distortions should become apparent in action1. And indeed, there are reports that 
seem to support this conjecture. Hermens and Gielen (2003a), for instance, 
presented participants with a reference line that moved on a vertical screen in 
the frontoparallel plane towards the participant. The reference bar was presented 
in different orientations. Participants had to align the orientation of a bar with 
the orientation of the reference line at a pre-defined location, in front of the 
participant, at the moment the line passed the pre-defined location. Hermens and 
Gielen (2003a) maintained that participants thus intercepted the reference line. 
                                            
1  Alternatively, an algorithm may exist that corrects these perceptual distortions when 
transforming the perceptual representation into action (Cuijpers, 2000). However, this would 
beg the question why the perceived world would remain distorted in the first place. 
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Notice, that these authors thus considered the task as a catching action (cf. 
Chapter 3). In a second condition, the line became invisible during its approach 
and participants were required to again align the orientation of the bar with that 
of the reference line at the pre-defined location at the moment the line would 
pass this location. Participants made significant orientation errors for oblique 
orientations, but not for cardinal orientations. However, these errors were 
negligible and small when the reference line remained visible throughout its 
approach. In contrast, in the condition in which the line became invisible during 
the approach significant orientation errors occurred, the magnitude of which 
increased when the location at which the line disappeared was farther from the 
interception point in front of the participant. Hermens and Gielen (2003a) 
showed that these errors were similar to the errors in perceived orientation of a 
stationary reference line at various distances (see also Philbeck & Loomis, 1997; 
cf. Pagano, Grutzmacher, & Jenkins, 2001). Hermens and Gielen (2003a) 
claimed that the analogous pattern of errors in orientation for action and 
perception tasks provide support for the view that perception enslaves action, 
also suggesting that humans may not always act as accurately as is commonly 
presumed. Chapter 3 examines an alternative explanation that is based on a 
parallel view of action and perception, which is discussed in the next section. 
 
The parallel view: Separate systems for action and perception 
Milner and Goodale (1995; Goodale & Milner, 1992) rejected the serial view of 
action and perception. Rather, they argued that the visual system originally 
evolved to enable animals to control their movements in a cluttered environment 
(i.e., action). It did not evolve to provide (more abstract) knowledge of the 
world. This perceptual function evolved during a much more recent stage in 
evolution to permit animals a more flexible behavioral repertoire (i.e., actions 
that involve long-term memory, problem solving, delaying a response, etc.). In 
other words, according to Milner and Goodale’s view, humans possess two 
functionally and neuroanatomically independent visual systems for action and 
perception. Noticeably, from this parallel view, distortions in perception do not 
need to become apparent in action; the systematic deviations in the perceived 
orientation of an elongated object should not occur in the control of catching 
movements (i.e., action). Apparently, this hypothesis is challenged by the 
findings of Hermens and Gielen (2003a, see previous section). Chapter 3 
examines this contradiction. 
Chapter 1 
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Figure 1.2. Parallel view of perception and action. A) Major routes of retinal 
information into ventral and dorsal streams (from Milner & Goodale, 1995). LGNd, 
lateral geniculate nucleus, pars dorsalis; Pulv, pulvinar; SC, superior colliculus. B) 
Schematic representation of the parallel view. 
 
Two neuroanatomically separate visual pathways can be discerned in the 
primate cortex. The dorsal pathway, projecting from the primary visual cortex to 
the posterior parietal cortex, supports online visual control of movements; it is 
dedicated to ‘vision for action’. The ventral pathway, projecting from the 
primary visual cortex to the inferotemporal cortex, serves to gather knowledge 
about persons, objects, events and places; it is dedicated to ‘vision for 
perception’. An important part of the evidence for the existence of the two 
neuroanatomically and functionally distinct visual systems is provided by 
neuropsychology. Patients with optic ataxia, who have damage to the superior 
regions of the posterior parietal cortex (i.e., dorsal pathway), are adversely 
Information 
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affected in the use of visual information for controlling movements2 directed 
toward objects, despite having comparatively normal recognition of (properties 
of) these objects (Jakobson, Archibald, Carey, & Goodale, 1991; Jeannerod, 
1986; Jeannerod, Decety, & Michel, 1994; Perenin & Vighetto, 1988). Such 
observations indicate that the dorsal pathway plays a crucial role in the visual 
control of movements (i.e., action). Yet, they do not rule out the serial view that 
action is being enslaved by perception. For example, a common inference was 
that optic ataxia originated from a disconnection between intact perceptual and 
motor systems (Milner, 1998), resulting in accurate perception while action was 
impaired. What would not be easily reconciled with a serial view is the reverse 
dissociation, in which action remains intact but perception is negatively affected. 
Milner and Goodale (Goodale, Milner, Jakobson, & Carey, 1991; Milner, 
Perrett, Johnston, et al., 1991) found such a dissociation in patient D.F., who had 
a profound visual form agnosia following a bilateral lesion of the occitemporal 
cortex (i.e., ventral pathway). Despite D.F.’s difficulty in perceptually judging 
object properties like shape, size and orientation, her actions toward objects 
were barely impaired (e.g., Carey, Harvey, & Milner, 1996; Goodale et al., 
1991; Milner et al., 1991). The observations in patients with optic ataxia and 
visual agnosia thus present a double dissociation between the use of vision for 
perception and for action (cf. Pisella, Binkofski, Lasek, Toni, & Rossetti, 2006). 
This suggests that the dorsal and ventral pathways selectively and independently 
support action and perception, respectively.  
 
To reiterate, it is important to explicitly define the key concepts used in the 
present thesis. The thesis primarily investigates action and perception within a 
behavioral context and is only loosely indicative with respect to the underlying 
neural circuitry. For this reason, the processes of using visual information for 
action and perception are labeled as ‘vision for action’ and ‘vision for 
perception’ (e.g., Goodale & Humphrey, 1998; Goodale & Milner, 2004a). By 
contrast, ‘dorsal stream’ or ‘ventral stream’ is used to refer to the underlying 
neural structures. Finally, ‘system’ is used in a less restrictive manner to include 
both the process and the neuroanatomical circuitry that distinguish action and 
perception.  
 
                                            
2  This is particularly true for movements made to objects in the periphery (Pisella, 
Binkofski, Lasek, Toni, & Rossetti, 2006). 
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Apart from the observations of neurological patients, Goodale and Milner 
presented several lines of evidence to support their parallel view of action and 
perception. They contended that the functional demands of action and 
perception require the use of different types of information. Information for the 
control of action is egocentric (i.e., body-centered), coding objects in relation to 
the actor. To allow for online control of movement, which is necessary due to a 
continuously changing relation between actor and environment, the information 
needs to be available instantaneously (e.g., when grasping a sushi from a slightly 
irregular moving conveyor belt). In contrast, perception requires information 
that is allocentric, coding objects relative to each other or the environment (i.e., 
object- or world-centered). This way constancy of size, shape, color, lightness 
and relative location is maintained across different viewing locations and 
viewing occasions (e.g., recognizing the sushi you ate during a previous visit). 
 
An important, but controversial piece of evidence that the distinction between 
action and perception is based on the use of different types of information 
(Michaels, 2001; van der Kamp & Savelsbergh, 2001; van der Kamp, Oudejans, 
& Savelsbergh, 2003; van der Kamp, Rivas, van Doorn, & Savelsbergh, 2008) 
or, as Milner and Goodale (Goodale & Haffenden, 1998; Milner & Goodale, 
1995) have conceptualized the distinction, based on the different 
transformational algorithms that are applied, comes from research that employed 
visual illusions. This paradigm was introduced by Aglioti, DeSouza, and 
Goodale (1995). Aglioti et al. (1995) used the Ebbinghaus or Tichener illusion 
that consists of a circle that is surrounded by a circular array of smaller or larger 
circles. Two Ebbinghaus displays were presented side by side with the relative 
size of the two inner circles varied in such a way (i.e., one circle was surrounded 
by an array of large circles, the other with an array of small circles) that in some 
trials the inner circles were perceptually different (due to the size contrast with 
outer circles) while they were of the same physical size. In other trials, inner 
circles were physically different, but appeared perceptually equivalent. Aglioti 
et al. (1995) asked the participants to grasp the left inner circle if they thought 
the inner circles were of equal size or the right inner circle if they thought the 
inner circles were of different size. It was found that the perceptual judgment of 
whether or not the inner circles were of the same or different size was affected 
by the Ebbinghaus illusion, while the maximal hand aperture was relatively 
unaffected by the illusion and scaled to the physical size of the circle. This 
General introduction 
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dissociation between visual perception and movement control was attributed to 
vision for action and vision for perception’s differential reliance on egocentric 
and allocentric information, respectively (Aglioti et al., 1995). In other words, 
since vision for action exploits egocentric information, the illusion does not bias 
grasping. Since then findings of numerous other studies using visual illusions 
(including Müller-Lyer, Judd and Ponzo illusions) have suggested that visual 
illusions seem to affect perception in a more pronounced way than action, which 
may further support the parallel view of perception and action (e.g., Ganel, 
Tanzer, & Goodale, 2008).  
 
Yet, there is no unequivocal support for this claim and alternative interpretations 
abound (e.g., Franz, 2000; Smeets & Brenner, 2006; Smeets, Brenner, de Grave, 
& Cuijpers, 2002; for reviews, see Bruno, 2001; Bruno et al., 2008; Bruno & 
Franz, in press; Carey, 2001; Franz, 2001). Some argue that no differential 
illusory bias exists, whereas others hold that the differential effects are due to 
factors other than functional demands (i.e., action vs. perception). A corollary of 
this debate is the emphasis on type of information that is used (or, alternatively, 
the nature of information processing). The issue whether or not the differential 
functional requirements of vision for action and vision for perception have also 
resulted in distinct constraints on the detection (or pick up) of information has 
been overlooked (cf. Goodale & Milner, 1992). Chapter 6 therefore examines 
gaze differences between action and perception (see also Chapter 2). 
 
Perception in action3 
Although the separation between the two visual systems has received most 
attention, it goes without saying that action also involves contributions from the 
vision for perception system. The two work closely together in the course of 
action (Creem & Proffitt, 2001; Glover, 2004; Goodale & Haffenden, 2003; 
Goodale, Westwood, & Milner, 2004; Rossetti & Pisella, 2002). Several ways in 
which the vision for perception system contributes to performing an action can 
be identified. First, under specific circumstances vision for perception can 
dominate or replace certain aspects of movement control. Second, vision for 
perception contributes to action when movements are adjusted to properties of 
objects that are not directly specified by optic information alone such as 
                                            
3     Parts of this section are based on van der Kamp, Rivas, van Doorn, & Savelsbergh (2008). 
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fragility, weight and so on. Third, perception enables the actor to identify action 
goals and to choose an appropriate mode of action that brings about the intended 
change to the situation at hand.  
 
The case in which vision for perception comes to dominate or replace certain 
aspects of movement control has received the most attention. This vision for 
perception engagement in action occurs when the circumstances are not 
completely favourable for the vision for action system. Gentilucci, Chieffi, 
Daprati, Saetti, and Toni (1996), for instance, required participants to point from 
one end of the shaft of the Müller-Lyer illusion to the other under two vision 
conditions. The full vision condition showed only a weak effect of the illusion. 
However, a second condition, which imposed a time delay between viewing the 
shaft and initiating the pointing movement, resulted in a dramatic increase of the 
illusion effect. After introducing a delay, movement control came to rely on 
allocentric information (see also Bridgeman, Peery, & Anand, 1997; Westwood 
& Goodale, 2003; Westwood, Heath, & Roy 2000; Westwood, McEachern, & 
Roy, 2001). Similar effects have been reported for pantomimed actions (e.g., 
Goodale, Jakobson, & Keillor, 1994; Westwood, Chapman, & Roy, 2000). It is 
argued that the vision for perception system contributes to movement control as 
soon as the vision for action system can not get immediate access to visual 
information (Goodale et al., 2004). The vision for perception system’s 
participation in movement control is also invoked when movement execution is 
accompanied by verbalisation. Rossetti (1998; Rossetti & Pisella, 2002) 
presented participants with an array of visual stimuli, one stimulus of which 
changed colour. In one condition, participants were required to point to the latter 
target stimulus at the moment the array disappeared from screen, while at the 
same time speak aloud the number that was associated with the target location. 
Pointing errors in this verbalisation condition were aligned with the surrounding 
stimulus array, that is, perpendicular to the movement direction. This indicates 
that the participants used allocentric information that specified target location 
relative to the other stimuli. By contrast, non-verbalisation and task-irrelevant 
verbalisation (e.g., counting backwards) resulted in egocentric pointing errors, 
that is, errors that were aligned with the movement direction. Verbalisation 
during action execution thus appeared to have encouraged the involvement of 
the vision for perception system in movement control. 
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The second way that vision for perception can contribute to action occurs in 
situations in which the characteristics of the goal object that is acted upon are 
not directly specified by optic information, but partly depend on information 
derived from previous actions or encounters with the object (Goodale & 
Haffenden, 2003; Milner & Goodale, 2006). This is more pertinent for 
nonspatial characteristics like weight, fragility, texture, surface friction and 
temperature than it is for spatial properties like size, distance, shape and 
orientation (Glover, 2004). For example, the grip forces when grasping familiar 
objects are determined by the perceived identity of the object and earlier 
obtained information about weight, fragility and surface friction associated with 
that particular object (e.g., Savelsbergh, Steenbergen, & van der Kamp, 1996). 
The integration of these sources of information involves vision for perception. 
Evidence that the control of grip forces during action production is mediated by 
vision for perception comes from experiments using Ponzo illusions. When 
participants have to grasp an object that is placed on different locations on a 
Ponzo illusion background, they scale their grip force to the apparent size of the 
object. In other words, the size illusion affected movement parameters that are 
related to nonspatial object characteristics (i.e., weight). In contrast, the hand 
aperture is scaled to the real size of the object (Brenner & Smeets, 1996; 
Jackson & Shaw, 2000).  
 
A final contribution of vision for perception in action has received much less 
scrutiny, but is one of the key issues in the present thesis (e.g., Chapters 4, 5 and 
6). It concerns the way vision for perception contributes to action in identifying 
action goals and in choosing an action mode that allows the actor to 
appropriately and effectively realize the intended action during the course of 
action. Goodale and Humphrey (1998; see also Goodale & Milner, 2004a) have 
used the teleassistance model as a metaphor in describing how the two systems 
complement one another in the course of an action.  
 
In teleassistance, a human operator uses a symbolic code to communicate with a 
robot that actually performs the required motor act on the marked goal object 
[…]. In terms of this teleassistance metaphor, the perceptual-cognitive system in 
the ventral stream [i.e., vision for perception system, HvD], with its rich and 
detailed representations of the virtual scene, would be a human operator. 
Processes in the ventral stream identify a particular goal and flag the relevant 
object in the scene, perhaps by means of an attention-like process. Once a 
Chapter 1 
19 
particular goal object has been flagged, dedicated visuomotor networks in the 
dorsal stream [i.e. vision for action system, HvD] […] can then be activated to 
perform the desired motor act. Mechanisms in the dorsal stream, while not 
delivering anything like the detail provided by perception, do provide accurate 
information about the goal object in effector-specific frames of reference – and 
provide this information quickly. This means that a flagged object in the scene 
will be processed in parallel by both ventral and dorsal stream mechanisms – each 
transforming the visual information in the array for different purposes (Goodale & 
Humphrey, pp. 202-203). 
 
In short, there is division of labor: the vision for perception system plays the 
dominant role in determining what action the situation affords and selecting an 
appropriate and effective action pattern. In this regard, perception sets boundary 
constraints for action. In parallel, the vision for action system organizes 
movement execution (Milner & Goodale, 2006, 2008a, 2008b; van der Kamp et 
al., 2008).  
 
Thus far, the exact boundary constraints that vision for perception imposes upon 
action have not been spelled out in detail, let alone been empirically verified (or 
falsified for that matter). Hence, it has largely remained unclear as to what 
action processes the contributions from perception extend. Some investigators, 
the most noticeable of whom are Glover and Dixon (2001; Glover, 2004), 
argued that the intrusion of vision for perception includes the pre-planning or 
parameterization of initial movement kinematics of an action. In contrast, 
Goodale and Milner (2004a, 2008b) hold that the vision for action system is the 
dedicated system for the control of movement kinematics. Rather, the 
contributions from vision for perception in action would be limited to the 
identification of an action goal and the subsequent selection of an appropriate 
action pattern. But what these processes exactly involve has remained relatively 
vague. For example, aiming a projectile to a target entails the determination of a 
target location, but does it engage contributions from vision for perception or 
vision for action (cf. Gentullici et al., 1996)? These issues will surface 
prominently in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 of this thesis. 
 
Additionally, there is not much empirical work scrutinizing the role of 
perception in action. Nevertheless, there have been a few reports on patient D.F.. 
Patient D.F. suffers visual agnosia (i.e., ventral stream damage) and although 
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she is able to pick up tools, D.F.’s handling of the tools is not in a manner 
appropriate to their function. She is as likely to grasp a screwdriver by its shaft 
as by its handle, although her grip is nicely scaled to its orientation and size 
(Carey, Harvey, & Milner, 1996; Goodale & Milner, 2004b; Goodale & 
Haffenden, 2003; for similar results in healthy participants see Creem & Proffitt, 
2001). Furthermore, D.F. is impaired when asked to deal with complex stimuli. 
She appeared unable to produce appropriate grips when asked to grasp a 
transparent disc through holes cut into it (McIntosh, Dijkerman, Mon-Williams, 
& Milner, 2004), suggesting that contributions from the vision for perception 
system are required when selecting between different modes of action (i.e., an 
appropriate grip).  
 
Yet, except from observations in a few neurological patients, there is almost no 
behavioral evidence to support the contributions from vision for perception in 
action. Because a visual system that normally functions as a whole might be 
fragmented in case of damage, a better understanding of the contribution from 
the vision for perception system in action requires investigation in healthy 
participants (Bridgeman, 2002). As also Goodale and Humphrey (1998) have 
argued, the division of labor should introduce distinct spatial and temporal 
characteristics in the course of action. If this conjecture is true, then this would 
imply that the use of both allocentric and egocentric information should be 
discernable. Contributions from vision for perception (e.g., selecting an 
appropriate mode of action) should rely on allocentric information, whereas 
contributions from vision for action would encompass the exploitation of 
egocentric information. Chapters 4 to 6 employ the illusion paradigm to test this 
conjecture. 
 
Outline of the current thesis 
In the ensuing chapters various experimental designs are used in order to further 
scrutinize the relationship between vision for action and vision for perception. In 
Chapters 2 and 3, the thesis starts with experimental studies that further evaluate 
the explanatory value of the serial and parallel views of action and perception. 
Participants were presented with moving bars that were oriented differently. 
They were asked to either actually intercept and grasp the differently oriented 
bars or to make perceptual judgments of the bars’ orientation. Kinematics of the 
catching movements and gaze patterns were recorded. It was examined whether 
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21 
the widely reported systematic distortions in the perceived orientation can be 
discerned in (the inaccuracies in) a catching action. 
 In the subsequent chapters the primary focus shifts to issues that 
prominently surface in the discussion associated with the parallel view of action 
and perception. In particular, Chapters 4, 5 and 6 each address whether, and if so 
to what extent, vision for perception contributes to action. To this end, the 
illusion paradigm is employed. More specifically, Chapter 4 sets out to test 
whether selecting an appropriate action mode involves contributions of vision 
for perception in action and, if so, whether vision for perception also exerts its 
influence on the preparation of the initial movement kinematics. To this end, 
participants had to pick up bars with either one or two hands dependent on the 
length of the bars. By presenting the bars embedded in a Müller-Lyer illusion, 
the effects of allocentric information on the different components that constitute 
an action (e.g., selecting either one or two hands, preparing and executing the 
grasping movement) could be assessed. Participants also made perceptual 
judgments about the length of the bars. Illusory biases are determined as an 
indication of the involvement of vision for perception in the course of action.  
Chapter 6 adopts the same experimental paradigm as Chapter 4, but 
focuses on gaze patterns during the action and perception tasks. It explores 
whether the functional distinction between vision for action and vision for 
perception can already be discerned in the way participants visually scan the 
environment to detect useful information. The study compares the gaze patterns 
in the action and perception tasks by examining to what degree gaze is directed 
to areas containing allocentric information. In Chapter 5, another possible role 
of vision for perception in action is assessed. In particular, it is investigated what 
type of information is used to determine the location of a target. To this end, the 
illusion paradigm is employed, but this time the Judd illusion is used in a shuffle 
boarding task in which participants slide a disk to a far target embedded in the 
illusion. The reliance on allocentric and egocentric information is investigated 
by assessing the degree to which the illusion biases the accuracy of sliding. A 
reliance on allocentric information would point to the engagement of vision for 
perception in action. Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the main findings of the 
thesis and ends with some concluding remarks.  
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Abstract 
The present study investigated whether participants who intend to intercept a 
moving object that is temporally occluded from view continue to ‘track’ the 
object or make predictive gaze shifts to the location where the object will have 
to be intercepted after it disappears from view. To this end, participants were 
presented with moving objects (1.0 m/s) that approached from the right side in 
the frontoparallel plane over a distance of 1.5 m. In one condition, the object 
was visible throughout its trajectory, whereas in the second condition it was 
made invisible for the final 0.5 s of its trajectory. Gaze behavior and the 
temporal characteristics of the catch were measured. The results showed that 
irrespective of occlusion, the participants ‘tracked’ the object throughout the 
entire approach, although gaze tended to slightly lag behind the object just 
before interception. No systematic pattern of gaze shifts was found. The timing 
of the catch was significantly influenced by occlusion, the catch being completed 
faster and earlier in the occlusion condition. We conclude that successful 
interception of temporally occluded objects can be ensured by continued 
‘tracking’ of the object, at least when it moves relatively slowly. 
 
 
Chapter 2 
31 
Introduction 
Successful interceptive action necessitates that rigorous spatiotemporal 
requirements are met. For example, in their classic high speed analysis of one-
handed catching, Alderson, Sully and Sully (1974) demonstrated that a 
successful interception requires that the hand is roughly positioned at the 
interception point and that spatial adjustments of hand orientation are made so 
that the metacarpal region of the hand makes contact with the ball. Concurrently, 
the onset and completion of the grasp is precisely timed within a restricted time-
window. Alderson et al. found that for a ball travelling with a speed of about 10 
m/s, the precision with which the grasping action must be timed is 
approximately 15 ms. Clearly, visual information is indispensible in allowing for 
such precise coordination between the effector (i.e., hand) and an approaching 
object (for an overview, see Caljouw, van der Kamp, & Savelsbergh, 2004b). 
Yet, people often encounter situations in which the objects that are to be 
intercepted (or avoided) are temporally occluded from view by other objects or 
persons (e.g., a soccer corner kick that is to be headed passes behind an 
opponent player). Here, we examine how moving objects are successfully 
intercepted even when they are temporally out of view.  
 
In the late sixties and early seventies, Whiting (1968; Whiting & Sharp, 1974; 
Sharp & Whiting, 1974) examined the old adage that for a successful 
interception the catcher or batter needs to ‘keep the eye on the ball’. Whiting 
and colleagues temporally removed vision of the approaching ball by turning the 
room lights on and off during its flight. They sought to asses whether a catcher 
needs to view the entire ball trajectory, or alternatively, whether there are 
sections of the trajectory that provide sufficient information for a successful 
interception. Their studies indicated that viewing the early or late parts of the 
ball flight led to fewer successful catches (see also deLucia & Cochran, 1985). 
Whiting’s work showed that it is not necessary to view the ball throughout the 
entire flight to ensure an interception, even though information from each part of 
the trajectory can enhance performance. Still, what remained unsolved from 
these studies is how indeed humans are able to intercept objects that are 
temporally occluded.  
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To get the hand at the right time at the right place (Alderson et al., 1974) 
information about ball flight is pertinent even when the ball’s trajectory is partly 
occluded from view. One hypothesis is that actors make eye and/or head 
movements as if they continue ‘tracking’ the object after it disappears from view 
(Peterken, Brown, & Bowman, 1991; Whiting, 1968). These eye and/or head 
movements would not be distinct from the visual tracking behaviours during the 
interception of an object that is not occluded from view (Mrotek & Soechting, 
2007b). These ‘tracking’ movements make information available from the extra-
ocular muscles and the neck-propriocepsis that can be used to predict the 
spatiotemporal characteristics of the trajectory of the occluded object. Evidence 
to support this contention comes from studies on movement extrapolation. In the 
typical study, a moving object is shown on a monitor, but disappears at some 
point during its trajectory. Participants are asked to indicate the moment the 
object would have passed a predefined location had it continued its original 
path. For example, Peterken et al. (1991) showed that for relatively low object 
speeds (i.e., ≈ 2.5°/s) the accuracy of the temporal judgments was better when 
observers were instructed to track the object than when they were required to 
fixate either the object’s starting or interception point. Peterken et al. claimed 
that the preferred strategy for movement prediction is to continue tracking the 
object with the eyes after it disappears (Peterken et al., 1991; Rosenbaum, 
1975). However, they did not provide gaze data to substantiate this claim. 
Moreover, it is not immediately evident beforehand that these perceptual 
findings generalize to real interceptive actions (Milner & Goodale, 1995). 
 
Unlike in young infants (e.g., Berthier, Bertenthal, Seaks, Sylvia, Johnson, & 
Clifton, 2001; Jonsson & Von Hofsten, 2003), there is a dearth of studies in 
adults that measured tracking behaviour during the interception of objects that 
are temporally occluded4. It has been suggested that tracking may be an 
appropriate strategy, because it could provide a stable egocentric frame of 
reference for the control of the hand movements (Paillard & Beaubaton, 1978; 
Whiting, 1968). The developmental work, however, suggest that even infants as 
                                            
4  There is perhaps one exception. Mrotek and Soechting (2007a) assessed tracking in 
conditions in which participants pointed to the location where they thought the object (which 
was displayed on a monitor) would re-appear. However, this work concerns a virtual rather 
than a real object (cf. Milner & Goodale, 1995) and the authors mainly focused on spatial 
aspects of the response. In this chapter we emphasize the temporal characteristics. 
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young as nine months make predictive saccades (i.e., gaze shifts) to the future 
point of interception rather than ‘tracking’ (i.e., maintaining ‘gaze’ at) the 
occluded object. Indeed, some studies discerned predictive saccades in adults as 
well, but these involved interception tasks with fast moving balls that were not 
occluded (e.g., in cricket and baseball (Hubbard & Seng, 1954; Land & 
McLeod, 2000; cf. Bahill & Ritz, 1993)). For instance, Land and McLeod 
(2000) found that an elite cricket player initially tracked the ball, but then shifted 
gaze to the point of interception. Land and McLeod argued that these predictive 
saccades were necessary because of the high speed of the approaching ball. That 
is, humans cannot track objects moving faster that 70-80°/s (e.g., Schalen, 
1980). Finally, Hermens and Gielen (2003), who used an experimental setup 
comparable to the present study, presented participants with a reference line in 
different orientations that moved in the frontoparallel plane and that was 
occluded during its approach. Participants made systematic errors when asked to 
align the orientation of a hand-held bar to the orientation of the reference line at 
a predefined location the moment the line would have passed that location. 
Hermens and Gielen speculated that these errors reflected the occurrence of a 
saccade to the interception point. However, since gaze was not measured, a firm 
basis for deciding whether participants continued ‘tracking’ the object or made 
saccades to the interception point is lacking. 
 
In the present study we presented participants with moving objects that 
approached from the right side in the frontoparallel plane. In one condition, the 
object was temporally occluded from view. The participants were required to 
intercept the moving object when it passed in front of them. We examined 
whether the occlusion affected the spatiotemporal accuracy of the interception. 
Further, we measured participants’ gaze to assess whether they continue 
‘tracking’ the object after it is occluded or whether they make gaze shifts to the 
interception point. 
 
Methods 
Participants 
Nine participants (five male, four female), 23 to 28 years of age participated in 
the experiment. For six participants, the point of gaze was successfully 
measured. The participants had normal or corrected to normal vision, were naïve 
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with regard to the purpose of the experiment and signed, after being informed on 
the nature and requirements of the experiment, a consent form in accordance 
with the guidelines of the local ethical committee. 
 
B2
B1
B3
B4
BA 0 50 100 150
 
Figure 2.1. Experimental set-up. A) Front view of the BallTrAp. B) Side view of 
connection between bar and lorry; B1) the bar, B2) the holder at which the bar was 
fixed, the bar plus holder could rotate around a central axis (as indicated by the dashed 
line), B3) the air suction system and B4) the rod that is connected to a (moving) lorry 
(not shown). 
 
Task and apparatus 
The participants were required to catch a moving illuminated bar (30 cm long 
and 1.5 cm in diameter) that approached at different orientations. The bar was 
transported over a spatial fixed trajectory by the BallTrAp (for a detailed 
description, see van der Kamp, Savelsbergh, & Smeets, 1997) and approached 
the participants from the right at eye height in the frontoparallel plane with a 
speed of 1 m/s. The distance from the eyes to the interception point straight 
ahead of the nose was 50 cm. The moving bar became visible at 150 cm to the 
right of the interception point. 
The bar was fixed on a holder, which by means of air suction, was 
attached to a rod connected to the (moving) lorry of the BallTrAp (see Figure 
2.1b). The bar plus holder were detached from the lorry as soon as the bar was 
grasped. The experiment was carried out in a dark room. To make the bar 
visible, a LED was placed at one end of the bar so as to illuminate it from the 
inside without illuminating the environment. Turning on and off this LED was 
computer controlled. 
The position and orientation data of both the bar and the hand were 
obtained using an Optotrak 3020 motion analysis system (Northern Digital, 
Waterloo, Ontario). IREDs were placed on both ends of the bar; on the most 
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distal phalanx of the index and auricular finger, and on the caput of the ulna and 
radius. An additional IRED was attached to the bar, which was turned on and off 
at the same times as the LED that illuminated the bar. The IREDs were very 
clearly visible (as white dots) on the video recordings of the eye tracker scene 
camera (see below). The IRED that turned on and off simultaneously with the 
LED that illuminated the bar made it possible to detect, on the basis of the video 
images of scene camera, when the bar was visible for the participant (i.e., 
particularly in the case that the bar was far from the interception point, it was 
difficult to detect the very dim illumination of the bar). 
A head-mounted eye tracker (model 501, Applied Science Laboratories, 
Bedford, MA) was used to monitor participants’ point of gaze (POG). In 
addition, a head mounted scene video camera was used to record the scene at 
which the participant looked. The POG, visualized as a white square, was 
superimposed over the video images of the scene camera. The video image thus 
created, displayed the location of the POG within the scene. This video image 
was digitally recorded with a sample frequency of 50 Hz.  
 
Procedure and design 
To familiarize the participants with the task and the catching device, they 
received four practice trials in which the bar was visible during the entire 
trajectory. The participants placed their right hand in a resting spot at waist level 
20 cm in front of their body mid-axis. They were instructed to intercept the bar 
when it passed straight ahead of the nose. At the beginning of each trial the 
participant had to fixate the LED near the bar’s starting position. One second 
after the LED was turned off the bar started to move (with 1 m/s) and became 
visible at 150 cm to the right of the participant. The bar moved with one of four 
main orientations5; 180, 135, 90 or 45°, with 0° at 3 o’clock and a positive 
rotation counter-clockwise. An additional scatter of 2° or 4° was added to these 
main orientations. In the occlusion condition, the bar was made invisible (by 
turning off the LED that illuminated the bar) at 50 cm before the interception 
                                            
5  Originally, we were also interested in the effect of orientation on the timing of the 
catch (see Hermens & Gielen, 2003, Chapter 3). However, both performance and gaze 
measures did not show any relation with bar orientation (see also Brouwer, Smeets, & 
Brenner, 2005). Hence, orientation was not included as a factor in the final analyses. Note that 
an added benefit of using different orientations is that it prevented that participants made 
stereotyped automatic catching responses. 
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point, whereas in the no occlusion condition the bar remained visible during the 
entire trajectory. The participants were not informed that the bar was made 
invisible. The head movements of the participants were not restricted to allow 
free tracking of the bar. Participants were reminded repeatedly to grasp the bar 
straight ahead of their nose. Each orientation was repeated 2 times, resulting in 
10 repetitions per main orientation. This resulted in a total of 80 trials (i.e., 4 
orientations x 2 viewing x 10 repetitions), which were randomly presented. The 
experiment took about 45 minutes. 
 
Data analysis 
Gaze 
The video data were digitized to be able to process POG off-line. The position 
and orientation of the bar within the video images was determined by the pixel 
positions (i.e., x-coordinates in horizontal direction and y-coordinates in vertical 
direction) of the two IREDs on both ends of the bar. POG within the video 
image was determined as the pixel position of the centre of the white square (see 
Figure 2.2). 
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Figure 2.2. One frame of the video image showing the illuminated bar with the two 
IREDs at its end and the POG represented by a white square. The white‘+’ indicates 
the point on the bar with the shortest distance to the POG (i.e., SDG). 
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To asses if the gaze ‘tracked’ the bar, we first calculated cross correlations 
for the x-positions of the POG and the point on the bar with the shortest distance 
to the POG (denoted as SDG) (Figure 2.2). This was done separately for the 
occlusion and no occlusion conditions for three time intervals of 0.5 s (i.e., 0.0-
0.5 s from start of the trial, 0.5-1.0 s and 1.0-1.5 s). X-positions were used 
because the bar moved in a horizontal direction. The 180° bar orientation could 
not be used for this analysis because the x-coordinates of POG and the SDG 
point on the bar are always the same. Fisher's Z transformations were used to 
normalize r-values (Sachs, 1982), However, untransformed correlation 
coefficients are reported in the Table of this chapter. Secondly, we determined 
the gap between gaze and SDG to examine whether POG was ahead of, at or 
lagged behind the bar. To this end, the distance (in mm) between POG and SDG 
was transformed to degrees of visual angle by taking the inverse tangent of the 
gap distance divided by the distance between the scene camera and the centre of 
the bar. For simplicity, it was assumed that position of the scene camera did not 
move to or away from the bar. To make a comparison between the three time 
intervals, the average gap for each of the intervals was calculated. 
In order to test if participants made predictive saccades, we established a 
coarse measure for gaze shifts6. To this end, we took the gap between the x-
coordinates of the POG and the SDG point on the bar. Gaze shifts were then 
identified as points in the gap’s acceleration profile exceeding a threshold of 
±1000°/s2. For each time interval (0-0.5, 0.5-1.0 and 1.0-1.5 s) and viewing 
condition the number of gaze shifts was counted. For this analysis only forward 
gaze shifts are used, that is, gaze shifts that moved toward the interception point. 
The individual means of the cross correlations, gap (in degrees of visual 
angle), and number of gaze shifts were submitted to a 2(viewing: no occlusion, 
occlusion) x 3(time: 0-0.5, 0.5-1.0, 1.0-1.5 s) analysis of variance with repeated 
measures on both factors. In the case that the sphericity assumption was violated 
(i.e., epsilons smaller than 1.0) Huyn-Feldt adjustments of the p-values are 
reported. Post hoc comparisons were performed with Tukey HSD tests (p < 
0.05) 
 
                                            
6  It is difficult to accurately distinguish eye and head movements from POG. 
Technically speaking we can therefore not discern saccades. Hence, we refer to gaze shifts to 
denote accelerations in gaze. 
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Catching movements 
To examine the occlusion effects on the timing of the catch, the time of 
initiation of the catching movement (relative to trial start), the time of contact 
between hand and bar, and movement duration were calculated. Time of 
initiation was defined as the time at which the markers on the wrist approached 
the object with 5% of peak velocity (i.e., maximum velocity attained by the 
wrist). Time of contact was defined as the moment at which the (resultant) 
acceleration of one of the IREDs on the bar (depending on which one was first) 
exceeded 2 times the standard deviation of the IREDs acceleration during the 
first part of the bar’s trajectory. This indicated the moment of completion of the 
catch. The movement duration is the time between time of initiation of the 
catching movement and time of contact between the hand and the bar. Two-
tailed samples paired t-tests were performed on time of initiation, time of 
contact, and movement duration to assess whether there were differences in 
catching between the two viewing conditions. 
 
Results 
Gaze 
Figure 2.3 shows the gap between POG and the SDG point on the bar as a 
function of viewing condition. In general, during the first parts of the bars 
trajectory (i.e., ≈ 0-1.2 s) participants are more or less tracking the bar (actually, 
if anything, POG may be slightly ahead of the bar). During the final part of the 
bar’s trajectory (i.e., 1.2-1.5 s), however, the gaze starts to lag behind the bar 
and does increasingly so until interception. Figure 3 also suggests that the gaze 
patterns are quite similar for the two viewing conditions. This was confirmed by 
an analysis of variance of the cross-correlation values between the gaze and the 
SDG point on the bar (Table 2.1). Neither the effect of viewing (F(1, 5) = 1.70), 
nor the viewing by time interaction (F(2, 10) = 2.84) was found to besignificant. 
However, there was a significant difference in the cross correlation between the 
time intervals (F(2, 10) = 16.14, p < 0.001, ηp2  = 0.99). Post hoc tests indicated 
that the 0-0.5 s and 0.5-1.0 s, and 0.5-1.0 s and 1.0-1.5 s intervals differed from 
each other. The 0.5-1.0 s interval showed the strongest coupling between POG 
and SDG. Yet, all cross correlation values were very high, indicating that the 
gaze was strongly coupled to the bar throughout the entire approach in both 
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viewing conditions. In addition, analysis of variance showed that the gap 
between POG and the SDG point on the bar was significantly influenced by time 
(F(2, 10) = 4.74, p < 0.05, ηp2 = 0.65). Post hoc indicated that the gap was 
largest in the 1.0-1.5 s interval, suggesting that gaze started to get behind the bar 
shortly before the interception. As attested by the absence of significant viewing 
and viewing by time effects (F(1, 5) = 0.71 and F(2, 10) = 1.06, respectively), 
the gap between POG and SDG was not influenced by viewing condition. 
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Figure 2.3. Group averages of the gap (in degrees of visual angle) between POG and 
the SDG point on the bar for the no occlusion (gray line) and occlusion (black line) 
conditions. POG is point of gaze, and SDG is the point on the bar with the shortest 
distance to the POG. Negative values indicate that POG is ahead of the bar, whereas 
positive values indicate that POG lags behind. 
 
To test for differences in frequency of occurrence of gaze shifts (i.e., gaze 
accelerations above 1000°/s2 toward the interception point) between the 
different time intervals and viewing conditions, an analysis of variance on the 
number of gaze shifts was conducted. This revealed no significant effects of 
time (F(2, 10) = 2.16), viewing (F(1, 5) = 0.18) and the viewing by time (F(2, 
10) = 0.12) (see Figure 2.4 and Table 2.2).  
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Table 2.1. Average cross-correlation and average gap (in ° of visual angle) between 
POG and the SDG point (standard deviation) as function of viewing and time. 
Time  
0-0.5 s 0.5-1.0 s 1.0-1.5 s 
No occlusion Correlation  
Gap  
0.998 (0.001) 
-0.67 (1.77) 
0.999 (0.002) 
-0.76 (0.82) 
0.995 (0.006) 
0.66 (0.85) 
Occlusion Correlation  
Gap 
0.998 (0.001) 
-0.49 (1.77) 
0.999 (0.001) 
-0.37 (0.84) 
0.992 (0.007) 
0.58 (1.58) 
 
Figure 2.4. Gaze shifts in the no occlusion (top panel) and occlusion viewing conditions 
(bottom panel). On the y-axis all analyzed trials of each participant are shown. ‘+’ 
marks on the ‘no shift’ line indicate trials in which no forward gaze shifts were made. 
‘+’ marks between 0 and 1.5 s indicate the timing of a forward gaze shift for that trial. 
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Table 2.2. Average number of gaze shifts per trial (standard deviation) as function of 
time and viewing. 
 Time 
  0-0.5 s 0.5-1.0 s 1.0-1.5 s 
No occlusion 0.29 (0.31) 0.03 (0.07) 0.11 (0.14) 
Occlusion 0.32 (0.38) 0.07 (0.11) 0.11 (0.20) 
 
Catching movement 
Table 2.3 shows the temporal characteristics of the catching action for the two 
viewing conditions. Occluding the later part of the object’s trajectory resulted in 
a significantly earlier initiation of the catching action (t(5) = 4.34, p < 0.01, 
Cohen’s d = 0.20), a significantly earlier contact with the object (t(5) = 5.13, p < 
0.01, d = 1.57), and a significantly shorter movement duration (t(5) = 3.29, p < 
0.05, d = 0.53) as compared to the no occlusion condition. There were no 
significant differences with respect to the intra-participant standard deviations. 
 
Table 2.3. Time of initiation (standard deviation), time of contact and movement 
duration as a function of viewing 
 No occlusion Occlusion 
Time of initiation (s) 2.799  (0.143) 2.779  (0.137) 
Time of contact (s) 3.286  (0.048) 3.227  (0.058) 
Movement duration (s) 0.484  (0.104) 0.448  (0.085) 
 
Discussion 
Thus far, there is a lack of studies that measured gaze in adults while they 
attempt to intercept a moving object that is temporally out of view. Although 
many investigators (Lyon & Waag, 1995; Peterken et al., 1991; Rosenbaum, 
1995; Whiting, 1968) have alluded to the idea that actors would continue to 
‘track’ the object, it has not been investigated whether actors do indeed continue 
to ‘track’ the object when it is occluded, or alternatively, whether they make a 
predictive saccade to the point of interception (Hermens & Gielen, 2003). The 
present findings clearly show that the gaze is strongly coupled to motion of the 
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to-be-intercepted object, irrespective of whether the object was visible. 
Additionally, the frequency of occurrence of gaze shifts in the direction of the 
interception point did not increase when the object was occluded. In other 
words, participants continued to ‘track’ the object when it became invisible. 
This may seem in contradiction with earlier observations that expert baseball 
hitters and cricketers do make predictive saccades to the interception point for 
unoccluded balls (Hubbard & Seng, 1954; Land & McLeod, 2000). However, 
there may be different reasons for this discrepancy. Except for differences in the 
plane at which the ball moves in relation to the actor (sagittal vs. frontoparallel), 
the speed of approach may be a pertinent factor (Land & McLeod, 2000). Bahill 
and LaRitz (1984) reported that average skilled baseball players’ maximal 
tracking velocity was approximately 70°/s (and somewhat higher for a high 
skilled player), after which gaze starts to lag behind the ball (see also Schalen, 
1980). Only faster ball speeds induced saccades to keep up with the ball. In the 
present study, the velocity of the ball reached the 70°/s threshold just before the 
interception, which may have caused gaze to start lagging behind the ball during 
the final part of the bar’s approach, but may have been insufficient to invoke 
saccades (see Figure 2.4).  
 
Our findings with respect to gaze are in line with previous observations in 
motion prediction tasks (e.g., Peterken et al., 1991; Rosenbaum, 1975). This 
work suggested (albeit indirectly) that gaze would continue to track the object 
when it is temporally occluded from view during perceptual tasks where 
observers are asked to predict the moment the object will reappear. Still, 
behaviourally considerable differences exist between the participants’ response 
in the motion prediction studies and the present interception study. In general, 
the timing errors found during motion extrapolation point to the participants 
overestimating the duration of the occluded motion (e.g., Hermens & Gielen, 
2003; Peterken et al., 1991; Sokolov & Pavlova, 2003; Yakimoff, Mateeff, 
Ehrenstein, & Hohnsbein, 1993). In contrast, the present participants acted as if 
they were underestimating the duration of the occluded motion, i.e., the bar was 
intercepted earlier in the occlusion viewing condition compared to the no 
occlusion condition  (see also Brouwer et al., 2003). These timing differences 
did, however, not result in more catching fumbles. It is not particularly clear as 
to why the bar was intercepted earlier when it is temporally out of view. It does 
correspond with ideas that the movement control system responds adaptively to 
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increased uncertainty conditions (in the present experiment due to the visual 
occlusion). For moving objects, it has been argued that higher temporal 
precision demands (due to increased projectile speed) cause adjustments in 
movement kinematics, in particular higher peak movement speed (e.g., Caljouw, 
van der Kamp, & Savelsbergh, 2004b; Tresilian & Lonergan, 2002). Tresilian 
and Lonergan (2002; see also Brouwer, Brenner, & Smeets, 2000) argued that 
such a strategy decreases the chance of timing error, i.e., it may reduce 
uncertainty (see also Loftus, Servos, Goodale, Mendarozqueta, & Mon-Williams 
(2004) for how uncertainty is reduced when grasping stationary objects). 
Similarly, participants may have intercepted the moving bar slightly earlier 
because it reduces uncertainty. 
 
A more principled account for the differences in timing between the perceptual 
motion prediction studies and the spatiotemporal timing errors found in the 
present study could be provided by Goodale and Milner’s (1992; Milner & 
Goodale 1995) proposal that there is a distinction between vision for action and 
vision for perception. Milner and Goodale argued that a functional and structural 
distinction exists between the exploitation of visual information in action and 
perception tasks. They mapped the distinction between action and perception 
onto two broad pathways of the human visual system that emanate from the 
primary visual cortex (Goodale & Milner, 1992). The dorsal visual stream, 
which projects to the posterior parietal cortex, supports the online visual control 
of movement (i.e., vision for action), whereas the ventral visual stream, which 
projects to the inferotemporal cortex, is involved in the visual perception of the 
world around us (i.e., vision for perception). There is a wealth of evidence 
suggesting that the two visual streams exploit different sources of information in 
a different way (for overviews, see Milner & Goodale, 2008; Rossetti & Pisella, 
2002). From this perspective, the motion prediction studies would implicate the 
involvement of vision for perception, whereas the present interception task 
would primarily engage vision for action. The differences in timing accuracy 
between the two types of task (i.e., motion prediction and catching tasks) may 
therefore be a consequence of the differential contribution of the two visual 
streams. Yet, a more direct comparison between action and perception is needed 
to test this conjecture. In this respect, a study by Hermens and Gielen (2003) is 
relevant. In an experimental set-up akin to the one used here, they found similar 
errors (related to orientation, not time) in action and perception, albeit that their 
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interception task (i.e., aligning the orientation of an hand-held bar to a moving 
reference bar at the moment it passes at a pre-defined interception point) might 
have more characteristics in common with a perceptual judgment task than with 
an action task (see Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of this issue).  
 
In conclusion, the present study indicated that in order to intercept a moving 
object, humans track the object even when it is temporally occluded from view. 
The participants behaved as if ‘keeping the eye on the ball’ even when it was 
invisible. No clear evidence was found of participants making a large amplitude 
gaze shift to the vicinity of the interception point after the object disappeared 
from view. Despite the absence of differences in gaze behavior, however, small 
but significant differences occurred in the temporal characteristics of the 
catching movements. 
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Abstract 
The hypothesis that perception enslaves action is examined by assessing whether 
systematic distortions in perceptual judgments are reflected by inaccuracies in 
catching. In the first experiment, participants had to align manually the 
orientation of a reference bar placed at different distances in the frontoparallel 
plane. In the second experiment participants had to catch differently orientated 
moving bars, which became invisible at different distances from the interception 
point. In the matching experiment, systematic errors in the alignment of 
orientation were found in particular for oblique orientations, the magnitude of 
which increased with increasing distance of the reference bar. The inaccuracies 
in the final hand orientation during the catching task, however, did not mirror 
this pattern of deviations. The findings are interpreted to be more consistent 
with recent views that vision for perception (i.e., matching) and vision for action 
(i.e., catching) are dissociated than with the view that perception enslaves 
action. 
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Introduction 
To date, there has been much work on how we perceive the spatial lay out of the 
world around us. A common observation has been that the Euclidean geometric 
relations are distorted with respect to distance, location, size, shape, and 
orientation in the perceived world (Blumenfeld, 1913; Foley, 1980, 1991; 
Helmholtz, 1962; Hillebrand, 1902; Indow, 1991; Koenderink & van Doorn, 
2000; Tittle, Todd, Perotti, & Norman, 1995). It has been observed, for example, 
that participants show systematic deviations in their perceptual judgements 
when asked to indicate the halfway point between themselves and a point 
straight in front of them (Foley, 1967, 1972; Gilinsky, 1951). Concerning 
orientation, the topic under study here, it has been found that systematic 
deviations occur when participants are asked to match the orientation of lines or 
bars in the frontoparallel plane. These deviations appeared larger for oblique 
orientations than for cardinal orientations, and increased with larger lateral 
distances of the reference lines or bars (Cuijpers, Kappers, & Koenderink, 2000, 
2001; Hermens & Gielen, 2003b; Soechting & Flanders, 1993).  
The accurate perception of orientation, distance, and size are often 
considered indispensable for adaptive actions like grasping and catching objects. 
This has prompted the issue how humans can act accurately (in grasping, 
catching, and walking) in the face of the observed perceptual distortions. 
According to one hypothesis, which can be traced back to Descartes (Rossetti, 
1998), humans construct from perceptual and cognitive processing one internal 
representation of the physical environment. This internal representation is 
thought to form the basis of both conscious experience of the world, and the 
control of actions (such as grasping, catching, and walking). If this hypothesis is 
correct, then traces of the perceptual distortion should become apparent in the 
control of actions. Indeed, there are reports that may be interpreted to support 
the enslaving hypothesis. Philbeck and Loomis (1997), for instance, found that 
the distance errors made when walking blindfolded to a remembered target 
location are related to the errors in perceived distance (cf. Pagano, Grutzmacher, 
& Jenkins, 2001). Recently, Hermens and Gielen (2003a) have reported similar 
findings relating to orientation. Participants were presented with a line in various 
orientations that moved on a vertical screen in the frontoparallel plane towards 
the participant. The participants were required to align the orientation of a bar 
with the orientation of the moving reference line at the precise location and time 
Catching and matching orientation 
 50 
the line passed in front of the participant. According to Hermens and Gielen 
(2003a) participants thus intercepted the reference line, and interpreted the task 
as a catching action. During one condition the line became invisible during its 
movement. Again, the participants were required to align the orientation of the 
bar with that of the line at the predefined location at the moment the line would 
have passed the participant. Participants made significant orientation errors for 
oblique orientations, but not for cardinal orientations. Negligible and small 
orientation errors were made when the line remained visible during its whole 
movement path. By contrast, in the case that the line became invisible during its 
approach larger orientation errors occurred, the magnitude of which increased 
when the location at which the line turned invisible was further from the 
interception point. Hermes and Gielen (2003a) showed that these errors were 
related to errors in perceived orientation of an identical stationary line at various 
distances. The authors interpreted this analogous pattern of errors as support for 
the view that perception enslaves action, suggesting that people may not always 
act accurately. 
 
A different view on how people can act accurately in face of the perceptual 
distortions is the recent proposition of two anatomically and functionally distinct 
visual streams for perception and action (Bridgeman, Kirch, & Sperling, 1981; 
Milner & Goodale, 1995; Rossetti, 1998). The dorsal stream is assumed to use 
visual information to control goal-directed action, whereas the ventral stream is 
thought to encompass the use of visual information to obtain knowledge of the 
environment and the self (i.e., perception). Accordingly, the use of vision for 
perception and action is dissociated. Perceptual distortions, therefore, would not 
necessarily result in inaccurate actions. Here, a precise description of perception 
and action is imperative (Rossetti & Pisella, 2002). In that respect, it is the goal 
of a task, not the movement pattern that is decisive. Perception functions to 
obtain knowledge of objects, events and places in the environment (e.g., the 
orientation of a rod), whereas action functions to change the state of the 
environment by moving objects or by altering the course of events (e.g., 
grasping or catching a rod) (Michaels, 2000). The difference between perception 
and action is sometimes very subtle. Goodale, Milner, Jakobson, and Carey 
(1991), for example, tested orientation perception of patient D.F. who suffered 
profound visual agnosia. They found that D.F.’s perceptual judgments were 
grossly impaired. She was highly variable and made many errors when asked to 
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choose one of four line orientations that corresponded to the orientation of a slot 
in a disk, or when requested to turn a hand-held card until its orientation 
matched that of the slot. In contrast, when she was requested to reach out and 
post the hand-held card through the slot, the orientation of the card was similar 
to that of two control participants. In particlar, the comparison between the two 
conditions with the hand-held card is noteworthy. Although both tasks involved 
a similar pattern of arm movements, the pattern of errors for the perceptual task 
(i.e., turning the card to match the slot’s orientation) was clearly distinct from 
that of the action task (i.e., posting the card). It closely resembled the responses 
of the other perceptual tasks, however. These findings emphasise that it is the 
task goal and not the absence or presence of movement that sets apart perception 
and action (for similar findings in healthy participants see Bridgeman, Gemmer, 
Forsman, & Heumer, 2000; Bridgeman, Peery, & Anand, 1997; Daprati & 
Gentilucci, 1997; Dyde & Milner, 2002; Haffenden & Goodale, 1998; 
Westwood, McEachern, & Roy, 2001). In this respect it is significant that 
Hermens and Gielen (2003a) had participants align the orientation of a hand-
held bar with the orientation of the moving reference line as if to catch the 
reference line. It is not unlikely that this task, which was used to represent a 
catching action, might have shared more characteristics with perception tasks 
(i.e., participants were matching the orientation of a moving line) than with 
action tasks (i.e., physically grasping a moving object). If this conjecture is 
correct, then Hermens and Gielen’s findings cannot be considered to directly 
support the hypothesis that perception enslaves action. It is not unlikely that 
both tasks tapped into similar ventral perception processes. 
 
The aim of the present study is to examine whether similar inaccuracies are 
present in perceptually matching and catching bars presented in different 
orientations. To this end two experiments were conducted. Participants were 
required to either manually match the orientation of a reference bar that was 
located at different distances (i.e., perception), or to catch differently orientated 
moving bars that were made invisible at different distances from the interception 
point (i.e., action). It is expected that if vision for perception enslaves vision for 
action, distortions in perceived orientation would be reflected in the final hand 
orientation of the catching movements. Alternatively, distortions in perceived 
orientation may be unrelated to inaccuracies in the final hand orientation of 
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catching, which would support the contention that vision for perception and 
vision for action are dissociated processes. 
 
Experiment 1: Matching 
Methods 
Participants 
Ten participants (five male, five female) from 22 to 28 years of age participated 
in this experiment. Participants reported having normal or corrected to normal 
vision. All participants were naïve with regard to the task and the purpose of the 
experiment. After explanation of the nature and the requirements of the 
experiment, participants signed an informed consent form in accordance with 
the policy statement of the local ethical committee. 
 
Task and apparatus 
Participants were required to align the orientation of an illuminated target bar 
(30 cm long and 1.5 cm in diameter) to the orientation of an illuminated 
reference bar (30 cm long and 1.5 cm in diameter) that was placed at various 
distances in the frontoparallel plane to the right of the participant. The distance 
from the eyes to the target bar (and thus from the frontoparallel plane) was 50 
cm. The reference bar was presented using the Ball Transport Apparatus 
(BallTrAp: Figure 3.1a). The bar was fixed on a holder that was constructed in 
such a way that it could be attached to a (moving) lorry, which was fixed to the 
BallTrAp (see for a detailed description van der Kamp, Savelsbergh, & Smeets, 
1997). The holder was attached to the lorry by means of an air suction system 
(Figure 3.1b). The orientation and location of the reference bar were manually 
adjusted. The target bar was fixed on a holder in the same way as the reference 
bar. The holder was attached to an axis, such that the axis of rotation was 
horizontal and sagittally orientated, allowing the bar to be tilted in the 
frontoparallel plane, rotating around its centre. The experiment was carried out 
in the dark, and a LED was placed at one end of both bars illuminating the bars 
from the inside without illuminating the environment. 
The orientation of the target bar was obtained using an Optotrak 3020 
motion-analysis system (Northern Digital, Waterloo, Ontario). Infrared light 
emitting diodes (IREDs) were placed on both ends of the bar. The bar 
orientation was defined as the angle between orthogonal projection of the line 
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connecting the two markers (on the bar) on the frontoparallel plane and the 
horizontal plane. The data were recorded with a sample frequency of 200 Hz for 
1 s.  
 
Procedure and design 
Before the beginning of each trial the participants placed their right hand on a 
hand rest at waist level 20 cm in front of their body mid-axis. As soon as both 
bars became visible the participants were allowed to grasp the target bar (which 
was placed in a random orientation, but never in the same orientation as the 
reference bar) and to rotate it such that they perceived the target bar to be 
parallel to the reference bar (i.e., that the orientation of the target matched that 
of the reference bar). There was no time constraint. After the participants 
indicated that the bars were perceived as parallel, the orientation of the target bar 
was recorded. 
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Figure 3.1. Experimental set-up. A) Front view of the BallTrAp in the matching 
experiment. B) Side view of connection between bar and lorr; B1) the bar, B2) the 
holder on which the bar was fixed, the bar plus holder could rotate around a central 
axis, B3) the air suction system and B4) is the rod that is connected to a (moving) 
lorry (not shown in the figure). C) Front view of the BallTrAp in the catching 
experiment. D) View of the catching device. 
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The orientation of the reference bar had one of four main orientations: 
oblique (45°), vertical (90°), oblique (135°), or horizontal (180°), with 0° at 3 
o’clock and a positive rotation counter-clockwise. An additional scatter of 2 or 
4° was added to these main orientations. For example, the 90° main orientation 
was presented as either 86, 88, 90, 92 or 94°. The participants were told to 
reproduce the exact orientation the reference bar. The reference bar was placed 
at 50, 100, or 150 cm to the right of the participant in the frontoparallel plane. 
Each trial was repeated 2 times, resulting in 10 repetitions for each main 
orientation. This resulted in a total of 120 trials (= 4 [main] x 5 [scatter] 
orientations x 3 distances x 2 repetitions), which were presented in a random 
order. The experiment took about one hour.  
  
Data analysis 
We used three measures for the difference between the orientation of the 
reference bar and the target bar: 1) the constant error, defined as the difference 
in degrees between the orientation of the target bar and the orientation of the 
reference bar, 2) the absolute error, defined as the absolute difference between 
the orientation of the target bar and the orientation of the reference bar, and 3) 
the variable error, defined as the standard deviation for the constant error. 
Intra-individual means were calculated from 10 repetitions of each of the 
four main orientations at each of three distances. To reveal perceptual 
distortions, a series of t-tests was carried out to examine whether constant errors 
differed from zero. The α-level was set according to Bonferroni adjustments for 
multiple comparisons. Furthermore, to reveal systematic differences between the 
orientations of the reference and target bars each of the three measures was 
submitted to a 4(orientation: 45, 90, 135, and 180°) by 3(distance: 50, 100, and 
150 cm) analysis of variance with repeated measures on both factors. In the case 
that the sphericity assumption was violated (i.e., epsilons smaller than 1.0) 
Huyn-Feldt adjustments of the p-values are reported. Finally, post hoc 
comparisons were performed with Tukey HSD tests (p < 0.05). 
 
Results 
Two participants (one male and one female) were excluded from the data 
analysis because of technical failure in the data recording. The remaining eight 
participants showed similar patterns of results, and hence we only report group 
Chapter 3 
 55
averages. Figure 3.2 illustrates that the alignment of the orthogonal, but not the 
cardinal, orientations was systematically distorted. T-tests confirmed that the 
constant error differed significantly from zero for the oblique orientations only 
(indicated by an asterisk). Further analysis of variance on the constant error 
revealed a significant main effect of orientation (F(3, 21) = 55.4, p < 0.001). 
Tukey’s HSD showed that all constant errors at every orientation were 
significantly different from each other, except for 90 and 180° orientations. The 
magnitude of the constant errors was larger for oblique orientations as compared 
to cardinal orientations. Although no main effect of location on constant error 
(F(2, 14) = 0.29) was found, analysis of variance did reveal a significant 
interaction effect between location and orientation (F(6, 42) = 47.7, p < 0.001). 
Tukey’s HSD indicated that the magnitudes of the constant error for the 45 and 
135° orientations were larger when the reference bar was located further away. 
However, for the 90 and 180° orientations the magnitude of the constant error 
was independent of distance. 
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Figure 3.2. The constant error in the matching task as function of the orientation and 
distance of the reference bar. An asterisk denotes a significant difference of the constant 
error from zero. Within-subjects standard deviation is shown.  
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Figure 3.3. The absolute error in the matching task as function of the orientation and 
distance of the reference bar. Within-subjects standard deviation is shown. 
 
A subsequent analysis of variance on the absolute error allowed a 
comparison between the magnitudes of the errors made for the different main 
orientations and distances of the reference bar (see Figure 3.3). Significant main 
effects of orientation and location (F(3, 21) = 14.4, p < 0.001 and F(2, 14) = 
47.3, p < 0.001, respectively) and a significant interaction effect between 
location and orientation (F(6, 42) = 16.5, p < 0.001) were found. Tukey’s HSD 
tests indicated that the magnitudes of the absolute error of the two oblique 
orientations were significantly larger than those of the two cardinal orientations. 
A comparison of the two oblique and two cardinal orientations, however, did not 
indicate significant differences in the magnitude of the absolute error. Finally, 
the magnitudes of the absolute error were larger for the further reference bar 
locations for the oblique orientations, but not for the cardinal orientations. 
The final analysis assessed the effects on the variable error. Once more, a 
significant main effect of reference bar orientation was found (F(3, 21) = 11.4, p 
< 0.001). Post hoc comparisons showed that the magnitudes of the variable error 
of the two oblique orientations were significantly larger than those of the 
cardinal orientations. However, the within comparisons of the oblique (i.e., 45 
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vs. 135°) and cardinal orientations (i.e., 90 vs. 180°) did not reveal differences. 
Additionally, the variable error appeared significantly affected by location (F(2, 
14) = 7.03, p < 0.001). Post hoc comparisons showed a significant difference 
between the 50 and 150 cm reference bar location. This effect, however, was not 
mediated by orientation (F(6, 42) = 0.41) (see Figure 3.4). 
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Figure 3.4. The variable error in the matching task as function of the orientation and 
distance of the reference bar. Between-subjects standard deviation is shown. 
 
Discussion 
The aim of this experiment was to investigate whether perception of orientation 
in the frontoparallel plane is distorted. To this end, participants manually aligned 
the orientation of a target bar to the orientation of a reference bar that was 
located at different distances. Participants indeed made systematic errors. In the 
case of the oblique reference orientations, the magnitude of the errors increased 
with increasing distance of the reference bar. By contrast, the smaller magnitude 
of the errors for cardinal orientations was not influenced by distance. The 
current distortions in perceived orientation corroborate previous reports by 
Hermens and Gielen (2003a; 2003b).  
 
One explanation for the pattern of errors of perceived orientation is that the 
projection of the orientation of the reference bar on the retina is distorted. If the 
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orientation of an oblique bar in plane Y is projected on plane Z that is not 
parallel to plane Y, the projection of the orientation of the bar on plane Z is 
distorted. And like in the present experiment, the further the distance between 
the reference bar and the projection plane, the larger the distortion in orientation.  
This geometric distortion is also known as perspective (Hermens & 
Gielen, 2003b). We assessed to what degree perspective can account for the 
pattern of errors in perceived orientation of the present experiment. Figure 3.5 
shows the expected constant errors based upon perspective (see Kanatani, 1990) 
and the actual constant errors. Qualitatively, the patterns of the observed 
constant errors resembles those predicted from perspective; the magnitude of the 
errors of the oblique orientations (i.e., 45 and 135°) increase with the distance of 
the reference bar, whereas the magnitude of the errors of the cardinal 
orientations (i.e., 90 and 180°) are near zero and are independent of the distance 
of the reference bar (see also Figure 3.3). Moreover, geometric distortion 
predicts the errors for the 45 and 135° orientations to be of the same magnitude 
but with an opposite sign, which was also found. Nonetheless, it should be 
pointed out that the magnitude of the observed constant errors is only half of that 
predicted by perspective, suggesting that the retinal image did not fully specify 
the orientation of the reference bar. 
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Figure 3.5. The actual constant error and the predicted constant error based on 
geometric distortion. 
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An alternative explanation for the relatively large magnitude of the errors 
for the oblique compared with that of the cardinal orientations may be the 
human visual system’s enhanced sensitivity for horizontal and vertical 
orientated stimuli as compared to oblique orientated stimuli (Campbell, 
Kulikowski, & Levinson, 1966; Furmanski & Engel, 2000). The larger variable 
error for oblique orientations may be a point in case. Despite this finding, the 
anisotropy in sensitivity for oblique and orthogonal orientations seems a less 
likely account, because it cannot predict the observed effects of distance on the 
perceived orientations in case of oblique orientated objects. In sum, it seems that 
perspective is an important source of information for the perception of 
orientation. Its use, however, results in systematic errors in perceived 
orientation. 
 
In Experiment 2, we investigated whether the pattern of errors in perceived 
orientation was also evident during catching (Hermens & Gielen, 2003a). It is 
hypothesized that if perception enslaves action, inaccuracies in the final hand 
orientation of the catching movement would mirror the errors in perceived 
orientation. Alternatively, if the use of vision for perception and action are 
separated, the inaccuracies in catching would be unrelated to the errors found for 
perceived orientation. 
 
Experiment 2: Catching 
Methods 
Participants 
Twelve participants (eight males, four females) 23 to 28 years of age 
participated in this experiment. Six participants had previously taken part in 
Experiment 1. All participants had normal or corrected to normal vision, were 
naïve with regard to the purpose of the experiment, and signed, after explanation 
of the nature and the requirements of the experiment, an informed consent form 
in accordance with the policy statement of the local ethical committee. 
 
Task and apparatus 
The participants were required to catch a moving illuminated bar (30 cm long 
and 1.5 cm in diameter) that approached with different orientations. The bar 
approached the participant from the right at eye height in the frontoparallel plane 
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with a speed of 1 m/s. The distance from the eyes to the interception point 
straight ahead was 50 cm and the bar became visible at 150 cm to the right of 
the interception point (i.e., the plane in which the bars moved was identical to 
the plane in which the bars were presented in Experiment 1). The apparatus was 
similar as in the first experiment (see Figure 3.1c). The bar was fixed on a 
holder, which by means of air suction was attached to a rod connected to the 
(moving) lorry of the BallTrAp (see Figure 3.1b). The location and speed of the 
lorry was determined by a computer-controlled step-motor. When the bar was 
caught, the bar plus holder was detached from the moving lorry (i.e., the bar 
became free of the lorry when it was contacted by the catching device (see 
below)). The experiment was carried out in the dark, and a LED was placed at 
one end of the bar so as to illuminate the bar from the inside without 
illuminating the environment. 
To spatially constrain the participants’ final hand orientation, the 
participants wore a catching device (see Figure 3.1d). The device consisted of 
two plates (22 cm high and 14 cm wide) that were connected to each other by a 
hinge. The fingers were strapped to one of the plates and the thumb was 
strapped to the other plate, the hinge was in the palm of the hand. The bar could 
only be grasped successfully if the device was accurately aligned with the 
orientation of the bar. 
The position and orientation of the bar and the catching device were 
obtained using an Optotrak 3020 motion analysis system (Northern Digital, 
Waterloo, Ontario). IREDs were placed on both ends of the bar and on both ends 
of the back (formed by the hinges between the two plates) of the catching 
device. The kinematic data were recorded at a sample frequency of 200 Hz. 
To detect the moment of contact between catching device and bar, the bar 
was covered with a conducting mesh and the inside of the catching device was 
covered with conducting foam, both of which were connected by a wire. As 
soon as contact was made between the catching device and the bar an electrical 
circuit was closed and an Optotrak IRED was turned on. This indicated the 
moment of completion of the catch. 
 
Procedure and design 
To familiarize themselves with the task and the catching device, the participant 
started with four practice trials in which the bar was visible during the whole 
trajectory. The participant placed their right hand, strapped in the catching 
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device, in a resting location at waist level 20 cm in front of their body mid-axis. 
At the beginning of each trial the participant had to look to a LED near the 
starting position of the bar. One second after the LED was turned off the bar 
started to move (with 1 m/s) and became visible at 150 cm to the right of the 
participant. The bar moved with one of four orientations; 180, 135, 90 or 45°, 
with 0° at 3 o’clock and a positive rotation counter-clockwise. The bar either 
became invisible (by turning off the LED that illuminated the bar) at 50 cm 
before the interception point, or remained visible during the whole trajectory. 
The participants were not informed that the bar was made invisible. Each 
orientation was repeated 10 times. This resulted in a total of 80 trials (= 4 
orientations x 2 visibility locations x 10 repetitions), which were randomly 
presented. The experiment took about 45 minutes. 
 
Data analysis 
The orientation of the catching device was defined as the angle between 
orthogonal projection of the line connecting the two pairs of IREDs on the 
catching device on the frontoparallel plane and the horizontal. The final hand 
orientation of the catch was defined as the orientation 10 ms before the catching 
device contacted the bar.  
We used three measures to assess the accuracy of the final hand 
orientation during catching 1) the constant error, defined as the difference 
between the orientation of catching device and the orientation of the catching 
bar, 2) the absolute error, defined as the absolute difference between the 
orientation of catching device and the orientation of the catching bar, and 3) the 
variable error, defined as the standard deviation of the constant error. 
Intra-individual means were submitted to a 2(viewing: visible throughout 
vs. visible until 50 cm distance) x 4(orientation: 45, 90, 135, and 180°) analysis 
of variance with repeated measures on both factors. In the case that the 
sphericity assumption was violated (i.e., epsilons smaller than 1.0) Huyn-Feldt 
adjustments of the p-values are reported. Post hoc comparisons were performed 
with Tukey HSD tests (p < 0.05). 
 
Results 
Two participants (one male and one female) were excluded from the data 
analysis because of technical failure in the data processing. Both participants 
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had participated in Experiment 1. The remaining 10 participants successfully 
caught the moving bar: there were only four trials in which participants failed to 
catch the bar. Figure 3.6 shows the average constant errors of the 10 
participants. 
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Figure 3.6. The constant error in the catching task as a function of orientation and 
viewing. Within-subjects standard deviation is shown. 
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Figure 3.7. The absolute error in the catching task as a function of orientation and 
viewing. Within-subjects standard deviation is shown. 
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Significant main effects of viewing and orientation were found for 
constant error (F(1, 9) = 5.20, p < 0.05 and F(3, 27) = 4.97, p < 0.01, 
respectively). In addition, the viewing by orientation interaction was significant 
(F(3, 27) = 3.41, p < 0.05). Tukey’s HSD tests showed that the constant error for 
the 180° orientation differed from that for the 45 and 90° orientations. In 
addition, making the bar invisible resulted in a significantly larger magnitude of 
the constant error for the 45° orientation only (Figure 3.6). 
Subsequent analysis on the absolute error revealed a significant effect of 
viewing (F(1, 9) = 17.6, p < 0.01), showing that the magnitude of the absolute 
error increased when the bar became invisible at 50 cm before the interception 
point (Figure 3.7). The orientation and viewing by orientation effects did not 
reach significance. Analysis on the variable error revealed neither significant 
effects for viewing and orientation, nor for their interaction (Figure 3.8). 
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Figure 3.8. The variable error in the catching task as a function of orientation and 
viewing. Between-subjects standard deviation is shown. 
 
Comparing Experiment 1 and 2 
Next we compared the pattern of orientation errors in the two experiments. To 
this end, the constant error observed in the 50 cm distance condition of the 
matching task was compared to the difference in constant error between the two 
viewing conditions (i.e., the error for the catching bar visible until 50 cm 
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condition minus the error for the bar visible throughout condition) of the 
catching task. The latter measure, denoted further as the constant catching error, 
was chosen because even when the moving bar was visible throughout its 
trajectory constant errors were large, indicating that even when directly in front 
of the participant, the final orientation of the catching device had an off-set with 
respect to the orientation of the catching bar7. Figure 3.9 shows the average 
constant matching and catching errors. The patterns of constant errors for the 
two tasks appear rather disparate.  
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Figure 3.9. The constant matching and catching errors as a function of orientation. 
Between-subjects standard deviation is shown. 
 
A 2(task: matching vs. catching) by 4(orientation: 45, 90, 135, and 180°) 
analysis of variance with repeated measures on the last factor indeed yielded a 
significant orientation by task interaction (F(3, 48) = 10.6, p < 0.001). 
Tukey’s HSD test showed that the magnitude of the constant matching error 
differed between the 45, 135 and the 90 and 180° orientations. By contrast, 
the magnitude of the constant catching error was not different between 
orientations8. This finding was supported by observations of the individual 
data. As mentioned above, the pattern of constant matching errors was similar 
across participants for the matching task. However, there were large 
                                            
7  For the matching task, we assume that participants would have aligned the orientation 
of the target bar almost perfectly to the orientation of the reference bar in a straight line in 
front of them. 
8  The analysis for the absolute errors showed a similar pattern. 
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individual differences for the pattern of constant error in the catching task, 
with only one participant showing a pattern of errors that mirrored that in the 
matching task. 
 
Discussion 
The aim of the second experiment was to investigate whether orientation-
dependent errors could be discerned in catching, and if so, whether these reflect 
those found for perceived orientation. It is found that orientation-dependent 
errors also occur when catching moving bars. In particular, the findings indicate 
that for the 45° orientation, the final hand orientation is orientated more to the 
vertical when the bar is not visible until the interception point than when the bar 
remains visible throughout its movement. In addition, the absolute error is 
larger when the bar is not visible throughout its trajectory, independent of the 
orientation of the bar. Unlike for the matching task, no systematic differences 
between oblique and orthogonal orientations are apparent. 
Neither the geometric distortion (i.e., perspective) nor a difference in the 
sensitivity for horizontal and vertical orientations offers a simple explanation 
for the observed pattern of errors. Geometric distortion would have predicted an 
increase in constant error for the oblique orientations, but not for the cardinal 
orientations, when the bar is made invisible before the interception point. 
Moreover, the signs of the constant errors for the two oblique orientations 
would have been expected to be opposite. Anisotropy in sensitivity for oblique 
and cardinal orientations would have resulted in larger variable errors for the 
oblique orientations. However, there is not even a qualitative agreement with 
one of these explanations. It seems, therefore, more likely that motor or action 
constraints have had a larger impact on the final hand orientation than the 
exploitation of any of these sources of visual information. We come back to this 
issue later. 
 
General discussion 
The main purpose of the current study is to assess the hypothesis that perception 
enslaves action. Although systematic errors were distinguished in the matching 
and catching tasks, the orientation errors in matching were not reflected in 
catching, in particular so for the oblique orientations. The patterns of orientation 
errors in matching and catching are unrelated. This was true for all participants, 
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except one. We conclude therefore that the present experiment does not provide 
evidence that perception enslaves or uniquely determines action. 
One reservation to this conclusion that might be raised is that the 
processes of perception and action might still be causally related, even if the 
patterns of constant and absolute errors are not similar. That is, it is not 
inconceivable that perception is followed by an additional process that 
‘removes’ the perceptual distortion to prevent action from being inaccurate. The 
consequence would be an increased variable error for action induced through 
noise associated with the additional processing (Michaels, Withagen, Jacobs, 
Zaal, & Bongers, 2001). At first glance, the larger variable error in catching 
compared to matching may lend support to this hypothesis. Another finding, 
however, renders this explanation less likely. The most pronounced differences 
between the matching and catching tasks were found for the oblique 
orientations. Hence, the most additional processing would be needed for the 
oblique orientations, and hence the difference in variable error for the oblique 
and cardinal orientations is expected to be larger in catching than in matching. 
By contrast, a difference in variable error in catching between the oblique and 
cardinal orientations was not found.  
 
Hermens and Gielen (2003a) reported that both for matching and catching the 
constant errors in the oblique orientation increase with distance of the static 
reference object or the distance at which the moving reference object becomes 
invisible. We did not replicate the oblique effect for the final hand orientation in 
catching when the bar becomes invisible at a distance from the interception 
point, presumably because the constraints in our catching experiment were (and 
were meant to be) vastly different from those in the work of Hermens and 
Gielen (2003a). Instead of mimicking a catch by aligning a hand-held bar with 
the orientation of a moving reference line (i.e., perception), participants in the 
current study moved to actually intercept and grasp a physical bar (i.e., action). 
Whereas Hermens and Gielen compared two perceptual tasks, in which 
participants had to match the orientation of stationary and moving lines, we 
contrasted a perceptual task with an action task. Hermens and Gielen found a 
similar pattern of orientation errors in the two perceptual tasks. The current 
study replicated this pattern for the perceptual task, but not in the action task. 
Taken together these findings are indeed consistent with the proposal that vision 
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for perception and action are dissociated (e.g., Milner & Goodale, 1995). The 
present results, however, do not necessarily prove the putative dissociation. 
The dissociation between vision for perception and action is assumed to 
encompass the use or processing of different sources of information (e.g., 
Milner & Goodale, 1995; van der Kamp, Oudejans, & Savelsbergh, 2003). 
Compared to the control of action, perceptual judgments are thought to rely 
much more on pictorial sources of information, such as relative size and texture. 
The current study shows that perspective, another example of a pictorial 
information source, seems a powerful variable in the specification of perceived 
orientation, but not in the control of hand orientation during catching, in which 
alternative or additional information sources may have been involved. The 
information may be embedded in the invariant transformations of the optic flow 
field that are generated by the motion of the bar (Gibson, 1979). The projection 
of the orientation of a stationary bar on the retina is distorted, and the further 
the distance, the larger the distortion (i.e., perspective). The retinal orientation, 
however, changes when the bar moves and passes in the frontoparallel plane. If 
the observer can extract information on the bar’s current speed and distance, 
then the rate of change of the retinal orientation would provide information 
about the moving bar’s (future) orientation. A study by Mitsumatsu and 
Yokosawa (2003) provides some evidence that people are sensitive to this type 
of information. Participants indicated whether objects that passed and moved in 
their frontoparallel plane and that were temporally occluded, were the same or 
different. The participants responded slower when the rate of change of retinal 
orientation was unpredictably changed during the occlusion period (i.e., 
inconsistent with a constant orientation of the moving bar). In order to avoid 
any misunderstanding, it is pertinent to note that Mitsumatsu and Yokosawa’s 
study involved a perceptual task and did not asked the participants to indicate 
the orientation of the objects. It does suggest, however, that object motion may 
grant additional information about an object’s (future) orientation. Yet, 
Hermens and Gielen (2003a) found the same pattern of orientation errors for 
static and moving lines, suggesting that the information did not contribute to the 
perception of orientation. Whether or not the rate of change of retinal 
information is actually involved in the control of the hand orientation during 
catching remains an empirical issue.  
Another information-based difference between perception and action may 
be the greater sensitivity of the visual system for cardinal orientations as 
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compared to oblique orientations in the matching task and not in the catching 
task, as indicated by the pattern of variable errors. This visual oblique effect is 
thought to originate in the primary visual cortex (Furmanski & Engel, 2000; Li, 
Peterson, & Freeman, 2003), and has been observed with measures such as a 
spatial acuity test, contrast sensitivity, orientation sensitivity, orientation 
discrimination and motion discrimination. If the oblique effect has its neural 
basis in primary visual cortex than one would expect that the oblique effect 
would materialize in both perception and action. However, this oblique effect 
has not been observed in action tasks, underlining that perception and action 
may rely differently on similar sources of information. 
In addition, one could argue that also motor constraints and not only the 
visual constraints make the difference between perception and action. 
Obviously, the final hand and arm orientation depends on the orientation of the 
target (Desmurget & Prablanc, 1997), but others have found that the final 
orientation is also affected by intrinsic (i.e., arm posture) constraints (Soechting 
& Flanders, 1993; Wang, 1999). Wang (1999), for instance, argues that the 
contribution of each individual joint to an arm movement is constrained by the 
principle of minimum energy and minimum discomfort. The actual movement 
then is assumed to reflect the balance between the comfort postures that the arm 
tries to hold and the recruitment of additional degrees of freedom enforced by 
task demands (Paulignan, Frak, Toni, & Jeannerod, 1997). Hence, one may 
speculate that the inaccuracies in the final hand orientation in catching, that is 
the observation that the final hand orientation was not precisely aligned with the 
orientation of the moving bar, serve to keep the shoulder, arm and wrist joints 
within their range of comfort. Nevertheless, comfort of the end posture is not 
the only motor constraint on the final hand orientation. For a successful 
interception, the rotation of the hand during the catching movement will be an 
important constraint for the final hand orientation. Meulenbroek, Rosenbaum, 
Vaughan, and Vogt (2001) found that a major determinant of grasping 
kinematics is avoidance of collisions with the object to be grasped. In the case 
of catching, for instance, it is important not to collide with the object before the 
hand is in the right orientation. Hence, adjustment of the orientation of the hand 
(grasping device) must take place before the hand is in the movement plane of 
the bar. Thus unlike matching, the change in orientation needs to be controlled 
throughout the catch to arrive with the correct orientation at the right place and 
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time. The relatively large variable error in the final hand orientation may have 
resulted from these or similar continuous control processes. 
In short, motor constraints are likely to have had a much greater impact 
on the hand orientation in the catching than in the matching task. If this 
conjecture is correct, then it would follow that the different pattern of errors in 
catching and matching are not only due to visual constraints, but also to motor 
constraints. Having said this, however, it must be remembered that getting the 
hand in an appropriate orientation at the right place and time implies the 
detection and use of visual information (Peper, Bootsma, Mestre, & Bakker, 
1994). 
 
We conclude that the systematic distortions in perceived orientation are not 
reflected in the control of the final hand orientation. It is suggested that the 
results are consistent with recent models purporting a dissociation between 
vision for perception and vision for action. However, it is argued that motor 
constraints also need to be taken into account. 
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Abstract 
The present study examines the contributions of vision for perception processes 
in action. To this end, the influence of allocentric information on different action 
components (i.e., the selection of an appropriate mode of action, the pre-
planning and online control of movement kinematics) is assessed. Participants 
(n = 10) were presented with a shaft of various lengths (i.e., 13-20 cm) that was 
embedded in a Müller-Lyer figure. Picking up the shaft would, dependent on its 
length, either require a one- or a two-handed grasp. In different conditions 
participants were instructed to give a verbal judgement on the size of the shaft 
(VSJ); to make a manual estimation of the shaft’s length (MLE); to indicate 
verbally whether they would grasp the shaft with one- or two hands (VAE); to 
actually grasp the shaft (G). We found that the Müller-Lyer figure affected the 
choice between using a one- or two-handed grasp, both when the participants 
actually grasped (G) the object and when they made a verbal estimation (VAE). 
The illusory bias was of a similar magnitude as the one found in the verbal 
(VSJ) and manual perception task (MLE). The illusion had only a minor 
influence on the movement kinematics, and appears to be restricted to 
participants in which the grasping condition was immediately preceded by the 
VSJ-condition. We conclude that vision for perception contributes to the 
selection of an action mode, and that its contributions beyond that stage are 
dependent on the particular (experimental) circumstances. 
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Introduction 
There is a widely accepted argument for a distinction of human vision into 
vision for perception and vision for action (e.g., Bridgman, 2002; Goodale & 
Milner, 1992; Jeannerod, 1994; Milner & Goodale, 1995; Rossetti & Pisella, 
2002; cf. Franz, Gegenfurther, Bulthoff, & Fahle, 2000; Brenner & Smeets, 
1996; Mendosa, Elliott, Meegan, Lyons, & Welsh, 2006). The distinction is 
mapped onto two broad pathways of the human visual system that emanate from 
the primary visual cortex. The ventral visual stream projects to the 
inferotemporal cortex and is involved in the visual perception of the world 
around us. The dorsal visual stream projects to the posterior parietal cortex and 
is involved in the pick up of visual information for the guidance of action. 
Nonetheless, the neuro-anatomical data also indicate that the putative 
segregation between vision for perception and vision for action streams is less 
clear than often presented. Rossetti and Pisella (2002), for instance, pointed to 
interconnections between the dorsal and ventral streams at many levels. In 
particularly, they argued that both the dorsal and the ventral stream project to the 
primary motor cortex, suggesting that the dorsal stream is not privileged over 
the ventral stream in its contribution in action. This raises the issue as to the 
contribution of the ventral vision for perception processes in action. In the 
present study two proposals about the role of vision for perception9 in action 
under normal full vision are investigated. It is assumed to engage in 1) the 
selection of an appropriate mode of action (Milner & Goodale, 1995), and 2) the 
pre-planning or parameterization of initial movement kinematics of an action 
(Glover & Dixon, 2002).  
 
Action mode selection 
Perhaps the least controversial is the purported role of vision for perception in 
obtaining information that enables the actor to select a mode of action for the 
                                            
9  In this study, we only obtained behavioral data. We did not use brain-imaging 
techniques to verify activations in the ventral and dorsal streams. Hence, our claims and 
interpretations are necessarily restricted to behavior, and as such can only be suggestive with 
respect to the underlying neural circuitry. For this reason, we use the phrases ‘vision for 
perception’ or ‘vision for action’ to refer to behavioral processes of detecting and using visual 
information for perceiving the world or acting on the world (Goodale & Humphrey, 1998). By 
contrast, when we refer to the underlying neural circuitry, we use ‘ventral stream’ or ‘dorsal 
stream’. 
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task at hand10 (Bridgeman, 2002; Creem & Proffitt, 2001; Goodale & 
Humphrey, 1998; Milner & Goodale, 1995; Passingham & Toni, 2001; Rossetti 
& Pisella, 2002; cf. Norman, 2002). Visual information serves to determine 
which of different modes of action is the most appropriate; for instance, whether 
to grasp an object with one or two hands or a tool with an under- or overhand 
grip. These choices between action modes are not necessarily conscious or 
learned: even 4-month-old infants select one- or two-handed grasps dependent 
on object size (van Hof, van der Kamp, & Savelsbergh, 2002). Yet, the 
empirical evidence of vision for perception contributions in action mode 
selection is sparse and mostly restricted to observations with neurological 
patients.  
Dijkerman, Schindler, McIntosh, Nijboer, and Milner (2003) investigated 
the selection of different hand postures in patients who had either damage to the 
ventral or dorsal stream. The patients were asked to grasp a rectangular object 
by placing thumb and index finger at its two ends. The objects were presented in 
different orientations, increasing from 80 to 140° with respect to the 
participant’s mid-sagittal axis. Healthy participants were observed to switch 
from a ‘thumb to the left grip’ to a ‘thumb to the right grip’ when the object’s 
orientation exceeded 110° (Stelmach, Castiello, & Jeannerod, 1994). By 
contrast, patients with ventral damage failed to show a consistent switch in hand 
posture when the orientation of the object exceeded 110°, although they adjusted 
their hand posture to the objects’ orientation. A patient with damage to the 
dorsal stream did show the switch to a ‘thumb to the right’ grip, although she 
was reported to have problems with online adjustments of the hand orientation 
(Dijkerman, et al., 2003). In the same vein, patient D.F. with ventral stream 
damage has great difficulty when she must act upon complex stimuli. She was 
unable to produce appropriate grips when asked to grasp a transparent disc 
through holes cut in to it (McIntosh, Dijkerman, Mon-Williams, & Milner, 
2004). The neurological evidence thus implies that an intact ventral vision for 
perception system is needed when selecting between different action modes.  
Aside from the abovementioned studies with neurological patients there is 
almost no behavioral evidence to support the role of vision for perception in 
                                            
10  Originally, Milner and Goodale (1995) referred to this function as ‘planning’. 
Recently, there has been much debate over what ‘planning’ involves (Glover, 2004; Goodale 
& Milner, 2004). To avoid confusion, we therefore refer to this function as the selection of an 
action mode. 
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selecting an appropriate mode for action (cf. Passingham & Toni, 2001). Since a 
visual system that normally functions as a whole might be fragmented in case of 
damage, a better understanding of the contribution of the vision for perception 
system in action requires additional investigation in healthy participants 
(Bridgeman, 2002). Glover and Dixon (2001a) used an orientation illusion to 
examine the issue in healthy participants. A bar was placed in front of the 
participants at various orientations with a background grating, which induced 
the orientation illusion. Participants had the choice between grasping the bar 
with an over- or underhand grip. It was found that bar orientation at which the 
participants switched between the two grasping modes was affected by the 
illusory background. Although these observations are consistent with the 
contribution of vision for perception in action mode selection, they do not prove 
it. The tilt illusion is thought to originate from interactions between neurons in 
the primary visual cortex (V1), which projects to both the ventral and dorsal 
stream (Dyde & Milner, 2002). Consequently, an illusory bias in action mode 
selection would also be predicted when action mode selection is supported by 
the dorsal vision for action system.  
In this study we used the Müller-Lyer illusion. The illusion is generated at 
different levels of visual processing, including visual centers beyond V1 (e.g., 
Coren & Porac, 1983; Predebon, 2004; Radoeva, Cohen, Corballis, Lukovits, & 
Koleva, 2005). The Müller-Lyer illusion consists of a shaft with opposing 
arrowheads on each end. When the arrowhead points outward, the shaft is 
perceived longer than when it points inward. The illusion reflects that the 
perception of the size of a target is influenced by its spatial relation to the 
surrounding visual context (Greene & Nelson, 1997; Welch, Post, Lum, & 
Prinzmetal, 2004). The pick-up of invariants that emphasize the spatial 
relationship between an object and its surrounding (i.e., allocentric information) 
is considered an attribute that flags the participation of vision for perception 
processes. By contrast, vision for action primary relies on absolute metrics (i.e., 
egocentric information) (Goodale & Milner, 1992; Milner & Goodale, 1995; 
Bridgeman, 2002; Rossetti, 1998; Rossetti & Pisella, 2002). It has repeatedly 
been shown that the perceived length of a shaft depends upon the direction of 
the arrowheads, while grip scaling to pick up the shaft does (virtually) not (Otto-
de Haart, Carey, & Milne, 1999; Gentilucci, Chieffi, Daprati, Saetti, & Toni, 
1996; Radoeva et al., 2005; Westwood, McEachern, & Roy, 2001).  
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The particular twist of the present study is the use of relatively large shafts 
up to 20 cm. The smaller shafts are picked up with one hand between thumb and 
forefinger. However, if the shaft’s length exceeds a critical size (relative to hand 
span), then it will invoke a two-handed grasp (Cesari & Newell, 2000; van der 
Kamp, Savelsbergh, & Davis, 1998). Confronted with the shaft, the participant 
must select the appropriate grip (i.e., one- vs. two-handed). We hypothesized 
that if vision for perception has a pertinent role in the selection of an action 
mode, then the critical shaft length for which participants shift from a one- to a 
two-handed grasp would be influenced by the Müller-Lyer illusion. 
In the light of the neuro-anatomical data that suggest many 
interconnections between the ventral and dorsal streams (Rossetti & Pisella, 
2002), we also investigated whether vision for perception is solely responsible 
for grip selection or, alternatively, whether there are also contributions from 
vision for action in the selection of an appropriate action mode. For instance, 
Grafton, Fagg and Arbib (1998) used PET-scans to investigate brain activity 
while healthy participants performed a grip selection task based on arbitrary 
stimuli (e.g., use of a precision or power grip was specified by a red or green 
LED). They found grip selection related activity in both the dorsal premotor and 
in the intraparietal cortex (see also Grezes, Tucker, Armony, Ellis, & 
Passingham, 2003; Schluter, Krams, Rushworth, & Passingham, 2001). The 
activity in the parietal cortex suggests that the dorsal vision for action system 
contributes to grip selection as well. Hence, we compared the effects of the 
Müller-Lyer illusion on grip selection in different perception and action tasks, 
under the assumption that the magnitude of the illusory bias may depend on the 
relative contribution of the two systems. That is, in one of the perceptual tasks, 
the participants were asked to verbally indicate whether they would grasp the 
shaft with one or two hands, but they were not allowed to act (i.e., a relatively 
smaller influence of the vision for action system). By contrast, in the action task 
the participants were required to in fact grasp the shaft with one or two hands 
(i.e., a relatively larger engagement of vision for action). We anticipated that in 
the case that action mode selection involves interactive contributions of the two 
vision processes the illusory bias would be somewhat smaller for the action task 
as compared to the verbal judgment task due a relatively stronger reliance on 
egocentric information of vision for action (van der Kamp, Savelsbergh, & 
Rosengren, 2001). 
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Pre-planning of movement kinematics  
The role of the vision for perception in the planning of the movement kinematics 
before the onset of the action (Glover & Dixon, 2001a,b, 2002; Glover, 2002, 
2004) is more contentious. Optic ataxia patients (i.e., damage to the dorsal 
stream), for instance, exhibit normal pointing and grasping movements, at least 
when foveal targets do not change position during the movement (Rossetti, 
Pisella, & Vighetto; 2003; but see Jakobson, Archibald, Carey, & Goodale, 
1991). Glover (2003) proposes that optic ataxia is best characterized as a deficit 
in the visual online control of actions, with the planning of the movement 
kinematics remaining relatively intact. The interpretation follows from the 
planning-control model put forward by Glover and Dixon (Glover & Dixon, 
2001a,b, 2002; Glover, 2002, 2004). According to Glover (2004, p. 4) 
movement planning is responsible for such things as selecting an appropriate 
movement goal or target, selecting an appropriate mode of action (see above), 
but also includes the parameterization of the (initial) movement kinematics. It is 
important that unlike the subsequent online control of the movement, planning 
takes into account a wide variety of visual and cognitive information, not in the 
least the visual context surrounding a target. Vision for movement planning thus 
primarily entails allocentric information. Hence, illusions would only affect 
movement planning, not movement control. Empirical support for this position 
comes from a series of studies that revealed an illusory bias in the (early) 
movement kinematics that diminishes as the movement progresses (Glover & 
Dixon, 2001a,b, 2002). According to Glover (2004) this dynamic illusion effect 
reflects that the visual movement planning operates before movement initiation 
and accommodates the initial kinematics of the movement. After the movement 
has been initiated it comes increasingly under the authority of the online visual 
control system, which corrects for the illusory bias. Glover proposes that the 
allocentric information (i.e., visual context) included in the movement planning 
process is supported by projections from the ventral stream to the inferior 
parietal lobe, the latter being thought to be the prime neural base that underlies 
movement planning (Glover, 2004, p. 6). Yet, attempts to replicate the dynamic 
illusion effect have not always been successful (Danckert, Sharif, Haffenden, 
Schiff, & Goodale, 2002; Franz, 2003; Franz, Scharnowski, & Gegenfurtner, 
2005; Heath, Rival, & Neely, 2006; Heath, Rival, Westwood, & Neely, 2005; 
Meegan, Glazebrook, Dhillon, Tremblay, Welsh, & Elliot, 2004). This has 
raised doubts on the involvement of allocentric information, and hence the 
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contribution of vision for perception processes, to the planning of the (initial) 
movement kinematics. Westwood and Goodale (2003) further question the 
putative role of vision for perception in the planning of the movement 
kinematics. They found no size-contrast illusion on the grasping kinematics 
(which would flag the use of allocentric information) when the target object was 
visible until the hand started to move. By contrast, a size-contrast illusion was 
observed when the object was occluded earlier, at the time the onset of the 
movement was signalled. According to Westwood and Goodale (2003) this 
shows that the planning of the (initial) movement kinematics occurs de novo 
each time a decision to act is made. Planning is based on vision for action and 
not on vision for perception. We investigate the role of vision for perception in 
movement planning by assessing whether grip aperture is affected by the 
Müller-Lyer illusion, and whether the effect diminishes as the movement 
proceeds. If the conjecture is correct that vision for perception plays a role in the 
planning of the (initial) movement kinematics, than an illusory bias in the grasp 
kinematics should occur. By contrast, if vision for action supports planning, then 
the grasp kinematics should be immune to the illusion.  
 
In short, we investigate the extent to which vision for perception contributes in 
action. To this end, we establish the influence of contextual, allocentric 
information on three action components: viz., selection of the action mode, 
planning of the (initial) movement kinematics and online movement control 
after movement onset. 
 
Methods 
Participants 
Ten right-handed volunteers (three males, seven females) aged 19-25 years 
participated in the experiment. Participants reported having normal or corrected 
to normal vision and were naïve as to the purpose of the experiment. They gave 
their written consent prior to the experiment and were treated in accordance with 
the local institution’s ethical guidelines. 
 
Apparatus 
The participants sat at a table. In each trial they were presented with two dark 
grey Müller-Lyer stimuli on a white background. The stimuli were made of an 
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aluminium bar with cardboard arrowheads. The bars were 1 cm in height and 
width and ranged in length between 13 and 20 cm, the precise measures of 
which were dependent on the participants’ maximal hand aperture (see 
Procedure). The arrowheads were 3 cm long, and the angle between the 
arrowheads and the bar was 50°. In each trial, an inward and an outward 
stimulus were presented simultaneously. The target stimulus was positioned 20 
cm to the right of the participant’s body midline and 40 cm from the frontal 
plane. The reference stimulus was located 20 cm to the right of the body midline 
and 48 cm from the frontal plane. Both bars were horizontally oriented. The 
hands’ starting position was marked by a black dot, which was positioned 20 cm 
to the right of the body midline and 15 cm from the frontal plane. The Optotrak 
3020 motion-analysis system (Northern Digital, Waterloo, Ontario) was used to 
record aperture between the left and right middle fingers and the right thumb 
and middle finger. To this end, infra-red light emitting diodes were placed on 
the two middle fingers and the right thumb. The sample frequency was 200 Hz. 
 
Procedure 
Each participant visited the laboratory three times. During the first visit, the 
participants grasped bars without arrowheads that were between 13 and 20 cm 
long. They were told to grasp as many bars as possible at the longitudinal axis 
with one hand between thumb and middle finger, but not to drop the bar. If the 
bar was too long to be grasped with one hand, they were told to use both hands 
and grasp the bar between the middle fingers of the two hands. We established 
the length of the bar at which the participant switched from grasping the bar 
with one hand to grasping the bar with both hands. After the length of the 
‘switching bar’ was determined, the participant was familiarised with the 
procedures for the next visits in which Müller-Lyer stimuli were used. The 
reference stimulus’ bar was identical to the length of the switching bar. The 
length of the thirteen target stimulus bars ranged from the length of the 
switching bar minus 1.5 cm to the length of the switching bar plus 1.5 cm in 
steps of 0.25 cm (e.g., for a 16 cm switching bar, bars ranged from 14.5 to 17.5 
cm). The length of the target stimulus will be expressed relative to the length of 
the switching bar (from -1.5 cm to 1.5 cm). Both the inward and the outward 
configurations served as target stimuli. Each bar was presented 4 times, resulting 
in a total of 104 trials (=13 lengths x 2 configurations x 4 repetitions), which 
were presented in a random order. 
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Each participant performed four tasks. They were asked 1) to make a 
verbal judgement of size (VSJ) of target stimulus relative to the reference 
stimulus (i.e., ‘shorter’, ‘same’ or ‘longer’), the experimenter recorded the 
answer on a sheet of paper; 2) to make a manual estimation of the length (MLE) 
by either adjusting the aperture between the right thumb and middle finger, or 
the gap between the two middle fingers to match the length of the target 
stimulus. The participants were told not to make any forward movements and 
that they could compare the size of the aperture between their fingers with the 
length of the target bar. After the participants signalled that the aperture matched 
the length of the target bar, a 1 second recording of the aperture was taken; 3) to 
make a verbal estimation on the mode of action (VAE; i.e., ‘one-handed’ or 
‘two-handed’ grasp’) they would use had they been required to grasp the target 
stimulus. The experimenter recorded the answer on a sheet of paper; 4) to 
actually grasp (G) the target stimulus along its longitudinal axis with either one 
or two hands. The participants were instructed to make a natural grasp. The 
movement was recorded with Optotrak, and the mode of action was recorded on 
a sheet of paper.  
In all tasks, the participants closed their eyes before each trial and placed 
the middle finger and thumb of both hands on the starting position. The 
participants opened their eyes after the experimenter had given a verbal signal 
and performed the trial. The eyes were closed when the trial was completed. 
During the second and third visits, two of the four tasks were performed, the 
order of which was counterbalanced between participants. Each visit took about 
one and a half hour and took place on separate days. 
 
Data analysis 
Behavioral measures 
For each task the illusory bias in action mode selection (i.e., one-handed vs. 
two-handed) was determined to asses the degree to which vision for perception 
was involved in the different tasks (VSJ, MLE, VAE, and G). For the VSJ task, 
the ‘shorter’, ‘same’ and ‘longer’ responses were given a score of 0.0, 0.5 and 
1.0, respectively. For each participant, separate logistic (S-shaped) functions 
were fitted through the mean scores of each target length for the inward and 
outward Müller-Lyer configurations on the basis of a least squares fitting 
method (e.g., responses ‘same’, ‘same’, ‘shorter’, ‘same’ for one particular 
target length gives a mean score of 0.375). The function was of the form where 
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y is the assigned score (i.e., fraction two-handed grasps, x is the length of the 
target stimulus, c is the target stimulus length at the 50% point (i.e., y = 0.5), and 
k is a measure of the slope at this point, 
( )
1
1 k x c
y
e− −
= +                 (Eq. 4.1) 
This model was then used to determine the length of the target bar that the 
participants judged to be of equal length as the reference bar (i.e., y = 0.5). For 
the MLE, VAE, and G tasks a similar procedure was used. The proportion of 
two-handed responses was determined for each of 13 target stimuli lengths. For 
each participant, separate logistic functions (see Eq. 4.1) were fitted through the 
scores for the inward and outward target configurations for each task. The model 
was then used to determine the length of the target stimulus at which 50% of the 
responses were two-handed. To test the effect of the Müller-Lyer illusion within 
and between tasks, the lengths of the target shaft at the 50% points were 
submitted to a 4(task: VSJ, MLE, VAE, G) x 2(illusion: inward, outward 
Müller-Lyer configuration) analysis of variance with repeated measures on all 
factors (RM-ANOVA). Furthermore to asses if the Müller-Lyer illusion affects 
the four tasks to the same degree (reflected in the presence of the illusion at 
shorter and/or longer shaft lengths), the fitted fraction of two-handed grasps at 
each target length were submitted to a 4(task: VSJ, MLE, VAE, G) x 2(illusion: 
inward, outward Müller-Lyer configuration) x 13(length: -1.50, -1.25, -1.00, -
0.75, -0.50, -0.25, 0.00, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 1.00, 1.25, 1.50 cm difference with the 
switching bar) RM-ANOVA. 
 
Kinematic measures 
To assess the magnitude of the illusory bias in the kinematics of grasping, the 
aperture in the MLE-task (i.e., average distance between the two middle fingers 
or between the middle finger and the thumb) was compared to the aperture in the 
G-task (i.e., the maximal aperture between the two middle fingers or between 
the middle finger and the thumb). For this purpose, we included data of the two-
handed grasps for the five largest target stimuli and the three smallest target 
stimuli for the one-handed grasps. All data of the other stimuli were excluded, 
the reason being that the maximal aperture of the one-handed grasps may suffer 
from a ceiling effect (i.e., the participant was required to pick-up as many bars 
with one hand as possible). Only the bars that were grasped at least twice with 
one or two hands were included in the analysis. These were the five longest and 
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three shortest target stimuli. The individual means were submitted to a 2(task: 
MLE, G) by 2 (illusion: inward, outward Müller-Lyer configuration) RM-
ANOVA.  
 
Finally, we examined whether the magnitude of the illusory bias changed with 
the unfolding of the movement. We first determined movement time (MT). This 
was defined as the difference between the moment of onset of the grasp (i.e., the 
time at which the resultant velocity of the right middle finger in case of one-
handed grasps, and right or left middle finger for two handed grasps, depending 
on which was first moved, exceeded 20 mm/s) and the moment of grasp end 
(i.e., the time of the first sample after maximal closing velocity between thumb 
and middle finger or both middle fingers at which the velocity of the aperture 
was larger than -10 mm/s for nine consecutive samples). We subsequently 
calculated the aperture at 10% MT, 20% MT, and so on until 100% MT. This 
was done for the averages of the one-handed grasps for the three smallest target 
stimuli and for the two-handed grasps for the five largest target stimuli. The 
individual means were then submitted to a 2(illusion: inward, outward Müller-
Lyer configuration) by 10(time: 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100% MT) 
RM-ANOVA.  
 In the case when the sphericity assumption for the RM-ANOVAs was 
violated (i.e., epsilons smaller than 1.0), we report Huyn-Feldt adjustments of 
the p-values. To assess the differences between means, the ANOVAs were 
followed up with Tukey HSD-tests (p < 0.05), which control for Type I errors. 
 
Results 
Action mode selection 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the effect of the Müller-Lyer illusion on perceived length 
in the verbal length estimation task (VSJ). Participants perceived the shaft length 
for the inward configuration to be shorter than the shaft length of the outward 
configuration in the VSJ task. A similar illusory bias is apparent for the use of 
one or two hands in the manual estimation of shaft length (MLE), the verbal 
action estimate (VAE), and the grasping (G) tasks (Figure 4.1). For the outward 
configuration the participants showed a predominance of using two hands at 
shorter shaft lengths compared to the inward configuration. Figure 4.1 also 
shows the logistic function fits. Details of these fits are reported in Table 4.1. An 
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Figure 4.1. The effects of the Müller-Lyer illusion as a function of task. a) The verbal 
judgment of perceived size (VSJ) relative to the reference stimulus. b, c, & d) The 
proportion of two-handed grasps in relation to the length of the shaft of the target 
stimulus for each configuration (filled and open symbols for the outward and inward 
Müller-Lyer configurations, respectively). The lines represent the best logistic function 
through the individual participants’ means of each configuration (n = 10). Error bars 
represent standard error. 
 
 
Table 4.1. Parameters of the logistic function (Eq. 4.1) that best fitted the data for each of 
the four tasks.  
 VSJ MLE VAE G 
 outward inward outward inward outward inward outward inward 
k 3.2446 3.5414 2.8431 2.6093 3.8700 3.1754 2.3812 2.7563 
         
c -0.2461 0.1239 -0.2155 0.2849 -0.3022 0.2735 -0.3124 0.3077 
         
r 0.9951 0.9983 0.9942 0.9900 0.9958 0.9919 0.9948 0.9844 
         
p 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0004 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0010 
k is steepness at y = 0.5, c is the shaft length at y = 0.5, r is the regression coefficient, and 
p is the significance level. 
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analysis of variance of the shaft length at which 50% of the responses were two-
handed (i.e., c in Eq. 4.1), which were derived from the logistic logistic fits of 
each participant’s individual data, indicated an effect of illusion (F(1, 9) = 59.8, 
p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.87). However, no effects for task (F(3, 27) = 0.18) and task x 
illusion (F(3, 27) = 0.96) were found. Moreover, an ANOVA on the proportion 
of two-handed grasps at each target stimulus length revealed effects of illusion 
(F(1, 9) = 60.1, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.87), length (F(12, 108) = 197.0, p < 0.001, ηp2 
= 0.96) and illusion x length (F(12, 108) = 12.6, p < 0.001, ηp 2 = 0.58). Post hoc 
tests indicated that only target stimulus lengths (i.e., -0.50, -0.25, 0.00, 0.25, and 
0.50 cm) around the switching bar (as determined during the participant’s first 
lab visit) showed an illusory bias. The ANOVA did not reveal significant effects 
of task, indicating that the magnitude of the illusory bias was not different 
between tasks. 
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Figure 4.2. Effects of the Müller-Lyer illusion on aperture in the manual length 
estimation (MLE) and grasping (G) tasks. Error bars represent the standard error. 
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Kinematic measures 
The data of nine participants were included in the kinematical analysis11. We 
first compared the aperture in the manual length estimation task (MLE) with the 
maximal aperture in the grasping task (G). This revealed significant main effects 
of task (F(1, 8) = 45.6, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.85) and illusion (F(1, 8) = 28.4, p < 
0.001, ηp2 = 0.78). In addition, the task x illusion interaction was found to be 
significant (F(1, 8) = 13.4, p < 0.01, ηp2 = 0.63). Tukey’s HSD tests showed a 
clear illusory bias in manual matching, but not in grasping. In addition, maximal 
hand aperture was significantly larger for the grasping task than for the manual 
matching task (Figure 4.2). 
 
To test the illusory bias during the unfolding of the grasp (Figure 4.3) an 
analysis of variance on the time course of the grip aperture was conducted12. The 
analysis of variance revealed an effect of time (F(9, 72) = 96.1, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 
0.92), with peak hand aperture around 75% of the movement time. The main 
effect of illusion was not found to be significant (F(1, 8) = 2.4). However, the 
illusion x time interaction (F(9, 72) = 3.7, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.31) was found to be 
significant, although with a modest effect size. Tukey’s HSD tests indicated that 
at 30, 40, and 50% MT the grip aperture for the outward target configuration 
                                            
11  Due to technical failure and some participants falling short to consistently contact the 
middle fingers or the thumb and the middle finger at the start of each trial, we were not 
always able to obtain the kinematics for both the one- and two-handed attempts. Hence, we 
used the two-handed grasp of seven and the one-handed trials of nine participants for analysis. 
For six participants the data of both types of grasp were available. A comparison of the 
illusory bias in hand aperture between the one- and two-handed grasps among those six 
participants did not reveal significant differences. This was true for both the hand apertures at 
each 10% MT interval and for the maximal hand aperture.  
12  We do not report the scaled dynamic illusion as proposed by Glover & Dixon 
(2001a,b, 2002; cf. Heath et al., 2006). Rather than on the individual participant’s data, 
Glover and Dixon’s method to calculate the scaled illusion is partly based on group averages 
(e.g., the extent to which movement adjustments at any point in time are dependent on object 
properties). We concur with Franz (2003, Franz et al., 2005) that this method underestimates 
the variability of the scaled illusion effect, and hence increases the likelihood of finding a 
scaled effect that actually does not exist. However, when we calculated the individual scaled 
illusion effects, we found that for most participants there was hardly any variation in aperture 
with the size of the target for a substantial amount of the movement duration (up to 60% MT). 
The resultant large peak values of the scaled illusion effect made a reliable conclusion 
unfeasible. For the record, we did calculate the scaled dynamic illusion following the 
procedure proposed by Glover and Dixon (2002). That analysis did not reveal evidence for the 
presence of a scaled dynamic illusion effect. 
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was significantly larger than the grip aperture for the inward target 
configuration. 
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Figure 4.3. Dynamic illusion: time course of the aperture (mm) toward inward and 
outward Müller-Lyer configurations for grasping (left panel), and illusion effect 
(aperture toward outward minus aperture toward inward target configurations) at each 
10% MT (right panel). Error bars represent standard error. 
 
Discussion 
Action mode selection 
The present study set out to assess the contributions of vision for perception 
processes in action. One hypothesis is that the vision for perception is involved 
in the selection of an appropriate action mode (Bridgeman, 2002; Creem & 
Proffitt, 2001; Goodale & Humphrey, 1998; Milner & Goodale, 1995; 
Passingham & Toni, 2001; Rossetti & Pisella, 2002). Surprisingly, however, 
empirical evidence to support such a contention is scarce, particularly in the case 
of healthy participants performing meaningful actions in visually unperturbed 
(i.e., full vision) situations. We therefore assessed the involvement of vision for 
perception in action mode selection by investigating whether action mode 
selection is affected by allocentric visual information. Participants grasped target 
stimuli that either elicited a one-hand or two-handed mode of action dependent 
on the length of the stimulus. We found that for the outward target configuration 
participants selected a two-handed grasp at shorter shaft lengths as compared to 
the inward target configuration. The illusory bias clearly indicates that the 
selection of grip type involves allocentric information. We conclude that vision 
for perception processes, which are probably supported by the ventral stream, 
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contributes to the selection of an appropriate mode of action. Because the 
Müller-Lyer illusion may operate at V1 or lower levels, one could argue that this 
conclusion is not necessarily true. Nevertheless, our finding that the maximal 
aperture during grasping was not affected by the illusion (see also below) makes 
it more likely that with the relative large stimuli used in the present study, the 
illusion resulted from activity in areas beyond V1 that are part of the ventral 
stream. 
The many interactions between the dorsal and ventral streams (Rossetti & 
Pisella, 2002) suggest that both vision for perception and vision for action 
processes constrain action mode selection. By comparing tasks that are likely to 
entail different degrees of involvement of vision for action, we explored whether 
vision for action moderates the contribution of vision for perception (see 
Norman, 2002; van der Kamp et al., 2001). The present behavioral findings, 
however, did not provide support for this contention. That is, the illusory bias in 
the verbal action estimate task was of the same order of magnitude as that during 
grasping. Also the illusory biases in the manual length estimation and verbal 
size judgment tasks were of similar magnitude. This indicates that when 
choosing an appropriate grip type, allocentric information had a comparable 
influence irrespective of whether the participant intended to actually grasp the 
object. Hence, there is no evidence that a relatively larger engagement of vision 
for action mitigates the contribution of vision for perception. A number of 
authors have argued that the perception of objects in terms of the possibilities 
they offer for action (i.e., ‘affordances’, Gibson, 1979) should be viewed as a 
process that is primarily supported by dorsal stream activity (e.g., Hodges, Spatt, 
& Patterson, 1999; Norman, 2002). Norman (2002, p. 86), for instance, argues 
that the perception of (physical) affordances, like whether a particular object is 
graspable, ties in with what we know about the dorsal vision for action system. 
In light of the present study, however, such a position can no longer be 
maintained; clearly, vision for perception contributes as well. 
Our claim that in healthy participants in unrestricted circumstances vision 
for perception is needed for the selection of appropriate action is not completely 
new. Thus far, however, conclusive evidence was lacking. On the one hand, 
some have, based upon fMRI imaging, suggested a role of the ventral stream 
and that of its prefrontal projections in action selection (e.g., Passingham & 
Toni, 2001). However, most tasks in these studies involved memorized or rather 
arbitrary relations between the visual stimulus and the action response (e.g., the 
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presentation of a red triangle requires a wave of thumbs up). It is unclear to what 
degree this reflects the ventral vision for perception system’s functioning in 
more meaningful actions like grasping. On the other hand, Creem and Proffitt 
(2001) observed that a concurrent semantic task interfered with grasping objects 
appropriately by their handles. By contrast, a concurrent visuospatial task did 
not impair grasping. These observations are consistent with the involvement of 
vision for perception in action mode selection. Nonetheless, grasping familiar 
tools by their handles seem to require some ‘semantic’ information about its 
functional identity. Rather than a disruption of vision for perception per se, the 
failure to grasp tools appropriately may have been caused by semantic 
interference. By contrast, the manipulation of allocentric information allows a 
much more direct assessment of the role of vision for perception in action mode 
selection. The present study unambiguously shows that allocentric information 
is exploited in the selection of the appropriate action response mode.  
 
Pre-planning of the movement kinematics 
The present findings with respect to action mode selection are supportive for the 
two competing models of ventral and dorsal systems’ functioning. Both the 
perception-action model (Milner & Goodale, 1995) and the planning-control 
model (Glover, 2004) assert that the vision for perception processes would be 
involved in action mode selection. The two models, however, clearly depart with 
respect to their role in the pre-planning or initial parameterization of the 
movement kinematics. According to the perception-action model, the 
specification of the movement kinematics occurs online and is supported by 
dorsal vision for action processes. By contrast, Glover (2004) has proposed that 
this initial parameterization is part and parcel of one and the same ‘planning’ 
process that also includes action mode selection, and involves the ventral vision 
for perception system (Goodale & Milner, 2004, p. 38). 
The illusory bias was significantly larger in the manual length estimation 
(MLE) than in grasping. In fact, an illusion could not be demonstrated at 
maximal aperture. The nonappearance of the illusion would have unequivocally 
supported the perception-action model, in which separate vision systems 
underlie perception and action (Milner & Goodale, 1995). Yet, the illusion did 
affect the aperture during the first half of the grasp, although to a much smaller 
degree than in the manual length estimation. The illusion disappeared as the 
hand(s) approached the target object. This observation of a dynamic illusion 
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effect is inconsistent with previous reports that illusions affect the entire time 
course of a movement (e.g., Franz, 2003). Instead, the dynamic illusion is 
consistent with the use of world-centered or allocentric information in the pre-
planning of the movement kinematics as anticipated by the planning-control 
model (Glover & Dixon, 2001a,b; Glover, 2004). The argument is that pre-
planning of the action involves vision for perception that exploits allocentric 
information and causes the illusory bias early in the movement. Once the 
movement is initiated, however, corrections are made through the separate 
vision for action processes that rely on egocentric information. Hence, the 
magnitude of the illusion decreases with the unfolding of the movement.  
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Figure 4.4. The dynamic illusion effect for each individual participant. The open circles 
indicate the participants who performed the grasping task (G) immediately after the 
verbal action estimation task (VAE). 
 
Despite the apparent support, it is worthy of mentioning that the data is 
not completely unambiguous with respect to the planning-control model; 
alternative explanations can not be ruled out. The illusion in the early part of the 
movement was rather small (and its presence could not be substantiated in our 
provisional analyses for the scaled dynamic illusion effect, see footnote 12). 
Why is that? One suggestion would be that the occurrence of the dynamic 
illusion effect is restricted to particular (experimental) circumstances. Perusal of 
Figure 4.4, which plots the dynamic illusion effect for each individual 
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participant, reveals that the presence of the dynamic illusion effect is obvious 
only in two participants, or at best in four. Interestingly, three of these 
participants (indicated by the open circles, Figure 4.4) were the only participants 
who did the grasping task immediately after (and in the same session) they had 
done the verbal action mode estimation task (i.e., VAE). It might be that the 
preceding VAE-task might have encouraged participants to reflect upon (or even 
verbalize to themselves) the choice between a one- and two-handed grasp, 
before or during action execution, resulting in an inclination to use allocentric 
information. Rossetti (Rossetti, 1998; Rossetti & Pisella, 2002; see also 
Bridgeman, Peery, & Anand, 1997; Carrozzo, Stratta, McIntyre, & Lacquaniti, 
2002; Gentilucci, Benuzzi, Bertolani, Daprati, & Gangitano, 2000; Gentilucci & 
Gangitano, 1998), for example, reported that simultaneous verbalization can 
force movement planning and control processes to exploit allocentric 
information. It is not entirely clear whether such allocentric structuring of the 
movement would stem from parallel contributions of the two vision systems, or 
whether, as the planning-control model implicates, it would result from a direct 
involvement of the vision for perception in the pre-planning of movement 
kinematics. 
 
In sum, the use of allocentric information in the choice between one- and two-
handed grasps underscores that vision for perception contributes to action; it 
informs that part of planning that is responsible for the selection of an 
appropriate mode of action (see Milner & Goodale, 1995; Glover, 2004). 
Contributions of vision for perception beyond action mode selection are more 
contentious. Although we find traces of the use of contextual, allocentric 
information in the early kinematics of the movement, our findings do not 
support the proposition of an across the board contribution of vision for 
perception processes in the pre-planning or initial parameterization of movement 
kinematics. Instead, we suggest that such contribution is restricted to particular 
circumstances only (e.g., a relative explicit way of monitoring the action). If 
confirmed, this would suggest that action mode selection and initial 
parameterization are not part and parcel of the same process as proposed by 
Glover (2004; cf. Milner & Goodale, 1995; Goodale & Milner, 2004). 
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Abstract 
The present study addresses the role of vision for perception in determining the 
location of a target in far-aiming. Participants (n = 12) slid a disk toward a 
distant target embedded in illusory Judd figures. Additionally, in a perception 
task, participants indicated when a moving pointer reached the midpoint of the 
Judd figures. The number of hits, the number of misses to the left and to the right 
of the target, the sliding error (in mm) and perceptual judgment error (in mm) 
served as dependent variables for sliding accuracy. Results showed an illusory 
bias in sliding, the magnitude of which was comparable to the bias in the 
perception of target location. The determination of target location in far-aiming 
is thus based on allocentric information. We argue that vision for perception 
sets the boundary constraints for action and that within these constraints vision 
for action autonomously controls movement execution, but alternative accounts 
are discussed as well. 
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Introduction 
Goodale and Milner’s (1992) proposal that the dorsal and ventral systems can be 
distinguished by the functional demands that they serve in action and perception, 
has explicated a confusion of neurophysiological and behavioral observations. 
Nevertheless, contributions to action by the ventral system, if any, are not 
clearly understood (Glover, 2004; Milner & Goodale, 2008). Hence, rather than 
address the distinction between vision for perception and vision for action13, we 
aimed to assess the role of vision for perception in the course of action. To this 
end, we investigated a far-aiming task that was modeled on a traditional Dutch 
sport called shuffle-boarding (‘sjoelen’), in which players slide disks toward a 
distant target. 
 
According to Milner and Goodale vision for perception serves to obtain 
knowledge about the environment, using information that specifies objects and 
their properties in relation to surrounding objects in relative metrics (i.e., 
allocentric information). They further argued that vision for action supports 
movement control and relies on information that specifies objects in relation to 
the actor in absolute metrics (i.e., egocentric information). Research using visual 
illusions has shown that perception of object properties, such as size and 
location, depends strongly on visual context, attesting to the use of allocentric 
information. Movement control, in contrast, remains relatively unaffected by 
visual context, suggesting that egocentric information is used (Agliotti, De 
Souza, & Goodale, 1995; Ganel, Tanzer, & Goodale, 2008). The role of vision 
for perception, however, is not confined to perception. Milner and Goodale 
(2008; van der Kamp, Rivas, van Doorn, & Savelsbergh, 2008) argued that the 
perception or identification of action goals and the selection of an appropriate 
action entail key contributions from vision for perception. For example, van 
Doorn, van der Kamp, and Savelsbergh (2007; see also Crajé, van der Kamp, & 
Steenbergen, 2008) recently demonstrated that in picking up relatively large 
objects the choice of either a one- or a two-handed grasp is affected by an 
                                            
13  We only obtained behavioral data. Hence, our claims are restricted to behavior and are 
necessarily suggestive with respect to the underlying neural circuitry. We use ‘vision for 
perception’ and ‘vision for action’ to refer to the behavioral processes of detecting and using 
visual information for perception and action. 
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illusion. The control of hand aperture, however, remained unaffected. In short, 
vision for perception and vision for action appear to serve distinct yet 
complementary functions in action. Vision for perception sets the boundary 
constraints for action, and within these constraints the movements are 
autonomously controlled by vision for action (Milner & Goodale, 2008). 
 
The present study addresses the roles of vision for perception and action in 
aiming towards a target. In particular, we asked what type of information is used 
to determine the location of a target. One conjecture is that target location is 
specified relative to its context. That is, vision for perception determines the 
target location relative to adjacent objects in the environment and sets this 
location as the boundary constraint for action. Informed by vision for 
perception, vision for action subsequently exploits (egocentric) information that 
specifies this target location in absolute metrics to the actor (Gentilucci et al., 
1996). Inaccurate aiming would reflect errors in the initial determination of 
target location by vision for perception. An alternative conjecture is that vision 
for action independently (i.e., without engagement of vision for perception) uses 
instantaneous information pertaining to the target location in relation to the 
actor, without taking the broader visual context into account. For movement 
control, this may be more efficient than relying on ‘delayed’ target location 
information provided by vision for perception (Westwood & Goodale, 2003). 
 
Unlike far-aiming, near-aiming, especially pointing, is well-researched in this 
context. In the typical study, participants make pointing movements to the 
endpoints of a line embedded in illusory surroundings, such as a Müller-Lyer 
figure (e.g., Gentilucci et al., 1996). A recent review of the extant literature on 
pointing revealed that under full vision conditions (i.e., with both the target and 
the hand in view) endpoint accuracy is largely immune to illusory 
configurations. Only when vision of the target is removed (particularly before 
movement onset) does significant movement bias occur (Bruno, Bernardis, & 
Gentilucci, 2008). In full vision, however, aiming reflects movement control that 
is based on target location information that is coded egocentrically in absolute 
metrics (e.g., the gap between hand position and target location). This online 
control is attributed to vision for action. 
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Importantly, in near-aiming, control of hand position is possible until contact is 
made with the target. Hence, analysis of only endpoint accuracy (as in Bruno et 
al.’s (2008) review) leaves doubts about whether determination of target 
location engages vision for perception. It would be more convincing to study 
pointing with no opportunity for participants to view their hand, or the target, 
during movement execution (Westwood & Goodale, 2003). In visual open-loop 
conditions, initial errors in perceived target location cannot be annulled by 
online vision for action control as the movement unfolds. Yet, these conditions 
still allow propriocepsis to reduce pointing error. Moreover, Gentilucci et al. 
(1996) reported that in full vision the Müller-Lyer figure affected the entire 
kinematics of the pointing movement (although the precise scope of the bias is 
difficult to quantify). This observation led Gentilucci et al. (1996) to speculate 
that initial aiming was based on allocentric information comprising visual 
context. 
 
Contrary to near-aiming, in far-aiming (e.g., sliding a disk toward a distant 
target) movement control (both visual and proprioceptive) is necessarily 
confined to the moment the object is released. Hence, the issue of what type of 
information (i.e., egocentric or allocentric) is used to determine target location 
may be more appropriately resolved using far- rather than near-aiming tasks. 
Two studies speak to this point, but provide ambiguous results. Glover and 
Dixon (2004) had participants step and hop from one end of a Müller-Lyer 
figure to the other end under full vision. A small illusion effect (< 3%) was 
discerned, but its magnitude might have been reduced by the moving body 
occluding the target, especially in the stepping task. More recently, van der 
Kamp and Masters (2008) reported that throwing accuracy in handball is 
influenced by the goalkeeper’s posture. Notably, the goalkeeper mimicked an 
amputated Müller-Lyer figure by raising the arms skyward (i.e., outward 
Müller-Lyer figure), stretching them to the side (i.e., neutral figure) or pointing 
them downward (i.e., inward figure). These goalkeeper postures affected the 
perceived size of the goalkeeper in accordance with the Müller-Lyer illusion. 
Intriguingly, participants threw the ball further from the goalkeeper when the 
arms were raised skywards than when the arms were stretched to the side. 
However, when the arms were pointing downward, the ball was not thrown 
closer to the goalkeeper. Although this might suggest the use of allocentric 
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information, it cannot be ruled out that the effects of goalkeeper posture on 
throwing accuracy are related to factors other than the illusory size of the 
goalkeeper (e.g., the arms up goalkeeper may look more aggressive). 
 
To further investigate what type of information defines the target location in far 
aiming, we asked participants to slide a disk over the exact midpoint of a line 
that was embedded in a Judd figure. We assumed that influences of visual 
context (i.e., the arrowheads) are indicative for the use of relative metrics (i.e., 
allocentric information), pointing to contributions from vision for perception 
rather than vision for action (Ganel et al., 2008). Hence, if there is a role for 
vision for perception in far-aiming, then sliding accuracy will be biased by the 
illusion. 
 
Methods 
Participants 
Twelve right-handed undergraduates of the University of Hong Kong (mean age 
21.6 yr, SD = 1.3) volunteered to participate. They were treated in accordance 
with the local institution’s ethical guidelines and gave written consent prior to 
the experiment. 
 
Apparatus 
Participants were seated in front of a table (152 cm in length and 137 cm in 
width). Three visual targets were used, consisting of black lines embedded in a 
Judd figure with the arrowheads pointing to the right or to the left, or without 
arrowheads. Commonly, the arrowheads affect perception of the midpoint of the 
line such that the perceived midpoint is shifted to the right for arrowheads 
pointing to the left and vice versa. The lines, which were printed on a sheet of 
paper, measured 8 cm in length and 2 cm in width, while the arrowheads were 2 
cm in length and had an inclination of 45° to the line. The targets were placed in 
the middle of the table or 2 cm to the right or left of the middle, at a distance of 
120 cm from the front edge of the table where the participant was seated. A red 
block (1 x 1 x 1 cm) served as the target during practice trials. A Chinese 
chequer disk (2 cm in diameter and 1 cm in height) served as the projectile. Two 
pre-calibrated cameras of a QualisysTM 3-D motion capture system recorded 
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the trajectory of the disk at 100 Hz. Reflective tape made the disk visible. There 
were two reference markers at the edges of the table aligned with the target. 
 
Procedure and design 
The participants performed an action and a perception task. For the action task, 
the participants started with a series of 100 practice trials. They were instructed 
to aim the disk at the red target block by making a sliding action. Participants 
observed the experimenter produce the sliding action to become acquainted with 
how to hold, move and release the disk. After the practice trials, the participants 
were instructed to propel the disk over the exact midpoint of the target line that 
was presented on the table top (Figure 5.1). They made a total of 90 sliding 
actions to 3 different target lines (i.e., line without arrowheads (‘control’), line 
with Judd figure arrowheads pointing to the left (‘Judd left’), line with 
arrowheads to the right (‘Judd right’)) at three positions (i.e., middle of the table 
and 2 cm to the right or left of the middle). The 9 conditions were presented in 
blocks of 10 trials, the order of which was randomized across participants. The 
participants propelled the disks one at a time and at their own pace. Short rest 
intervals were provided between blocks. 
 
For the perception task, the experimenter moved a pointer slowly behind the line 
from the left to the right (and vice versa in the other half of the trials). The 
participants were told to say ‘stop’ when they perceived that the pointer was at 
the exact midpoint of the line. Participants were allowed to alter their estimate if 
they had second thoughts about its correctness. The experimenter then marked 
the estimated midpoint on the sheet. A fresh sheet was used for each estimate. 
The same 9 conditions (i.e., same target lines and positions) as in the action task 
were used. They were presented in blocks with the order randomized across 
participants. Each condition was presented 4 times, resulting in 36 trials. Finally, 
the order of the perception and action tasks was counterbalanced between 
participants. 
 
Judd illusion in far-aiming 
 106
 
Figure 5.1. Schematic representation of the experimental set-up (i.e., not to scale). 
Depicted is a Judd left figure in the mid position 
 
Data analysis 
For the action task, the trajectory of the disk was used to compute the location 
where the disk crossed the target line. Sliding error was defined as the difference 
(in mm) between this location and the midpoint of the line. If the absolute 
sliding error was smaller than 10 mm (i.e., the disk touched the midpoint) a hit 
was scored, otherwise a miss to the left (i.e., error < -10 mm) or to the right (i.e., 
error > +10 mm) was scored. For the perception task, the judgment error was 
defined as the difference (in mm) between the estimated and the actual 
midpoint. We submitted both the sliding error and the perceptual judgment error 
to an ANOVA (Target: control, Judd left, Judd right) with repeated measures. 
The number of hits and the number of misses to the left and right were examined 
using a MANOVA (Target: control, Judd left, Judd right) with repeated 
measures. Post hoc comparisons were made using Tukey HSD, and ηp2 was used 
as the measure of effect size. Finally, the difference between the Judd right and 
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Judd left figures for the sliding and perceptual judgment errors served as 
indicators for the illusory bias in the action and perception tasks, respectively. T-
tests were used to assess whether the bias differed from zero. 
 
Results 
For the action task, the participants generally aimed to the left of the midpoint of 
the target line, but less so when it was embedded in the Judd left figure (Table 
5.1). The ANOVA confirmed that sliding error was significantly influenced by 
Target (F(2, 22) = 4.07, p < 0.05, ηp2 = 0.27). Post hoc tests indicated differences 
in error between the Judd left and Judd right figures and between the Judd left 
and control figures, but not between the Judd right and control figures. Figure 
5.2 presents the illusory bias for each individual participant. Ten out of twelve 
participants showed a bias, with a mean bias of 6.4 mm (SD = 9.0 mm) that 
significantly differed from zero (t(11) = 2.46, p < 0.05). 
 
Similar to sliding error, the MANOVA on the performance measures revealed a 
significant effect of Target (Wilks Λ = 0.54, F(6, 40) = 2.37, p < 0.05, ηp2 = 
0.26). Separate ANOVAs indicated that the illusion did not affect the number of 
hits (F(2, 22) = 1.86). The misses were significantly affected by the illusion. 
Participants missed more to the left of the midpoint when aiming at the Judd 
right and the control figures than when aiming at the Judd left figure (F(2, 22) = 
5.54, p < 0.05, ηp2 = 0.34). Conversely, participants missed more to the right 
when aiming at the Judd left and control figures than when aiming at the Judd 
right figure (F(2, 22) = 4.00, p < 0.05, ηp2 = 0.27) (Table 5.1). 
 
Table 5.1. Mean (SD) for sliding error (mm), number of hits, miss to left and right, and 
estimate error (mm). 
 Judd left Control Judd right 
sliding error -6.1 (9.3) -12.5 (8.3) -12.6 (3.9) 
Hits 6.9 (2.6) 5.1 (3.1) 6.3  (2.4) 
miss to left 13.0 (3.3) 15.3 (2.9) 15.9  (1.4) 
miss to right 10.0 (2.7) 9.7 (2.7) 7.7 (2.3) 
    
estimate error 2.0 (1.1) -0.3 (1.0) -2.3 (0.6) 
 
Judd illusion in far-aiming 
 108
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
-25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10
sliding error (mm)
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
Judd right
Judd left
 
Figure 5.2. The illusory bias in aiming for each individual participant. A bias occurred 
in all but two participants (i.e., 1 & 9) 
 
For the perception task, the ANOVA indicated a significant main effect of 
Target (F(2, 22) = 94.5, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.90). Post hoc tests showed that the 
midpoint estimates for each of the figures differed. The average illusory bias 
was 4.3 mm (SD = 1.3), which significantly differed from zero (t(11) = 11.7, p < 
0.001). Lastly, a comparison of the magnitudes of the illusory bias in the 
perception and action tasks did not reveal a significant difference (F(1, 11) = 
0.64). A Pearson-product-moment correlation, however, failed to show a 
significant relationship between the two biases (r(12) = -0.24, p = 0.4814). 
 
                                            
14  Exclusion of the two participants with a negative illusory bias in action still resulted in 
a nonsignificant correlation (r(10) = 0.41,  p = 0.12). 
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Discussion 
This study provided evidence of a contribution to action by vision for 
perception. Sliding accuracy toward the midpoint of the distant target showed a 
significant illusory bias15. The determination of target location thus strongly 
depended on allocentric information that specifies the midpoint in relation to its 
visual surrounding (i.e., arrowheads), indicating that vision for perception can 
indeed be engaged in action. Prior work has already pointed to a role of vision 
for perception in the choice of action goals and action modes (for an overview 
see Milner & Goodale, 2008). The present study further delineates this role of 
vision for perception in action by suggesting that it also contributes to the 
determination of target location. This does not imply that the distinction between 
vision for perception and vision for action becomes superfluous, nor does it 
prove that it is correct (Smeets et al., 2002; Visthon et al., 1999). Effects of 
allocentric information persist only when online movement control is minimized 
or perturbed, such as in far-aiming or visual open-loop conditions (Post & 
Welch, 1996). In full-vision conditions, errors in perceived target location are 
rapidly reduced during movement execution by vision for action. Ellis et al. 
(1999), for example, found that the location at which a bar was grasped was not 
systemically distorted by the Judd illusion (see also Gentilucci et al., 1996). 
 
Vickers (1992) recorded gaze in participants performing far-aiming tasks like 
golf putting and basketball shooting. Information about the target, especially its 
exact location was picked up prior to rather than during movement execution. 
Vickers argued that the duration of the final target fixation reflects the time 
needed for movement parameterization. She envisioned that target information 
stipulates the parameterization of the pre-programmed movement kinematics 
(see Glover, 2004). In contrast, rather than prescribing the movement 
kinematics, we argue that target location information obtained by vision for 
perception acts as a boundary constraint on vision for action. It is within these 
boundary constraints that vision for action instantaneously sets up and controls 
the kinematics of the movement in real-time (Westwood & Goodale, 2003). 
Admittedly, however, we cannot distinguish the validity of these two alternative 
                                            
15  In fact, only the Judd left figure differed significantly from the control figure. Perusal 
of the literature shows that this observation is not uncommon (e.g., Fleming & Behrmann, 
1998), but we found no explanation for this asymmetry. 
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accounts based on the present findings. Further work is needed to determine 
how vision for perception and action interact during the course of an action. 
 
One critical factor that may influence the extent to which vision for perception 
contributes to action is skill level (Gonzalez et al., 2008; van der Kamp et al., 
2003, 2008). An important distinction between novice and skilled performers is 
the degree of conscious control of the action. It is plausible that the more 
consciously an action is controlled, the more likely it is that it engages vision for 
perception. Gonzales et al. (2008), for example, found that unfamiliar awkward 
grips were much more susceptible to a size-contrast illusion than the precision 
grips that participants habitually used to grasp small objects. The present 
participants were all novices16. Hence, the illusory bias might have been 
markedly smaller, had the participants been skilled shuffle-boarding players. 
 
The illusory biases in the action and perception tasks were not identical nor were 
they correlated, suggesting that the tasks induced somewhat disparate 
contributions from vision for perception. One possible distinction is that in the 
action task the target location (i.e., midpoint of the line) was visually available 
relative to the visual surroundings only (i.e., endpoints of the line), while in the 
perception task the moving pointer may have provided additional contextual 
information. Previously, Post and Welch (1996) found that the illusory bias in 
pointing to the midpoint of a line within a Judd figure disappeared when a short 
line was added to mark the midpoint. Yet, the moving pointer in the present 
study does not necessarily provide more veridical information for the midpoint. 
Hence, it is unlikely that this informational difference between the present tasks 
caused a larger reliance on allocentric information (relative metrics) in the 
action than in the perception task. In any case, the present findings do underline 
the role of vision for perception in action for far-aiming tasks that are not 
uncommon. It is akin to directing a soccer penalty kick inside the uprights of the 
goal rather than at the uprights or placing a tennis serve in the back right corner 
of the service box rather than at the lines. It remains to be seen whether the 
present findings generalize to targets that are visually more directly specified. 
Another   observation  that  suggests   disparate  contributions   from  vision   for  
                                            
16  This is suggested by the mean within-participant standard deviation for the sliding 
error being much higher than for the perceptual judgment error (i.e., 40.1 mm vs. 9.9 mm). 
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perception in the two tasks is that participants slid the disk slightly to the left of 
the midpoint of the line. A similar leftward bias is reported for adults in line 
bisection tasks, where participants indicate the midpoint of a line (McCourt & 
Garlinghouse, 2000). Noticeably, this leftward bias only presented itself during 
the far-aiming task, but not when participants perceptually judged the midpoint 
of the line. This difference might be related to space being perceived differently 
within or beyond the action space. Longo and Lourenco (2006) demonstrated 
that the leftward bias in a line bisection task disappeared, or shifted to the right, 
when the line is placed out of reach of the observer. However, when the 
participant used a tool (i.e., a stick), thereby expanding the action space, the 
leftward bias also occurred for larger distances. Similarly, sliding a disk to a 
distant target might have expanded the participants’ action space, resulting in a 
leftward bias in aiming toward the target, but not when perceiving its midpoint. 
 
In sum, mapping the contribution of vision for perception to action is 
conditional for understanding how vision for perception and vision for action 
interact. In this respect, we found an illusory bias when a projectile was aimed 
toward a distant target, providing evidence for a contribution to action by vision 
for perception. This makes a great deal of sense given that determining target 
location in far-aiming (e.g., inside the base-line) is tightly linked with 
identifying action goals (e.g., hitting the tennis ball down-the-line or cross-
court) and selecting an appropriate action mode (e.g., fore- or back-hand), both 
of which involve vision for perception. Further investigation is needed to define 
how the two visual processes interact. 
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Abstract 
Following Goodale and Milner’s (1992) proposal to distinguish the dorsal and 
ventral systems on basis of the functional demands they serve (i.e., action and 
perception), a vast literature has emerged that scrutinized if the dorsal and 
ventral systems indeed process information into egocentric and allocentric 
codes in accordance with their respective functions. However, a corollary of 
Goodale and Milner’s original proposal, that these functional demands also 
impose different constraints on information detection, has been largely 
overlooked. In the present study, we measured gaze patterns to investigate how 
information detection for action and perception differs. In two conditions, 
participants (n = 9) grasped or made a manual estimate of the length of a shaft 
embedded in a Müller-Lyer configuration. The illusion significantly affected the 
manual estimates, but not the hand aperture during grasping. In line with these 
behavioral findings, significant differences in gaze patterns were revealed 
between the two tasks. Participants spent more time looking at areas that 
contain egocentric information (i.e., centre of the shaft) when grasping as 
compared to making a manual length estimate. In addition, participants, made 
more gaze shifts (i.e., especially between the two areas surrounding the shaft 
endpoints and including the arrowheads) when making the manual length 
estimate, enabling the pick up of allocentric information. This difference was 
more pronounced during task execution as compared to task preparation (i.e., 
before movement onset). These results support the contention that the functional 
distinction between the dorsal and ventral systems is not limited to the 
processing of information, but also encompasses the detection of information. 
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Introduction 
There is well-established evidence that indicates the existence of two neuro-
anatomically separate, but interconnected visual streams. The ventral visual 
stream projects from the primary visual cortex to the inferior temporal cortex, 
whereas the dorsal visual stream projects from the primary visual cortex to the 
posterior parietal cortex. Ungerleider and Mishkin (1982) argued that the ventral 
and dorsal streams play an essential role in object identification (e.g., size and 
shape) and localization (e.g., distance and position), respectively. More recently, 
Goodale and Milner (1992) have re-interpreted the distinction in terms of the 
functional demands the two streams serve. They proposed that the ventral visual 
stream serves to obtain knowledge of the environment (i.e., perception), while 
the dorsal visual stream mediates the guidance of goal-directed movements (i.e., 
action) (see also Milner & Goodale, 1995, 2008).  
According to this interpretation, the nature of the different functional 
demands of action and perception impose different constraints on how the two 
visual systems17 process information. Since perception requires information 
about objects in relation to other objects, the ventral system transforms or 
encodes visual information into visual representations within allocentric (i.e., 
object-centered) frames of reference. Action, in contrast, requires information of 
objects in relation to the actor. The dorsal system thus transforms or encodes 
visual information into egocentric (i.e., body-centered) frames of reference 
(Goodale & Humphrey, 1998; Goodale & Milner, 1992, 2004; Milner & 
Goodale, 1995, 2008). An important but controversial piece of evidence that 
supports the conjecture that ‘the transformational algorithms that are applied to 
the visual information are uniquely tailored to the function of each system’ 
(Goodale & Haffenden, 1998, p. 162) comes from research that involves visual 
illusions. The perception of an object strongly depends upon the visual 
surroundings, while in closed-loop situations movement control remains 
relatively unaffected by the visual context (Agliotti, De Souza, & Goodale, 
1995; Bruno, Bernardis, & Gentilucci, 2008; Carey, 2001; Ganel, Tanzer, & 
                                            
17  In this study, we only obtained behavioral data. We did not use brain-imaging 
techniques to verify activations in the ventral and dorsal streams. Hence, our claims and 
interpretations are necessarily restricted to behavior, and as such can only be suggestive with 
respect to the underlying neural circuitry. For these reasons, we use ‘ventral stream’ or ‘dorsal 
stream’ to refer to the underlying neural structures. By contrast, the terms ‘ventral system’ or 
‘dorsal system’ denote the dissociation in broader terms to include the different behavioral 
processes that are associated with the ventral and dorsal streams. 
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Goodale, 2008; but see Franz, Gegenfurther, Bülthoff, & Fahle, 2000; Smeets & 
Brenner, 2006). For example, we presented participants shafts of different length 
embedded in a Müller-Lyer configuration. Participants’ perceptual judgments of 
shaft length were clearly biased by the arrowheads surrounding the shaft. By 
contrast, the control of hand aperture when grasping the shaft was not affected 
by the visual context (van Doorn, van der Kamp, & Savelsbergh, 2007; see also 
Otto-de Haart, Carey, & Milne, 1999). These findings are consistent with the 
proposal that for perception the ventral stream encodes the information in an 
allocentric frame of reference whereas for action the dorsal stream encodes the 
information in an egocentric reference frame. In addition, we also found that the 
illusion effect was not restricted to perception. By using shafts that varied in 
length around maximum hand span, the participants were forced to choose either 
one or two hands to pick up the shaft. Like the perceptual judgments, the 
selection of a one- or two-handed grasp was affected by the arrowheads 
surrounding the shaft, indicating that the selection of an appropriate action mode 
involves an allocentric reference frame (van Doorn et al., 2007; see also Crajé, 
van der Kamp, & Steenbergen, 2008). 
 
Goodale and Milner’s reinterpretation of the functions of the ventral and dorsal 
stream thus holds that information about object identity and location are 
processed by both streams and that the key difference is in the way this 
information is transformed for perception and action. And yet, a corollary of this 
emphasis on the nature of processing has been that the question of how 
information is obtained has been largely overlooked (cf. Goodale & Milner, 
1992).  
Recently, proponents from the ecological approach have called into 
attention that action and perception may entail the pick up of distinct types of 
visual information (Michaels, 2000; Pagano & Bingham, 1998; van der Kamp, 
Oudejans, & Savelsbergh, 2003; van der Kamp, Rivas, van Doorn, & 
Savelsbergh, 2008; van der Kamp, Savelsbergh, & Rosengren, 2001). Action 
would require the detection of egocentric information, whereas perception 
would require the pick up of allocentric information. If this conjecture is correct, 
then the distinction between action and perception is not limited to differences in 
the nature of processing by the dorsal and ventral streams. Rather than emerging 
beyond the primary visual cortex, where the dorsal and ventral streams separate, 
the distinction might partly present itself before processing occurs in the two 
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streams. In other words, the nature of the different functional demands of action 
and perception also impose different constraints on the detection of information, 
the task-dependency of gaze being the case in point. Epelboim and colleagues 
(1995), for instance, showed that participants’ gaze characteristics when only 
looking at nearby targets differed from those when participants tapped at the 
target. The functional demands of a task are considered to play a pervasive role 
in guiding gaze (e.g., Hayhoe & Ballard, 2005; Johansson, Westling, Bäckström, 
& Flanagan, 2001; Land, 2006; Rothkopf, Ballard, & Hayhoe, 2007; Yarbus, 
1967). Participants tend to fixate those object properties that provide the visual 
information needed for performing the task at hand. According to Hayhoe 
(2000) ‘the goal of vision can be seen as the active extraction of specific, task 
relevant information, and the particular information being extracted is indicated 
by the particular location of fixation and the immediate behavioral context.’ 
(Hayhoe, 2000, p. 45). 
 
In the present study, we used the Müller-Lyer illusion to investigate whether the 
gaze patterns during action and perception differ. We presented participants with 
shafts that varied in length around maximum hand span (see van der Kamp, 
Savelsbergh & Davis, 1998; van Doorn et al., 2007). In two conditions, 
participants were instructed to grasp the shaft or give a perceptual estimate of 
the length of the shaft. In both conditions participants had to select using either 
one or two hands. With respect to gaze, we expected that during action the 
target-object would be fixated, because it is the target that contains the pertinent 
sources of egocentric information. In contrast, during perception gaze would 
also be directed at the target surroundings. That is, allocentric sources of 
information are available in the relation of the target and its visual context. More 
specifically, in the case of a shaft embedded in a Müller-Lyer configuration, we 
hypothesized that when grasping the shaft (i.e., action) gaze fixations will be 
directed at the central part of the shaft. Previous work on grasping has 
established that the optic angle subtended by the target-object and the point of 
observation (i.e., the eye) is a key source of information for the control of hand 
aperture (Caljouw, van der Kamp, & Savelsbergh, 2004; Paulignan, Jeannerrod, 
MacKenzie, & Marteniuk, 1991; Savelsbergh, Whiting, & Bootsma, 1991). 
Savelsbergh et al. (1991), for example, had participants grasp objects of 
different diameters, some of which shrunk in size. Relative to the constant-sized 
object, the optic angle subtended by the shrinking object decreased during 
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grasping. Savelsbergh et al. (1991) reported that the adjustments in hand 
aperture were consistent with the changes in optic angle. The optic angle can be 
detected by fixating the centre of an object, no gaze shifts are necessary. In 
contrast, when making a perceptual judgment of the length of the shaft, we 
hypothesized that gaze would be much more directed at the endpoints of the 
shaft and the surrounding arrowheads. The perception of shaft length is 
commonly assumed to be induced by the spatial relation of the shaft and the 
arrowheads (Greene & Nelson, 1997; Welch, Post, Lum, & Prinzmetal, 2004). 
The area comprised by the arrowheads and the endpoint of the shaft have been 
found to be particularly effective in inducing the illusion (Predebon, 2001). 
Since, Festinger, White and Allyn (1968) found that the magnitude of the 
Müller-Lyer illusion is related to gaze shifts from one endpoint to the other, we 
also explored whether there were more gaze shifts between the endpoints when 
estimating shaft length as compared to grasping the shaft.  
Finally, we expected that the differences in gaze patterns between action 
and perception would be more pronounced during task execution than during 
task preparation. That is, we have previously demonstrated that the choice of a 
one or two-handed action but not the control of hand aperture is influenced by 
the Müller-Lyer illusion, indicating that action mode selection involves 
allocentric information (van Doorn et al., 2007; see also Crajé et al., 2008, 
Milner & Goodale, 2008). Hence, during task preparation, we expected similar 
gaze patterns for action and perception; with gaze being primarily directed at the 
endpoints of the shaft and the surrounding arrowheads. During task execution, 
however, clear discrepancies in gaze are expected to emerge, the centre part of 
shaft being fixated more often during action than during perception. 
 
Methods 
Participants 
Nine volunteers (four males, five females) aged 22-54 years participated in the 
experiment. Participants reported having normal or corrected to normal vision 
and were naïve as to the purpose of the experiment. They gave their written 
consent prior to the experiment and were treated in accordance with the local 
institution’s ethical guidelines. 
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Apparatus 
The participants sat in an in height adjustable chair. The stimuli were presented 
on a table at a distance of 60 cm from the participants’ eyes (see Figure 6.1). 
The stimuli were grey aluminium shafts of different lengths (1 cm in height and 
width) with cardboard arrowheads (3 cm long) attached to the endpoints of the 
shaft at an angle of 50°. Either a single inward or a single outward stimulus 
configuration was presented horizontally on a white table-top surface that was 
tilted at an angle of 25°. The stimulus was positioned 30 cm to the right of the 
participants’ body midline. The starting position of the hands was located 30 cm 
to the right of the body midline at a distance of 15 cm from the stimulus. 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Schematic representation of the experimental set-up. 
 
We used Optotrak 3020 motion-analysis system (Northern Digital, 
Waterloo, Ontario) to measure the apertures between the right thumb and middle 
finger and between the left and right middle finger. Infra-red-light emitting 
diodes (IREDs) were placed on the most distal phalanxes of the right thumb and 
the two middle fingers. The sample frequency was 200 Hz.  
A head mounted eye tracker (model 501, Applied Science Laboratories, 
Bedford, MA) was used to monitor the point in the scene where the participants 
were looking. The system consists of two miniature video cameras. The eye 
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camera registers the participants’ eye, the x, y coordinates of the corneal 
reflection, and the center of the pupil of the left eye. The relative position of 
these features is used to compute eye line of gaze with respect to a 9-point grid 
projected onto the scene plane. The scene camera monitors the visual field of the 
participant. The visual point of gaze (POG) was obtained by superimposing the 
images of eye and scene cameras and then stored using a digital video recorder 
(50 Hz). The accuracy of the system was ±1° visual angle. The calibration of the 
system was intermittently monitored and if necessary the system was 
recalibrated. To synchronize kinematic and gaze measurements, an IRED 
positioned at the right edge of the tabletop was turned on at the start of each 
Optotrak recording, which was clearly visible on the video image of the eye 
tracker’s scene camera. 
 
Procedure and design 
Pre-measurement 
First, a pre-measurement was performed to determine for each individual 
participant the range of shaft lengths to be used in the main experiment. The 
participants grasped shafts without arrowheads that varied between 13 and 20 
cm in length. They were instructed to grasp the shaft by its ends with either one 
or two hands dependent on its length, but to grasp the shaft with one hand (i.e., 
between thumb and middle finger) if possible. However, if the shaft was too 
long to be grasped with one hand, they were required to use both hands (i.e., 
between the two middle fingers). No further instructions were given. We 
established the length of the shaft at which the participants were most likely to 
switch between one-handed and two-handed grasps (i.e., the ‘switching shaft’). 
The participants were then familiarised with the procedures for the main 
experiment.  
 
Main experiment 
The main experiment consisted of two tasks. The participants were asked to 
grasp the shaft by its ends and to make a manual length estimation of the shaft. 
The length of the eleven shafts used were the same for both tasks, and ranged 
from the length of the switching shaft minus 1.25 cm to the length of the 
switching shaft plus 1.25 cm in steps of 0.25 cm (e.g., for a 16 cm switching 
shaft, shafts ranged from 14.75 to 17.25 cm). The length of the shaft will be 
expressed relative to the length of the switching shaft (from -1.25 cm to 1.25 
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cm). Both the inward and the outward Müller-Lyer configurations were used. 
Each shaft was presented 5 times, resulting in a total of 110 trials for each task 
(i.e., 11 lengths x 2 configurations x 5 repetitions), which were presented in a 
random order. The order of the tasks was counterbalanced between participants. 
Each task was completed in approximately 40 minutes. 
During both tasks, the participants closed their eyes before each trial and 
placed the middle finger and thumb of both hands on the starting position. After 
a verbal signal of the experimenter, the participant opened their eyes. 
Approximately one second later, the room was illuminated, signaling the start of 
the trial and the start of the Optotrak recordings. After five seconds, the light 
turned off and the participants closed their eyes. 
Instructions for the grasping task were identical to those in the pre-
measurement. Instructions for the manual estimation task were similar to that for 
the grasping task. That is, the participants were told to use either one or two 
hands, and adjust the aperture between the thumb and middle finger or between 
the two middle fingers to match the length of the shaft. Participants were 
allowed to compare the size of their hand aperture and the length of the shaft. 
The manual estimations were performed near the starting position of the hands 
without making any movements towards the shaft. Finally, participants were 
instructed to fixate a black dot located at the upper right corner of the tabletop 
immediately after they had completed the manual estimation, but not to move 
their fingers. The resulting gaze shift enabled us to determine the end of a trial. 
The end of the grasping task was based on the kinematics of the grasping 
movement. 
 
Data analysis 
One- and two-handed responses  
For both tasks the illusory bias for selecting a one-handed vs. a two-handed 
response was determined. To this end, the proportion of two-handed responses 
was determined for each of 11 shaft lengths. For each participant, separate 
logistic functions (Eq. 6.1) were fitted through the scores for the inward and 
outward target configurations for each task (van Doorn et al., 2007). The 
function was of the form where y is the assigned score (i.e., fraction two-handed 
grasps) x is the length of the shaft, c is the shaft length at the 50% point (i.e., y = 
0.5), and k is a measure of the slope at this point, 
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( )
1
1 k x c
y
e− −
= +              (Eq. 6.1) 
This model was then used to determine the length of the shaft at which 
50% of the responses were two-handed. To compare the effect of the Müller-
Lyer illusion between conditions, the lengths of the shaft at the 50% points were 
submitted to a 2(Task: grasping, manual estimation) x 2(Configuration: inward, 
outward) analysis of variance with repeated measures on both factors. In the 
case that the sphericity assumption for the analysis of variance was violated (i.e., 
epsilons smaller than 1.0), we report Huyn-Feldt adjustments of the p-values. To 
assess the differences between means, the analysis of variance with repeated 
measures were followed up with Tukey HSD tests (p < 0.05).  
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Figure 6.2. Raw hand aperture (and SE) for one-handed (left panel) and two-handed 
(right panel) responses as a function of shaft length. Circles represent manual length 
estimation and squares represent grasping. Filled and open circles/squares depict the 
outward and inward Müller-Lyer configurations, respectively. 
 
Aperture 
To assess the magnitude of the illusory bias in hand aperture, the average 
distance between the two middle fingers or between the middle finger and the 
thumb in the manual estimation task was compared to the maximal aperture 
between the two middle fingers or between the middle finger and the thumb in 
the grasping task. Figure 6.2 shows the ‘raw’ hand aperture data as a function of 
shaft length plotted separately for task, configuration and the number of hands 
used to respond. A cursory look at the one-handed responses (left panel) shows 
fairly systematic results for the shorter shaft lengths: the Müller-Lyer 
Chapter 6 
125 
configurations seem to affect the apertures of the manual estimation, but not the 
grasp apertures. A similar pattern emerges for the two-handed responses to the 
longer shaft lengths (right panel). By contrast, the results are less systematic for 
the one-handed responses to the longer shaft lengths and the two-handed 
responses to the shorter shaft lengths. This pattern of results is due to the 
number of one-handed responses being much smaller for the longer as compared 
to the shorter shaft lengths. Similarly, the number of two-handed responses for 
the shorter shaft lengths is much smaller than the number of responses for the 
longer ones. Consequently, approximately only half of the participants (in 
changing composition!) contribute to the average apertures for these shaft 
lengths. Hence, to avoid spurious outcomes from occurring, we deemed further 
criteria for inclusion in the analysis necessary. We reasoned as follows. As a 
rule, the maximal aperture is larger for a two-handed grasp as compared to a 
one-handed grasp when grasping an object of the same size (Tresilian & 
Stelmach, 1997). To prevent that a prevalence for either one-handed or two-
handed patterns within a particular condition (e.g., more one-handed grasps for 
the inward than in the outward configuration) would bias the individual means 
for maximal aperture, for each shaft length either only the one-handed or only 
the two-handed patterns were included for analysis. This choice depended on 
which of the two patterns was dominant across the four conditions (i.e., task by 
configuration) for the particular shaft length. An additional criterion for 
inclusion was that in each of four conditions this prevalent pattern was used in at 
least two trials. For each participant, this resulted in at least the three longest and 
the two shortest shafts being selected for analysis (i.e., in total 58% of the trials 
was included in the aperture analysis). The individual means for maximal 
aperture were submitted to a 2(Task: grasping, manual estimation) x 
2(Configuration: inward, outward) analysis of variance with repeated measures 
on both factors. 
 
Gaze  
The location of the point of gaze and the locations of the endpoints of the shaft 
were digitized for each frame. We identified four areas of interest towards which 
gaze could be directed (Figure 6.3): 1) the shaft area (i.e., the inner quarters of 
the shaft), 2 & 3) the endpoint areas (i.e., the outer quarters of the shaft 
including the surrounding arrowheads), and 4) the approach area (i.e., the area 
between the starting position and the shaft). On average, participants directed 
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98% of gaze at one of these areas. Like the aperture data, both one- and two-
handed manual estimation and grasp trials were analyzed. We aimed to select 
the same trials that were included in the aperture data. However, in the case that 
point of gaze could not be identified for more than six consecutive samples, the 
trial was eliminated from further analysis. To make sure that the total amount of 
trials was approximately equally divided across task (i.e., 49% grasping and 
51% manual estimation) configuration (i.e., 61% inward and 39% outward) and 
number of hands used (i.e., 48% one-handed and 52% two-handed), an 
additional subset of trials was selected for analysis (i.e., this subset amounted to 
29 % of trials analyzed with respect to gaze)18. On average 82 trials (ranging 
between 76 and 91 trials) from each participant were included for gaze analysis.  
 
12 3
4
 
 Figure 6.3. The four gaze location areas. See text for further explanation. 
 
 Each trial was divided into a pre-movement (i.e., from trial-onset until 
movement onset) and movement-execution phase (i.e., from movement onset 
until trial-end). Trial-onset was defined as the first sample at which the point of 
gaze could be identified after the start of the trial. Movement-onset was defined 
as the moment at which the velocity of one of the middle fingers or the thumb 
exceeded 20 mm/s. For the manual estimation task, trial-end was defined as the 
last frame before gaze shifted towards the black dot located at the upper right 
corner of the tabletop. For the grasping task, trial-end was defined as the 
                                            
18  Comparisons between the gaze measures for trials that were included in the aperture 
data and those that were not did not reveal any significant differences. 
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moment at which the velocity of the aperture between the two middle fingers or 
between the middle finger and the thumb after having reached its maximal 
closing velocity was larger than -10 mm/s for nine consecutive samples.  
Finally, the percentage of time that gaze was directed at each of the four 
areas and the number of times that gaze shifted between areas were calculated. 
The individual means of these measures were submitted to two separate 
multivariate 2(Task: grasping, manual estimation) by 2(Phase: pre-movement, 
movement-execution) analysis of variance with repeated measures on both 
factors. 
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Figure 6.4. The proportion of two-handed responses (and SE) as a function of shaft 
length for the manual length estimation (MLE, left panel) and grasping (G, right panel) 
tasks. Filled and open circles represent the outward and inward Müller-Lyer 
configurations, respectively. 
 
Table 6.1. Logistic fits parameters for the proportion of two-handed responses as a 
function of shaft length for the outward and inward Müller-Lyer configurations in the 
manual length estimation (MLE) and grasping (G) tasks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: k is steepness at y = 0.5, c is the shaft length at y = 0.5, r is the regression 
coefficient (see Eq. 6.1), and p is  the significance level. 
 
 MLE G 
 outward inward outward inward 
k 2.33 2.67 3.00 2.96 
c -0.67 0.59 -0.58 0.60 
r 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 
p 0.0013 0.0000 0.0003 0.0005 
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One- and two-handed responses  
A pronounced effect of the Müller-Lyer illusion on the use of a one- or two-
handed response in the manual estimation and grasping tasks occurred (Figure 
6.4). For the outward configuration there was a prevalence of two-handed 
responses at shorter shaft lengths than for the inward configuration. This was 
confirmed by a significant effect of Configuration on the shaft length at which 
50% of the responses were two-handed (F(1, 8) = 173.4, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.96) 
(see Table 6.1 for the details of the logistic fits). There were no effects of Task 
(F(1, 8) = 0.24) and Task by Configuration (F(1, 8) = 0.05). 
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Figure 6.5. Hand aperture (and SE) for the outward and inward Müller-Lyer 
configurations for the manual length estimation (MLE, left panel) and grasping (G, 
right panel) tasks. An asterisk denotes a significant difference between the inward and 
outward Müller-Lyer configuration. 
 
Aperture 
Analysis of variance on aperture revealed significant effects of Task (F(1, 8) = 
42.2, p < 0.001, ηp2  = 0.84), Configuration (F(1, 8) = 49.0, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.86) 
and Task by Configuration (F(1, 8) = 56.0, p < 0.001, ηp2  = 0.88) (see Figure 
6.5). In line with previous findings, post hoc analysis indicated that aperture was 
affected by the Müller-Lyer illusion in the manual estimation but not in the 
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grasping task. In addition, maximal hand aperture was smaller in the manual 
estimation than in the grasping task19. 
 
Gaze 
Figure 6.6 illustrates the gaze patterns of one participant for two representative 
two-handed trials, one when making a manual estimate (left panel) and the other 
in the case of grasping (right panel). It neatly illustrates some of the 
characteristics that appear to differentiate the pattern of gaze during grasping 
from that during manual estimation. Gaze is directed more to the centre area of 
the shaft during grasping, whereas during manual estimation gaze is much more 
focused at the endpoint areas including the arrowheads. Moreover, shifts of gaze 
between the two endpoint areas occur less often during grasping. In addition, the 
gaze fixations at the endpoint areas are less evenly distributed (i.e., more 
asymmetrical) during grasping than during manual estimation. We elaborate on 
these findings below. 
 
Figure 6.7 shows the percentage of time spent viewing to each area20 as a 
function of task and phase. It illustrates that participants spent more time 
fixating the shaft area while grasping the shaft as compared to making a manual 
estimation of its length, the difference being more pronounced during the 
movement-execution phase. The multivariate analysis of variance revealed 
significant  effects  of Task (Wilks Λ = 0.24, F(3, 6) = 6.28, p < 0.05, ηp2 = 0.76) 
                                            
19  Several researchers reported the scaled illusion effect rather than the absolute illusion 
effect. They argued that baseline slopes (i.e., the rate of change in maximal grip aperture or 
hand aperture to a given change in shaft size) are not the same for grasping and manual length 
estimation, and that maximal apertures should be corrected for a more appropriate comparison 
between grasping and manual length estimation (e.g., Dewar & Carey, 2006; Franz, 2003; 
Franz, Fahle, Bülthoff, & Gegenfurtner, 2001). To compare our findings with this work, we 
determined the scaled illusion effect as follows: [aperture]/[baseline slope*actual shaft 
length]*100. The slopes were calculated separately for one- and two-handed grasps and 
manual estimations. The means were submitted to a 2(Task: grasping, manual estimation) x 
2(Configuration: inward, outward) analysis of variance with repeated measures on both 
factors. This analysis revealed a similar pattern of results as for the absolute illusion effects. 
That is, significant effects of Configuration (F(1, 8) = 52.0, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.87) and Task by 
Configuration (F(1, 8) = 56.4, p < 0.001, ηp2  = 0.88) were found. The scaled illusion effects 
for perception and action were 6.2 mm and 1.2 mm, respectively. 
20  For this analysis, we combined area 2 and 3 (i.e., the two areas surrounding the 
endpoints including the arrowheads and the outer quarters of the shaft) because they contain 
similar allocentric sources of information. 
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Figure 6.6. Typical gaze pattern for participant 7 during one manual length estimation 
(MLE, left panel) and one grasping (G, right panel) trial. Crosshairs indicate the gaze 
location for each sample (i.e., 4 ms) of the trial 
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Figure 6.7. Percentage of time spent viewing at the shaft, endpoint and approach areas 
as a function of phase for the manual length estimation (MLE) and grasping (G) tasks. 
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and Phase (Wilks Λ = 0.21, F(3, 6) = 7.74, p < 0.05, ηp2 = 0.80). The Task by 
Phase interaction failed to reach significance, but had a moderate to large effect 
size (Wilks Λ = 0.42, F(3, 6) = 2.82, p = 0.12, ηp2 = 0.59). Separate univariate 
analyses revealed that participants spent more time fixating the shaft area (F(1, 
8) = 21.27, p < 0.01, ηp2 = 0.73) and tended to spent less time fixating the 
approach area (F(1, 8) = 3.35, p = 0.062, ηp2 = 0.37) when grasping the shaft 
than when making a manual estimation. Furthermore, participants fixated the 
shaft area shorter (F(1, 8) = 17.22, p < 0.01, ηp2 = 0.68) and the endpoint areas 
longer (F(1, 8) = 27.15, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.77) during the movement-execution 
than during the pre-movement phase. The non-significant interactions for the 
time spent viewing at the shaft and reach areas might suggest that the difference 
between the two tasks becomes somewhat more evident during the movement-
execution phase. 
 
endpoint areas
pre-movement movement-execution
no
. g
az
e 
sh
ift
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
 a
re
as
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
MLE
G
endpoint areas <> shaft area
pre-movement movement-execution
no
. g
az
e 
sh
ift
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
 a
re
as
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
approach area <> endpoint or shaft area
pre-movement movement-execution
no
. g
az
e 
sh
ift
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
 a
re
as
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4 **
 
Figure 6.8. The number of gaze shifts (and SE) between the two endpoint areas (left 
panel), the shaft and endpoint areas (middle panel), and between the approach and 
other areas (right panel) as a function of phase for the manual length estimation (MLE) 
and grasping (G) tasks. An asterisk denotes a significant difference between the MLE- 
and G-task. 
 
Figure 6.8 presents the frequency of gaze shifts between the different areas. We 
compared the number of gaze shifts between the two endpoint areas (i.e., 
between area 2 & 3), between the centre of the shaft and the endpoints (i.e., 
between area 1 & 2 or 1 & 3), and between the approach area and any other 
area (i.e., between area 4 and 1 or 2 or 3) (see Figure 6.3). The multivariate 
analysis of variance revealed significant effects of Task (Wilks Λ = 0.22, F(3, 
6) = 6.97, p < 0.05, ηp2 = 0.78) and Task by Phase (Wilks Λ = 0.26, F(3, 6) = 
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5.80, p < 0.05, ηp2 = 0.74), but not for Phase (Wilks Λ = 0.50, F(3, 6) = 2.04). 
Separate univariate analyses indicated that during grasping there were less gaze 
shifts between the two endpoint areas (F(1, 8) = 7.22, p < 0.05,  ηp2 = 0.47), and 
between the approach area and either the shaft or one of the two endpoint areas 
(F(1, 8) = 6.94, p < 0.05, ηp2 = 0.47) as compared to manual estimation. The 
interactions of Task and Phase for the number of gaze shifts between the two 
endpoint areas (F(1 ,8) = 5.80, p < 0.05,  ηp2 = 0.42) and the number of gaze 
shift between the approach area and the other areas (F(1, 8) = 4.90, p = 0.057, 
 ηp2 = 0.38) indicated that these differences only occurred during the movement-
execution phase, but not during the pre-movement phase.  
 
Perusal of Figure 6.6 suggested that when making manual estimations, gaze was 
evenly distributed between the two endpoint areas, whereas during grasping 
gaze appeared less symmetrically distributed over the endpoint areas. To verify 
this, we calculated a symmetry index (SI). This measure was defined as:  
100*
 3 area %gaze  2 %area
3 area %gaze - 2 area %gaze
 SI ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+=                (Eq. 6.2) 
An SI-value of 0 indicates that participants distribute their gaze evenly over the 
two endpoint areas, whereas an SI-value of 100 indicates that participants 
directed gaze to one endpoint area only. A 2(Task: grasping, manual estimation) 
by 2(Phase: pre-movement, movement-execution) analysis of variance with 
repeated measures on both factors on SI revealed a significant effect of Task 
(F(1, 8) = 8.50, p < 0.05, ηp2 = 0.52), indicating that gaze was less evenly 
distributed over the endpoint areas for grasping as compared to making a manual 
estimate. Figure 6.9 may suggests that compared to the pre-movement phase, 
gaze was less evenly distributed over the endpoint areas when grasping than 
when making a manual estimate during the movement-execution phase. 
However, the Task by Phase interaction was not significant (F(1, 8) = 3.84, p = 
0.086, ηp2 = 0.32). 
 
Discussion 
A large amount of studies have examined the effects of visual illusions on action 
and perception. In general, these studies report that visual illusions have a 
considerably smaller effect on action than on perceptual responses (see also 
Bruno et al., 2008; Carey, 2001). The current study provides further evidence for 
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Figure 6.9. Symmetry index (and SE) as a function of phase for the manual length 
estimation (MLE) and grasping (G) tasks. See text for further explanation. 
 
such a differential effect of illusions on action and perception. Similar to our 
previous work (van Doorn et al., 2007), the Müller-Lyer illusion only affected 
hand aperture in the manual estimation task but not in the grasping task. 
 
This difference in the magnitude of the illusory bias is commonly attributed to 
the workings of the dorsal and ventral systems. Because of the distinct 
functional demands the two streams serve, visual information is transformed 
within egocentric and allocentric reference frames for action and perception 
respectively (Goodale & Milner, 1992; Milner & Goodale, 1995). The present 
results, however, demonstrate that the distinct functional demands also impose 
specific constraints on information detection as was indicated by different gaze 
patterns when grasping an object as compared to when making an estimation of 
its length. On the one hand, participants spent more time gazing egocentric 
sources of information during grasping than during manual estimation. 
Specifically, more gaze fixations were directed to the centre of the shaft, in line 
with the use of the optic angle subtended by the shaft. On the other hand, 
participants spent more time gazing at allocentric sources of information when 
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estimating the shaft’s length as compared to grasping the object. That is, 
participants spent less time fixating the centre of the shaft. They also made 
significantly more gaze shifts between the two endpoints areas of the shaft, 
which resulted in a fairly symmetrical distribution of gazes between the two 
endpoint areas of the shaft, and more shifts between the approach area (i.e., 
where the hands are positioned) and the endpoint and shaft areas. By shifting 
gaze between the two endpoints, participants increase the possibility to pick up 
allocentric information. Allocentric information is available from the spatial 
relation between the endpoint of the shaft and its direct visual surroundings 
(Greene & Nelson, 1997; Welch, Post, Lum, & Prinzmetal, 2004) and from the 
spatial relation between the two endpoints, which can be obtained by shifting 
gaze between the two endpoints. Presumably, the gaze shifts between the 
approach areas and the other areas serve to match up hand aperture and 
perceived shaft length.  
 
It could be objected that the observed task-related differences in gaze patterns 
are merely coincidental. In other words, foveation (i.e., fixation) of an area does 
not necessarily imply that information from that area is detected and exploited to 
control the task. In order to further explore the relationship between the use of 
information (as reflected by the magnitude of the illusion effect) and the location 
at which gaze is directed, we calculated Pearson product moment correlations 
between the magnitude of the illusion effect and percentage of gaze directed at 
the shaft area for both tasks separately. The analysis revealed a significant 
negative correlation for both grasping (r(9) = -0.63, p < 0.05) and matching (r(9) 
= -0.64, p < 0.05). Thus, the longer the gaze was directed at the centre area of 
the shaft, the less the illusion affected the hand aperture. This indicates that 
fixation of different areas is associated with the pick up of distinct types of 
information (i.e., egocentric or allocentric), and consequently, with the 
differential illusory effects in the grasp and the length estimation tasks. These 
results support the contention that the functional distinction between the dorsal 
and ventral systems is not limited to the processing of information, but also 
encompasses the detection of information. 
 
The participants’ selection of using one or two hands was clearly influenced by 
the illusion in both the estimation task and the grasping task. In other words, 
participants exploit allocentric information before they started moving in the 
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manual estimation task as well as in the grasping task. This finding underlines 
our earlier conclusion that the ventral system’s contribution is not confined to 
perception, but is also involved in action preparation, particularly in selecting an 
appropriate mode of action  (van Doorn et al., 2007; Crajé et al., 2008; see also 
Milner & Goodale, 2008). In line with a role for the ventral system in both 
perception and action preparation, we found similar gaze patterns directed at 
allocentric sources of information (as reflected by the number of gaze shifts and 
the time spent viewing to the endpoints and reach areas) in the pre-movement 
phase of the length estimation and the grasping task. Gaze, however, was also 
frequently directed at egocentric sources during the pre-movement phase. 
Possibly, this is due to observers typically tending to gaze at or near an object’s 
center of gravity (Vishwanath & Kowler, 2004). Distinct patterns of gaze for the 
length estimation and grasping tasks emerged most clearly during the 
movement-execution phase (i.e., after the participants started moving their 
fingers). During this phase, participants directed gaze more frequently at 
egocentric sources of information and less frequently to allocentric sources of 
information when grasping the shaft than when estimating the shaft’s length. 
Nevertheless, a substantial part of viewing time during grasping was directed at 
the endpoints of the shaft and the surrounding arrowheads, albeit that the 
symmetry index indicated that participants had a preference for one of two 
endpoints. Presumably, the participants gaze at the location where they plan to 
first contact the shaft with the finger (de Grave, Hesse, Brouwer, & Franz, 2008; 
Honda, 1982).  
 
In conclusion, our study supports the contention that the dorsal and ventral 
systems’ contributions in action and perception are evident during the process of 
information pick up. In other words, the distinct demands that action and 
perception pose on the two visual systems become apparent before visual 
information is further processed by the dorsal or ventral streams. The gaze 
differences manifest themselves most clearly during actual task execution (i.e., 
after movement onset). That the gaze patterns during action and perception were 
comparable during task preparation (i.e., before movement onset) is consistent 
with recent interpretations that the ventral system not only contributes to 
perception, but also impinges on action preparation (i.e., selecting an appropriate 
mode of action) (Glover, 2004; Goodale & Milner, 1992, 2004; Milner & 
Goodale, 2008; van Doorn et al., 2007).  
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Our results are consistent with studies that demonstrate that the magnitude of  
the illusory bias in perception is reduced when participants are instructed to 
direct attention to the shaft and ignore the arrowheads of Müller-Lyer illusion 
rather than allowing them unrestricted viewing (e.g., Coren & Girgus, 1972; 
Predebon, 2004, 2006). Although these studies did not monitor gaze, Predebon 
(2004) argued that the reduced illusion might thus have resulted from the 
artificially induced differences in gaze. Our finding that the location of the point 
of gaze is associated with the magnitude of the illusion under unrestricted 
viewing in perception and action tasks provides even stronger evidence for the 
role of gaze in invoking the illusion.  
 
Also others have claimed that the differential effects of illusions on action and 
perception are due to gaze (or distribution of attention) (e.g., Bruno, 2001; Franz 
et al., 2000; Pavani, Boscagli, Benvenuti, Rabuffetti, & Farne, 1999). However, 
those claims deviate from ours as far as it concerns the causes of the disparate 
gaze patterns. Franz et al. (2000), for example, noted that in the typical 
perceptual judgment task the two complementary illusory configurations are 
compared, whereas in the action task attention is only directed to one of the two 
configurations. Consequently, the differential illusion effects for perception and 
action would be an experimental artifact. Perception but not action tasks require 
participants to look at both configurations (Bruno, 2001; Pavani et al., 1999). In 
other words, perception requires attention to be distributed across the two 
configurations, whereas during action attention is directed to a single 
configuration only. The distinct gaze patterns for action and perception that were 
observed in the present study can not be attributed to such experimental 
artifacts. We used a single, identical illusion configuration in the action and 
perception tasks. Hence, we demonstrate that the differences in gaze for action 
and perception should be attributed to a different distribution of attention within 
a single configuration, rather than to a different distribution of attention between 
configurations (cf. Franz et al., 2000). The disparate gaze patterns thus reflect 
the differential use of egocentric and allocentric sources of information 
demanded by perception and action (see also Dewar & Carey, 2006). 
 
In sum, our results indicate that the distinction between action and perception is 
not restricted to differences in the nature of processing by the dorsal and ventral 
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streams. The distinction presents itself before processing occurs in the two 
streams. The functional demands of action and perception thus impose different 
constraints on the detection of information. Such task-specificity of gaze is not a 
new finding, and concurs with work that shows that task-specificity of gaze for 
perceptual judgment tasks and (natural) actions of various levels of complexity. 
Moreover, this task-specificity not only exists across tasks, but is also evidenced 
by a tight temporal coupling between gaze and the unfolding of a task (e.g., 
Land, 2006; Rothkopf et al., 2007; Yarbus, 1967). The present study adds to this 
body of work by showing a similar task-specificity within an identical stimulus 
environment. Our findings also hint at a task-specific evolution of gaze over 
regions that contain allocentric and egocentric sources information, but we need 
a more fine-grained analysis of gaze to provide a full-fledged portrayal of how 
information pick up unfolds in real-time. 
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Introduction 
The present thesis was set out to gain further insight in the roles of visual 
information in movement control (i.e., vision for action) and perception (i.e., 
vision for perception) and how they complement each other in the course of an 
action. The point of departure for the studies presented in this thesis was 
Goodale and Milner’s (1992) parallel view of action and perception. These 
authors argued that two separate, neuro-anatomically and functionally visual 
systems exist that mediate the exploitation of visual information for perception 
and action. The dorsal visual stream, which projects to the posterior parietal 
cortex, supports the online visual control of movement (i.e., vision for action), 
coding objects in relation to the actor in absolute metrics, as egocentric 
information. The ventral visual stream, which projects to the inferotemporal 
cortex, is involved in the visual perception of the world around us (i.e., vision 
for perception), coding objects and their properties in relation to other objects in 
relative metrics, as allocentric information. Chapters 2 and 3 addressed the 
explanatory value of this parallel view of action and perception and contrasted it 
with serial views, in which vision is used to create a general perceptual 
representation that in turn is used to guide action. The results were found to be 
more consistent with Milner and Goodale’s parallel view of action and 
perception, and hence, the remaining Chapters investigated how vision for 
action and vision for perception work together in order to produce purposive 
behavior, an issue which had not received much scrutiny. Chapters 4 and 5 
further delineated vision for perception contributions in the course of action. 
Another issue that has been relatively overlooked, since Goodale and Milner’s 
proposal, is that the functional demands of movement control and perception 
also impose different constraints on information detection. The final 
experimental chapter (Chapter 6) therefore investigated how information 
detection for action and perception differs. As an epilogue to the thesis, this 
Chapter provides a concise summary of the main findings of the reported 
studies, followed by the general conclusions.  
 
Summary of the main findings 
Chapter 2 addressed whether participants who intend to intercept a moving 
object that is temporally occluded from view continue to ‘track’ the object or 
make a predictive gaze shift to the location where the object is intercepted. 
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Participants were presented with moving objects that approached from the right 
side in the frontoparallel plane. In one condition, the object was visible 
throughout its trajectory, whereas in the second condition the object was made 
invisible for the final part of its trajectory. The participants caught the object 
when it passed in front of them. Participants directed their gaze to the moving 
bar in both viewing conditions, which was indicated by tight coupling of gaze to 
the moving bar and a low number of gaze shifts in the direction of the 
interception point, even when the object was occluded. In other words, 
participants ‘tracked’ the object throughout its entire trajectory also when the 
object was occluded from view. A remarkable finding was that, unlike in 
perceptual motion prediction studies, participants acted as if they underestimated 
the time the bar would arrive at the point of interception when occluded. It was 
argued that this discrepancy may be accounted for by the differential 
involvement of vision for action and vision for perception.  
 
Chapter 3 therefore made a more direct comparison between the role of visual 
information in action and perception. It explicitly compared the views that 
action and perception are dissociated (parallel view) or that perception enslaves 
action (serial view). This was done by assessing whether systematic distortions 
in perceptual judgments lead to similar inaccuracies in catching. In the 
perception experiment, participants manually aligned the orientation of a bar to 
the orientation of a reference bar placed at different distances in the 
frontoparallel plane. In the action experiment participants caught differently 
oriented moving bars, which either remained visible during the entire trajectory 
or were occluded 0.5 m before the interception point. The perception experiment 
showed systematic orientation errors, in particular for the oblique bar 
orientations. These errors increased in magnitude with an increase in the 
distance of the reference bar. The action experiment also revealed orientation 
errors. However, these orientations were different from those found in the 
perception experiment. These findings were interpreted to be more in line with 
the view that vision for perception and action are dissociated rather than that 
perception enslaves action.  
 
The study presented in Chapter 4 examined the contribution of vision for 
perception in action. To this end, the influence of allocentric sources of 
information on the components that constitute an action (i.e., the selection of an 
Epilogue 
146 
appropriate mode of action, and the pre-planning and online control of 
movement kinematics) were assessed. The assumption was that the use of 
allocentric sources of information point toward contributions of vision for 
perception. Participants grasped and made perceptual estimates of the length of 
shafts that were embedded in a Müller-Lyer configuration. Depending on the 
length of the shaft, participants had to select either a one- or two-handed 
response. It was found that the Müller-Lyer configuration affected the choice 
between using one- or two-handed responses when grasping the shaft to a 
similar degree as the perceptual estimates, thereby indicating the involvement of 
vision for perception in the selection of an appropriate mode of action. In 
contrast, the Müller-Lyer configurations had only a minor effect on movement 
kinematics during grasping, suggesting the use of egocentric information 
mediated by vision for action. It was concluded that the division of labor 
between vision for action and vision for perception is not absolute; vision for 
perception contributes to the selection of an action mode.  
 
Chapter 5 demonstrated a further role of vision for perception in action. The 
study addressed the role of vision for perception in determining the location of a 
target in a far-aiming task. In the same vein as in Chapter 4, the use of 
allocentric information was assessed in a task in which participants slid a disk 
toward a distant target embedded in Judd configurations. A clear illusory bias in 
sliding was observed, which was of similar magnitude as the bias in the 
perception of target location. This indicated the use of allocentric information in 
determining target location in far-aiming. It was argued that vision for 
perception sets the boundary constraints for action and that within these 
constraints vision for action autonomously controls movement execution. 
 
Finally, Chapter 6 sought to obtain insight in whether the functional demands of 
vision for perception and vision for action impose different constraints on 
information detection in addition to the traditionally emphasized differences in 
the processing of information. Participants grasped and made perceptual 
estimates of shafts of various lengths that were embedded in a Müller-Lyer 
illusion (i.e., as in Chapter 4). The participants’ gaze patterns were measured to 
investigate task-specific differences in information detection. The illusion 
significantly affected the manual estimates but not the hand aperture during 
grasping. In line with these behavioral findings, significant differences in gaze 
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patterns were revealed between the two tasks. Participants spent more time 
looking at areas that contain egocentric information when grasping as compared 
to making a manual length estimate. In addition, participants made more gaze 
shifts when making the manual length estimate, enabling the pick-up of 
allocentric information. These results support the contention that the functional 
distinction between the dorsal and ventral systems is not limited to the 
processing of information but also encompasses the detection of information. 
 
Concluding remarks 
This thesis investigated the relationship between vision for action and vision for 
perception and how they complement each other in the course of an action. The 
results of the present thesis favored a parallel view of action and perception (i.e., 
a functional dissociation between vision for perception and vision for action) as 
proposed by Goodale and Milner (1992). Importantly, however, the thesis 
further delineates and extends this parallel view. It demonstrates 1) how vision 
for perception and vision for action interact in the course of action, and 2) that 
the functional distinction also encompasses information detection. These further 
specifications to Goodale and Milner’s model are illustrated in Figure 7.1 (cf. 
Figures 1.1 and 1.2).  
 
 
Figure 7.1. Parallel view of perception and action. Arrows indicate studied 
relationships between perception, action and information. See text for further 
explanation. 
Information 
 
Information 
Perception 
Action 
Functional constraints on information detection (Ch. 6) 
Functional constraints on information detection (Ch. 6) 
Ch. 3 
 
Action mode selection (Ch. 4 & 6) 
Target location identification  
                 (Ch. 5) 
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First, the thesis provides evidence of vision for perception contributions in the 
course of action. It demonstrates contributions of vision for perception in action 
mode selection and the identification of the location of a target (see downward 
arrow between perception and action in Figure 7.1). It also appeared that the role 
of vision for perception in the control of movement was marginal at best. In 
sum, it is concluded that vision for perception and vision for action serve distinct 
yet complementary functions in the course of action. This interaction was 
interpreted as vision for perception setting the boundary constraints for action, 
rather than prescribing the movement kinematics. Within the constraints set by 
vision for perception, vision for action autonomously controls movement 
execution. Yet, future research is necessary to substantiate these conjectures.  
 
Second, the thesis provides evidence that the functional distinction between 
vision for perception and vision for action is not restricted to the processing or 
encoding of visual information in different frames of references, but that it also 
comprises the process of information detection (see the dashed lines between 
perception, action and information in Figure 7.1). One important issue for 
further consideration is whether these constraints on information detection can 
be linked in more detail with the complementary roles of vision for perception 
and vision for action in the course of action. In addition, it would be important 
to further scrutinize to what degree gaze behavior actually determines the 
information used. For instance, would movement control become more 
susceptible to illusion when participants are forced to gaze toward allocentric 
sources of information? 
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Visuele informatie voor perceptie in bewegingshandelingen 
 
Het algemene doel van het in dit proefschrift gepresenteerde onderzoek was om 
verder inzicht te krijgen in de rol van visuele informatie in bewegingscontrole 
(kortweg actie genoemd) en perceptie en hoe perceptie en actie elkaar aanvullen 
tijdens bewegen. 
In Hoofdstuk 1 werd het theoretisch kader van het onderzoek geschetst. 
Het vertrekpunt voor de in dit proefschrift gepresenteerde onderzoeken was 
Goodale en Milner’s parallelle model van het gebruik van visuele informatie in 
actie en perceptie. Deze auteurs stellen dat er anatomisch en functioneel twee 
gescheiden, parallelle visuele systemen kunnen worden onderscheiden die 
exploitatie van visuele informatie voor perceptie en actie mediëren. Tot de 
primaire visuele cortex is de verwerking van visuele informatie hetzelfde, maar 
daarna kan een onderscheid gemaakt worden tussen het ventrale en het dorsale 
visuele systeem. Het ventrale visuele systeem, dat projecties vanuit de primaire 
visuele cortex naar de inferotemporale cortex bevat, is gespecialiseerd in de 
(bewuste) waarneming van gebeurtenissen en voorwerpen in de omgeving 
(perceptie),  waarbij voorwerpen en hun eigenschappen gecodeerd worden ten 
opzichte van andere voorwerpen in een relatieve metriek, als allocentrische 
informatie. Het dorsale visuele systeem, dat projecties van de primaire visuele 
cortex naar de posterieure pariëtale cortex bevat, is gespecialiseerd in de 
(onbewuste) visuele controle van bewegingen in de omgeving (actie), waarbij 
voorwerpen ten opzichte van de actor in een absolute metriek gecodeerd 
worden, als egocentrische informatie. 
In de Hoofdstukken 2 en 3 werd de verklarende waarde van 
bovengenoemd parallelle model voor perceptie en actie geëvalueerd en 
vergeleken met seriële modellen waarin één algemene perceptuele representatie 
wordt gemaakt die vervolgens gebruikt wordt om bewegingen te sturen. De 
gevonden resultaten waren consistenter met Milner en Goodale’s parallelle 
model van actie en perceptie. In de na volgende hoofdstukken werd daarom 
onderzocht hoe perceptie en actie samenwerken om te komen tot een 
doelgerichte bewegingshandeling, een onderwerp dat in de literatuur tot nu toe 
onderbelicht is gebleven. In de Hoofdstukken 4 en 5 werd de rol van visuele 
informatie voor perceptie tijdens de uitvoering van bewegingshandelingen, 
waarbij niet alleen gedoeld wordt op bewegingscontrole (d.w.z. actie), maar ook 
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op bijvoorbeeld het selecteren van een geschikte handelwijze, bestudeerd. Een 
ander onderwerp dat tot nu toe relatief onderbelicht is gebleven sinds Goodale 
en Milner hun model voorstelden, is dat de functionele vereisten van perceptie 
en bewegingscontrole (actie) verschillende beperkingen opleggen aan de 
informatiedetectie. Daarom werd in het laatste experimentele hoofdstuk 
onderzocht of, en zo ja hoe, informatiedetectie voor perceptie en actie verschilt. 
De inhoud van deze hoofdstukken laat zich in meer detail als volgt samenvatten. 
 
In Hoofdstuk 2 werd de studie beschreven waarin werd onderzocht of mensen 
die een voorwerp proberen te onderscheppen dat tijdelijk niet zichtbaar is dit 
doen door het ‘denkbeeldige’ voorwerp te blijven volgen met hun ogen of dat zij 
snelle, predictieve veranderingen van blikrichting maken naar de locatie waar 
het voorwerp onderschept moet worden. Hiertoe kregen deelnemers bewegende 
voorwerpen gepresenteerd die vanaf rechts in het frontoparallelle vlak naar hen 
toe bewogen. In de ene conditie was het voorwerp continu zichtbaar, terwijl in 
de tweede conditie het voorwerp tijdens het laatste stuk van het bewegingstraject 
onzichtbaar was. De deelnemers vingen het voorwerp wanneer deze voor hen 
langs bewoog. In beide condities volgden de deelnemers met hun ogen het 
voorwerp hetgeen aangeeft dat de blikrichting nauw gekoppeld was aan de 
beweging van het voorwerp. Dit was zelfs het geval wanneer het voorwerp niet 
zichtbaar was. Er traden weinig snelle veranderingen in blikrichting in de 
richting van het voorgeschreven interceptiepunt op. Met andere woorden, 
deelnemers volgden het voorwerp met hun ogen tijdens het gehele 
bewegingstraject, ook wanneer het voorwerp onzichtbaar was. Een opvallende 
bevinding was dat, in tegenstelling tot perceptuele bewegingsinschattingsstudies 
(‘motion prediction’), deelnemers handelden alsof ze het moment dat het 
voorwerp het interceptiepunt zou passeren onderschatten wanneer de staaf 
onzichtbaar was. Gesuggereerd wordt dat deze discrepantie verklaard zou 
kunnen worden door de verschillende mate van betrokkenheid van actie en 
perceptie. 
In Hoofdstuk 3 werd daarom een directere vergelijking gemaakt tussen 
actie en perceptie. De gezichtspunten dat het gebruik van visuele informatie in 
actie en in perceptie gescheiden zijn (parallelle model) of dat actie de slaaf is 
van perceptie (seriële model) werden expliciet vergeleken. Dit werd gedaan door 
te onderzoeken of systematische fouten die gemaakt worden tijdens perceptuele 
inschattingen ook leiden tot vergelijkbare fouten tijdens vangen. In het 
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perceptie-experiment werd deelnemers gevraagd om manueel de oriëntatie van 
een staaf in dezelfde oriëntatie te zetten als de oriëntatie van een referentiestaaf 
die op verschillende afstanden in het frontoparallelle vlak was geplaatst. In het 
actie-experiment moesten deelnemers staven vangen met verschillende 
oriëntaties die in het frontoparallelle vlak naar hen toe bewogen. De staven 
konden of het gehele bewegingstraject zichtbaar blijven, of een halve meter voor 
het interceptiepunt onzichtbaar worden. Het perceptie-experiment liet zien dat er 
systematische oriëntatiefouten gemaakt werden, voornamelijk voor de schuine 
oriëntaties. Deze fouten werden groter naarmate de afstand van de 
referentiestaaf toenam. In het actie-experiment (vangen) werden ook 
systematische fouten gevonden, maar deze fouten waren verschillend van die in 
het perceptie-experiment. Deze resultaten zijn meer in overeenstemming met het 
parallelle model waar in het gebruik van visuele informatie in actie en in 
perceptie gescheiden zijn dan met het seriële model dat aangeeft dat perceptie 
voorgaat aan actie. 
Met het in Hoofdstuk 4 gepresenteerde experiment werd de 
betrokkenheid van perceptie in bewegingshandelingen onderzocht. Hiertoe werd 
de invloed van allocentrische informatiebronnen op de verschillende 
componenten waaruit een bewegingshandeling bestaat (de selectie van een 
adequate handelwijze (bijvoorbeeld een één- of tweehandig grijppatroon) en het 
vooruitplannen en onmiddellijke controle van de beweging) bekeken. Er werd 
aangenomen dat het gebruik van allocentrische informatiebronnen wijst op 
betrokkenheid van het gebruik van visuele informatie in perceptie en dat het 
gebruik van egocentrische informatie wijst op betrokkenheid van visuele 
informatie in actie. Deelnemers pakten en maakten een perceptuele schatting 
van de lengte van een staaf die ingebed was in een Müller-Lyer-configuratie. 
Afhankelijk van de lengte van de staaf moesten deelnemers een één- of 
tweehandige respons kiezen. Er werd gevonden dat de Müller-Lyer-configuratie 
effect had op de keuze voor een één- of tweehandige respons. Dit gold zowel 
voor pakken als voor perceptuele inschattingen. Dit onderstreept de 
betrokkenheid van perceptie bij de selectie voor een adequate handelwijze. In 
tegenstelling tot de selectie van een handelwijze, had de Müller-Lyer-
configuratie slechts een klein effect op de bewegingskinematica tijdens het 
pakken. Dit wijst op het gebruik van egocentrische informatiebronnen tijdens 
actie. Geconcludeerd wordt dat scheiding tussen het gebruik visuele informatie 
in perceptie en in actie niet absoluut is maar dat het gebruik van visuele 
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informatie in perceptie bijdraagt aan een bewegingshandeling door de selectie 
van een geschikte handelwijze. 
Hoofdstuk 5 liet nog een andere rol van het gebruik van visuele 
informatie in perceptie bij bewegingshandelingen zien. In de in dit hoofdstuk 
beschreven studie werd de rol van perceptie in het bepalen van de locatie van het 
doel in een miktaak naar doelen op afstand onderzocht. Op een gelijksoortige 
wijze als in Hoofdstuk 4 werd het gebruik van allocentrische informatie 
geëvalueerd in een taak waarin deelnemers een steen naar een doel sjoelden dat 
was ingebed in Judd-configuraties. Er werd een significant illusie-effect 
gevonden, dat in dezelfde orde van grootte was als het illusie-effect in de 
perceptie van doellocatie. Beargumenteerd wordt dat het gebruik van visuele 
informatie in perceptie de grenzen stelt waarbinnen het gebruik van visuele 
informatie in actie autonoom de bewegingsuitvoering controleert. 
In Hoofdstuk 6 is getracht om inzicht te krijgen in de vraag of de 
functionele vereisten van het gebruik van visuele informatie in perceptie en in 
actie, naast de traditioneel benadrukte verschillen in de verwerking van visuele 
informatie, verschillende randvoorwaarden stellen aan de wijze van 
informatiedetectie. Deelnemers pakten en maakten een perceptuele schatting van 
de lengte van een staaf die was ingebed in een Müller-Lyer-configuratie (net 
zoals in Hoofdstuk 4). De blikrichting van de deelnemers werd gemeten om 
taakspecifieke verschillen in informatiedetectie te onderzoeken. De Müller-
Lyer-configuratie had een significant effect op de perceptuele schatting maar 
niet op de handopening tijdens pakken. In overeenstemming hiermee werden 
significante verschillen in blikrichting tussen actie- en perceptietaken gevonden. 
Deelnemers keken langer naar gebieden met egocentrische informatie tijdens 
pakken dan tijdens het maken van een perceptuele lengte-inschatting. Daarnaast 
lieten de deelnemers ook meer snelle veranderingen in blikrichting zien tijdens 
het doen van een perceptuele lengte-inschatting. Dit laatste maakt het oppikken 
van allocentrische informatie mogelijk. De resultaten ondersteunen de gedachte 
dat de functionele dissociatie tussen het gebruik van visuele informatie in actie 
en in perceptie niet beperkt is tot het verwerken van visuele informatie, maar 
ook de detectie van informatie omvat. 
In de epiloog, Hoofdstuk 7, worden de belangrijkste resultaten kort 
samengevat en geïnterpreteerd in termen van het in Hoofdstuk 1 gepresenteerde 
theoretisch kader. De resultaten van de in dit proefschrift gepresenteerde 
experimenten waren in overeenstemming met het parallelle model van het 
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gebruik van visuele informatie in perceptie en het gebruik van visuele informatie 
in actie zoals voorgesteld door Milner en Goodale. Dit proefschrift verdiept en 
verbreedt Milner en Goodale’s parallelle model van actie en perceptie. Het toont 
1) hoe het gebruik van visuele informatie in perceptie en in actie interacteren 
tijdens bewegingshandelingen en 2) dat de functionele dissociatie van het 
gebruik van visuele informatie in actie en in perceptie, naast 
informatieverwerking, ook het oppikken van visuele informatie omvat. 
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Het mag een m&m-tje meer zijn 
 
Tja, John…was de vermelding van mijn naam in jouw proefschrift nog een zak 
m&m’s waard (die door mij geleverd moest worden), een feit is dat jij heel wat 
meer waard bent voor mij. Ik ben bij jou op je werkkamertje begonnen met de 
eerste ideeën voor dit proefschrift. Samen met mijn fiets en al mijn vieze spullen 
heb ik het daar goed naar mijn zin gehad. Je bent altijd een hele prettige 
discussiepartner geweest op de gebieden die ons beiden interesseren. Door jou 
heb ik Carianne, Sofie en Marijke leren kennen waarmee ik een erg leuke tijd in 
Hong Kong heb gehad en waar mijn proefschrift verder vorm kreeg. Jullie 
hebben me laten zien dat het leven met twee kleine kinderen toch wel erg 
gezellig kan zijn. Je hebt me heel wat in de wetenschap geleerd en je ‘Chinese’ 
houding ten opzichte van de bewegingswetenschappen staat me wel aan en dat 
laat zich mooi met het volgende vergelijken: Chinezen gebruiken het 
‘elektrische’ brein als metafoor voor de computer, terwijl westerlingen de 
computer juist als metafoor voor het brein gebruiken. Ik weet niet of 
onderstaande observatie iets met het bovenstaande te maken heeft, maar voor je 
tijd in Hong Kong keek je nooit naar lichaamsgewicht en snapte je überhaupt 
niet dat mensen naar hun gewicht keken, maar aldaar veranderde je in een 
strakke weight-watcher die zijn gewicht onder de 80 kg wil houden. Ik heb veel 
aan je gehad, en het fijnst vond ik dat je altijd je vertrouwen in de kwaliteit van 
mijn werk en het afronden van mijn proefschrift hebt blijven houden, ook al is 
het op mijn eigen manier en tempo gegaan… 
Een goed begeleiders duo bestaat uit een team met verschillende 
kwaliteiten die elkaar aanvullen. En dat heb ik gehad. John op inhoudelijk 
gebied, en Geert als strateeg. Geert, de wijze waarop jij communiceert lijkt 
misschien veel op die van mij. Dat pakte niet altijd even goed uit, hetgeen ik 
jammer blijf vinden. Je hebt me veel vrijheid gegeven en mij altijd de kans 
gegeven om door te gaan. Je hebt een neus voor timing: je weet altijd op de 
juiste tijd op de juiste plaats te zijn, zoals in Gent (we hadden zelfs geen 
tegenslagen tijdens onze reis, een onderdeel waarop je toch de nodige reputatie 
hebt opgebouwd). Bedankt voor jouw aandeel in de begeleiding. 
Simon Bennett, we met when I helped you as a student assistant with a 
few experiments, since then we always had nice discussions about our work.and 
cycling. 
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Rich, we haven’t worked together that much, but we do have a publication 
together. I liked the way in which you were ‘running’ the research group in 
Hong Kong: you are the ‘big dad’ of a family in which every body feels 
welcome. 
Matthieu, leuk dat jij met echt fundamentele wetenschapsvragen naar mij 
en John kwam. Aanvankelijk ging het over ecologische versus cognitieve 
psychologie, uiteindelijk zijn deze vraagstukken mooi gegoten in een jasje van 
Müller-Lyer en Milner & Goodale. Grappig om te zien dat je voor een deel net 
zo’n chaotische werkwijze hebt als ik. Je bent een bron van ideeën en ik heb het 
altijd erg leuk gevonden om samen met je te filosoferen en te kunnen genieten 
van je scherpe blik. Hoofdstuk 6 is een mooi resultaat van het samenwerken met 
jou! 
Marjolein en Melvyn, wat leuk dat jullie mij als paranimfen willen 
ondersteunen. Marjolein samen met jou ben ik eigenlijk de wetenschap ingerold. 
Tijdens de studie deden we veel samen. Dit resulteerde aan het einde van onze 
stage in een posterprijs. We vulden elkaar vanaf het begin goed aan in de 
eindeloze discussies die vanuit ons perfectionisme tot stand kwamen. In de 
gesprekken ben je altijd een goede sparring-partner voor me. Daarom kan het 
natuurlijk niet anders dan dat je nu ook mijn paranimf bent. Je komt er zelfs 
speciaal voor uit Amerika gevlogen… 
Melvyn, de tweede helft en einde van mijn promotietraject (dus ongeveer 
tijdens jouw hele promotie traject -verschil moet er zijn-) ben ik steeds meer met 
je opgetrokken. Beetje filosoferen over de wetenschap, slap praten in mijn vele 
koffie pauzes of ’s avonds bij het weggaan. Bedankt voor alle hulp bij het 
drukklaar maken van dit drukwerk. 
Brenda, met jou heb ik eigenlijk altijd een speciale band gehad bij de 
FBW sinds ik daar als student binnen kwam. Je directheid en het zeggen waar 
het op staat heeft me altijd erg aangesproken. Graag kwam ik bij je langs om 
even te kletsen (meestal over niets belangrijks) of om een balletje met je te 
slaan.  
De oerwoud kamer. Op deze kamer heb ik mijn tijd met veel mensen 
doorgebracht, in het begin waren dat Arenda en Rob, daarna volgden Tjeerd en 
Martijn. Tjeerd bedankt voor onze avonturen in de wereld van de planten, of 
waren deze planten slechts een dekmantel voor onze handel op de beurs? 
Martijn bedankt voor het feit dat je onze horizon nog kwam verbreden door ook 
fauna aan onze belevingswereld toe te voegen en natuurlijk voor het feit dat ik 
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mijn nadagen nog bij jou op de kamer heb mogen slijten. ‘Bad vibes’ waren er 
ook onze kamer, waardoor wij (Tjeerd, Martijn en ik) de nodige computer 
malheur hebben gehad, of waren het de kakkerlakken zoals Andreas beweerde. 
Wij hebben nog geprobeerd om ze bij Andreas in zijn maag te splitsen door een 
van de lokdozen met de grootste exemplaren in Tjeerd’s computer te stoppen die 
hij na jouw vertrek waarschijnlijk toch wel zou hergebruiken. Waarschijnlijk 
rook hij al onraad want de computer heeft hij doorgespeeld naar een van jouw 
opvolgers. De betreffende opvolger heeft inmiddels de doos aangetroffen. 
Zo verdienen nog vele FBW-ers een dankboodschap, maar die zal ik hen 
persoonlijk doen toekomen zodat mijn dankwoord op 3 pagina’s past. Iedereen 
bedankt voor de ‘open-kamer-cultuur’, voor alle borrels, AIO-weekenden, 
etentjes, en sportactiviteiten. 
 
Tot slot nog een paar mensen van ‘buiten’ de FBW-muren. FBW-ers van het 
eerste uur: Albert, Floor, Heleen, Marike, en Marjolein (later kwamen daar 
natuurlijk ook Bob, Andy, en Andrea bij). Hulde aan de oetlamp, de reuze mus 
en natuurlijk de spelletjes en de vakanties. Verder nog een woord voor Emil: 
fiets! 
Als laatste natuurlijk degenen zonder wie dit proefschrift er helemaal niet 
was geweest. Mams en paps: bedankt voor de onvoorwaardelijke steun en 
interesse in het doen en laten van jullie zoon (toch handig zo als enig kind, dan 
kan de aandacht natuurlijk ook niet ergens anders naar toe). En alle vrijheid die 
jullie me daar altijd bij hebben gegeven. Bij deze categorie horen tegenwoordig 
natuurlijk ook Marja en Rudy, een stel waarbij ik me altijd welkom voel. 
 Susan, samen met jou hoop ik nog vele ontdekkingstochten te maken. Ik 
ga niet proberen je te bedanken met woorden.  
 
Een dikke zoen voor Koen! 
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